during the recess after the expiration of a Congress." "24 So far as we are advised the select committee having this investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has it been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and, if continued or revived, will have all its original powers.25 This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the

Appeal-when question moot.

case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 514516, 55 L. ed. 310, 315, 316, 31 Sup. 24 Vol. 4, § 4545.

Ct. Rep. 279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as was done in the case cited.

What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness from custody be reversed.

Mr. Justice Stone did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.

254 Hinds, Precedents, §§ 4396, 4400, 4404, 4405.

In the comparatively few cases wherein the question has been raised, it has been consistently held that either branch of the legislative body, or one of its committees, has the power to summon persons who are not members to attend as witnesses any meeting which it has the power to hold, and, if the person so summoned wilfully fails to appear, he may be punished for contempt. Re Gunn (1893) 50 Kan. 155, 19 L.R.A. 519, 32 Pac. 470, 948; Burnham v. Morrissey (1859) 14 Gray (Mass.) 226, 74 Am. Dec. 676; State v. Brewster (1916) 89 N. J. L. 658, 99 Atl. 338, reversing (1916) 88 N. J. L. 551, 97 Atl. 60; Wickelhausen v. Willett (1860) 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 164, affirmed in (1861) 12 Abb. Pr. 319, which is affirmed in (1864) 1 Keyes, 521, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 596; People ex rel. Mc

Donald v. Keeler (1885) 99 N. Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N. E. 615; Re Falvey (1858) 7 Wis. 630; Ex parte Dansereau (1875) 19 Lower Can. Jur. 210. See also Ex parte Dalton (1886) 44 Ohio St. 142, 58 Am. Rep. 800, 5 N. E. 136; Re Barnes (1912) 204 N. Y. 108, 97 N. E. 508, affirming (1911) 147 App. Div. 396, 74 Misc. 170, 132 N. Y. Supp. 908. And see the reported case (MCGRAIN V. DAUGHERTY, ante, 1).

In Burnham v. Morrissey (1859) 14 Gray (Mass.) 226, 74 Am. Dec. 676, the court said: "The house of representatives has many duties to perform which necessarily require it to receive evidence, and examine witnesses... It has often occasion to acquire a certain knowledge of facts, in order to the proper performance of legislative duties. We therefore think it clear that it has the constitutional

right to take evidence, to summon witnesses, and to compel them to attend and to testify. This power to summon and examine witnesses it may exereise by means of committees. If a witness, duly notified or summoned by the authority of the house, to attend before a committee, or before the house, refuses to attend, or, when present and required to testify, or to do any other act which a witness may be lawfully required to do, refuses to obey the lawful commands of the house in that behalf, it is a contempt of the authority of the house; and, upon such refusal to attend, or if such refusal to testify occur before a committee, the house may compel his obedience by arresting him by the proper officer of the house, and bringing him before the house."

In Wickelhausen v. Willett (1860) 10 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 164, affirmed in (1861) 12 Abb. Pr. 319, which is affirmed in (1864) 1 Keyes, 521, 4 Abb. App. Dec. 596, the court held that it was within the power of the United States House of Representatives to require the attendance of witnesses when necessary, and in the case of refusal to attend to take them into custody. It was said: "That the power exists, there admits of no doubt whatever. It is a necessary incident to the sovereign power of making laws; and its exercise is often indispensable to the great end of enlightened, judicious, and wholesome legislation. The power is rather judicial in its nature, but in a legislative body exists as an auxiliary to the legislative power only. In the earlier history of the country, from which our institutions both of law and legislation are principally derived, judicial and legislative functions existed in and were exercised by the same body. And when they were afterward separated, and each came to be exercised by a separate tribunal or body, the legislative body necessarily retained a sufficient amount of the judicial power to enable it to investigate fully and to comprehend thoroughly, any and every subject upon which the body proposed to act in its legislative capacity. This included the power to subpoena

witnesses to give evidence, to compel them to attend and testify, and to punish for disobedience and contempt in refusing to attend, or in refusing to testify upon attendance. The power to punish for disobedience and contempt is a necessary incident to the power to require and compel attendance."

In State v. Brewster (1916) 89 N. J. L. 658, 99 Atl. 338, reversing (1916) 88 N. J. L. 551, 97 Atl. 60, wherein it appeared that the defendants were subpoenaed to be present as witnesses at an investigation conducted by a legislative committee and refused to attend, they were convicted under a statute making the wilful refusal to attend, when ordered to come before a legislative committee as a witness, a misdemeanor.

