[Chesapeake Guano Co. v. Montgomery.] established the rule to be, 'that decisions granting them will not be reversed, unless the evidence plainly and palpably supports the verdict.-Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 635; White v. Blair, 95 Ala. 147. The plaintiff, it will be noticed, did not offer to remit any specified sum as being in excess of the amount for which he was, under the evidence, fairly entitled to judgment. The proper practice required, that he should have stated the amount he was willing and offered to remit. He had no legal right to require the court to substitute its judgment for the verdict of the jury upon a question of fact, which they alone were competent, in the beginning, to determine. Remittiturs are favored by the courts in proper cases, for the promotion of justice and the ending of litigation; but a case such as the one. before us, where the evidence does not plainly support the verdict and judgment thereon, and where the party moving for a new trial did not consent, we cannot hold that the lower court erred in refusing to accede to the offer of the other party to remit such part of the damages as the court in its judgment might deem to be fair and right.-16 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 595; Nudd v. Wells, 11 Wis. 407; Thomas v. Womack, 13 Texas, 580; La Salle v. Tift, 52 Iowa, 164; Hill v. Newman, 47 Ind. 187. We have considered the only ground of error insisted on by appellant's counsel. Affirmed. Chesapeake Guano Co. v. Montgomery. Bill in Equity for Injunction. 1. Injunction; fraudulent transferee can not maintain bill therefor. The transferee of the property of a debtor, which was alleged to have been fraudulently disposed of, can not maintain a bill in equity to restrain the enforcement of a garnishment proceeding at law by a creditor of such a debtor pending a suit in equity by other creditors of said debtor, seeking to set aside the conveyance and to subject the same property to the payment of their demands. [Chesapeake Guano Co. v. Montgomery.] APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Chambers. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The appeal is taken from a decree of the chancellor overruling the defendant's motion to dissolve the injunction, to dismiss the bill for the want of equity, and the demurrers to the bill, upon the ground that it contained no equity; and the rendition of this decree is assigned as error. HOUSTON & POWER, LUM DUKE and R. C. SMITH, for appellant.-1. Appellee, who was garnishee in the proceedings at law, made answer of "No indebtedness, which, if maintained would exempt him from the double liability claimed, and fails to show wherein he is prevented in a court of law from establishing the truth of his answer.-3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., § 1361; Knight v. Drane, 77 Ala. 371. If appellee's answer in the garnishment proceedings is true, then in that event he would not need the protection of a court of equity by injunction for he can defend at law. If mistaken in his answer then he ought to do equity before asking the aid of a court of equity by offering to pay whatever is right.—Cunningham v. Beard, 44 Ala. 317; Mays v. Williams, 27 Ala. 270; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., §§ 392, 910, 935. An injunction will not be granted where the right is doubtful.-10 Amer. & Encyc. of Law, 784, 787, note. Or on mere apprehension of a threatened wrong.-10 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 783. A. & R. B. BARNES and SAMFORD & SON, contra. MCCLELLAN, J.-Spraggins, Buck & Co. and others, as creditors of R. G. Williams, filed their bill against said Williams and H. B. T. Montgomery, alleging that Williams had fraudulently conveyed or transferred certain of his property to Montgomery, and praying that said property might be subjected to the payment of their debts against Williams. Pending that suit and before answer therein, the Chesapeake Guano Company instituted an action at law against said Williams and ancillary thereto sued out a writ of garnishment directed to said Montgomery, requiring him to appear and answer [Chesapeake Guano Co. v. Montgomery.] as to indebtedness to Williams and as to property he might have belonging to Williams, &c. Montgomery answered non-indebtedness, and that he had no property or effects of said Williams in his possession, &c. The plaintiff contested this answer on the ground that certain property then held by the garnishee had been fraudulently transferred to him by Williams, and was subject to the satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment against Williams, plaintiff's debt antedating the transfer. At this stage of the proceedings against him as the alleged fraudulent grantee of Williams, Montgomery filed the present bill, setting up the foregoing facts more at large, and averring further that by their bill Spraggins, Buck & Co. and their co-complainants acquired a first lien on the property which he had received from Williams, and that if the transfer should be held invalid in that suit and also in the garnishment proceedings he would be compelled to pay the value of the property both to the complainants in that suit and to the plaintiff in the action at law. The prayer of his bill is for injunction of the garnishment proceedings at law prosecuted by the Chesapeake Guano Co. until the determination of the issue of fraud vel non in