And see Ex parte Dansereau (1875) 19 Lower Can. Jur. 210, wherein it was held that the legislative assembly of the province of Quebec had the power to compel the attendance of witnesses before it, and might order a witness to be taken into custody if he refused to attend when summoned.

In Carfer v. Caldwell (1906) 200 U. S. 293, 50 L. ed. 488, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264, reversing (1905; C. C.) 138 Fed. 487, it appeared that the appellant had been arrested for failure to attend an investigation conducted by a committee of the West Virginia house of delegates, at which he had been ordered to be present as a witness. It was held that the Federal courts had no jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to determine the validity of the arrest, because no Federal question was involved. However, in Ex parte Caldwell (1906) 61 W. Va. 40, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 172, 55 S. E. 910, 11 Ann. Cas. 646, it was held that the arrest for failure to attend the investigation had not been warranted because the committee had exceeded its powers in attempting to hold such investigation after the close of the session of the legislature. See to the same effect, Ex parte Blizzard (1906) 61 W. Va. 56, 55 S. E. 913.

In Sanborn v. Carleton (1860) 15 Gray (Mass.) 399, it was held that a deputy of the sergeant at arms of the United States Senate could not arrest

Bank, Tex. Civ. App. 141 S. W. 334; Kerfoot v. State Bank, 14 Okla. 104, 77 Pac. 46.

Messrs. Durham & Lowey, for respondents:

A chattel mortgage properly executed and legally recorded in the state where the property is situated will be enforced by the courts of another state into which the property is removed afterwards by the mortgagor.

Foster v. McAlester, 52 C. C. A. 107, 114 Fed. 147; Re Brannock (D. C.) 131 Fed. 819; Johnson v. Hughes, 89 Ala. 588, 8 So. 147; Teat v. Chapman, 1 Ala. App. 491, 56 So. 267; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Chicago & M. L. S. R. Co. 1 Ill. App. 399; Rosenbaum v. Dawes, 77 Ill. App. 295, affirmed in 179 Ill. 112, 53 N. E. 585; Bridges v. Barrett, 126 Ill. App. 122; Aultman & T. Machinery Co. v. Kennedy, 114 Iowa, 444, 89 Am. St. Rep. 373, 87 N. W. 435; Rhode Island Cent. Bank v. Danforth, 14 Gray, 123; Roach v. St. Louis Type Foundry, 21 Mo. App. 118; Brown v. Koenig, 99 Mo. App. 653, 74 S. W. 407; Cushman v. Luther, 53 N. H. 562; Anderson v. Doak, 32 N. C. (10 Ired. L.) 295; Wilson v. Rustad, 7 N. D. 330, 66 Am. St. Rep. 649, 75 N. W. 260; Henderson v. Thayer, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 115; Kerfoot v. State Bank, 14 Okla. 104, 77 Pac. 46; Casner v. Haskins, 64 Or. 254, 128 Pac. 841, affirmed on rehearing in 64 Or. 282, 130 Pac. 55; Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. W. 490; Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 64 L.R.A. 353, 105 Am. St. Rep. 951, 79 S. W. 796; Norris v. Sowles, 57 Vt. 360; Jones v. North Pacific Fish & Oil Co. 42 Wash. 332, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 490, 114 Am. St. Rep. 131, 84 Pac. 1122; Yund v. First Nat. Bank, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6; Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Mau, 13 Wyo. 358, 110 Am. St. Rep. 1001, 80 Pac. 151; Bonin v. Robertson, 2 Terr. L. R. 21; Gosline v. Dunbar, 32 N. B. 325.

Blume, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears, from a stipulation of facts herein, that on January 30, 1923, one J. C. Adams purchased from the Wroten-Hundley Motor Company, a Texas corporation, one of the plaintiffs below, one certain Dodge automobile. Adams paid some cash and on the same day executed a chattel mortgage to the Union Securities Company, another

Texas corporation, one of the plaintiffs below, to secure a note, executed on the same day for $772, which represented the balance of purchase price for said automobile. The chattel mortgage was duly filed for record in compliance with the laws of the state of Texas, on February 3, 1923, where said automobile was located at that time, and said mortgage is a valid, subsisting lien on said automobile in the state of Texas. On April 20, 1923, Adams made default in said mortgage, and on or about said date removed said automobile to the state of Wyoming, where he sold it to one Evans, who in turn sold it to Clarence Fisch, defendant in this action. Said chattel mortgage provided that the mortgagee might take possession of the automobile at any time and any place upon default of the payment of said note. Said mortgagor agreed not to remove the automobile from the state of Texas without the written consent of the mortgagee, and no such consent was ever given. Fisch was a purchaser for value without actual notice of a mortgage on the car or of any prior lien thereon. Said mortgage was never filed for record in the state of Wyoming.

The action herein was instituted by said Union Securities Company and said Wroten-Hundley Motor Company, as plaintiffs, against Clarence Fisch et al., defendants, to recover the possession of said automobile or the value thereof. The trial court found in favor of said plaintiffs and entered judgment against the defendant Fisch and his surety for the sum of $701.51, from which judgment the defendant Fisch, appellant herein, has appealed. The only question involved in this case is as to whether or not the rights of Fisch are subject to the rights of respondents under said mortgage; and that, in turn, depends upon the ultimate point whether the lien which respondents had under the laws of Texas must be upheld in Wyoming after the

property covered by said mortgage
was sold to an innocent purchaser,
a citizen of this state.

This court held, in the case of

Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Mau, 13

Wyo. 358, 110 Am. St. Rep. 1001,

80 Pac. 151, id. 14 Wyo. 68, 82 Pac.

2, that a contract of conditional sale

made in Utah and valid in that

state as to all persons, though not

filed of record, remained valid after

the property covered thereby was

removed to this state and sold to an

innocent purchaser. And we held,

in the case of Yund v. First Nat.

Bank, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6, that,

where a chattel mortgage was duly

filed for record in the state of Okla-

homa and the property covered by

said mortgage was subsequently re-

moved to this state, the mortgage

remained valid as against an inno-

cent purchaser in this state. These

cases are in accordance with the

weight of authority (11 C. J. 424),

and would ordinarily be decisive

herein. It appears, however, that

the courts of the state of Texas,

including the highest court of that

state, give no effect to the registra-

tion laws of other states, and hold

that, where mortgaged property is

removed to the state of Texas from

other states and purchased by an in-

nocent purchaser in that state, the

owner of the mortgage lien is not

protected, though the mortgage was

duly filed for record where it was

given, and though the lien thereun-

der is valid and protected in the

state of its origin. Crosby v. Hus-

ton, 1 Tex. 204; Best v. Farmers &

M. Bank, Tex. Civ. App. -, 141

S. W. 334; Farmer v. Evans, Tex.

Civ. App., 192 S. W. 342; Farmer

v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S. W.

101; Consolidated Garage Co. v.

Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S. W.

1072; Willys-Overland Co. v. Chap-

man, Tex. Civ. App., 206 S.

W. 978. And we must determine

what effect such holding has on the

case at bar.

-

It is fundamental that the laws

of Texas have, ipso proprio vigore,

no extraterritorial force. So far as

their effect is con- Conflict of
cerned, every other laws-extra-
state must be re- of state laws.

garded as a sepa-

territorial force

rate sovereignty to the same extent

as though it were a foreign nation.

The laws of one state can bind only

its own subjects, and others who

may be within its jurisdictional lim-

its. Whatever extraterritorial force

they have is the result, not of any

original power to extend them

abroad, but of that mutual respect,

called comity, which from motives

of public policy, other nations or

states are disposed to yield to them,

giving them effect with a wise and

liberal regard to enlightened self-

interest, common convenience, and

mutual benefits and necessities.

Story, Confl. L. § 7; 5 R. C. L. 908.

It is undoubtedly a rule of the com-

mon law that effect should be given
to the laws of other states to the

extent and within the limits men-

tioned; but foreign laws will not be

given effect when to

-when foreign

forced.

do so would be con- law not en-

trary to the settled

policy of the forum, or, generally

speaking, when the effect would be

injurious to the state or its citizens.

5 R. C. L. 908; 12 C. J. 434, 439,

440. It was said, in Rosenbaum v.

Dawes, 77 Ill. App. 295, that in many

cases and we might add, in most

cases the rule that citizens of one

state are bound by constructive no-

tice of a chattel mortgage, executed

and recorded in another state, nec-

essarily and inevitably operates to

the detriment of such citizens. We

held in the Yund Case, that, not-

withstanding that fact, the lien un-

der an Oklahoma mortgage was pro-

tected in this state. Nevertheless,

such lien is recognized only by rea-

son of comity. 11 C. J. 425; Stude-

baker Bros. Co. v. Mau, supra. And

inasmuch as it clearly appears from

the repeated decisions of the courts.

of Texas that the lien of a Wyoming

mortgage, duly filed of record in the

county where it is executed, in ac-

cordance with the laws of this state,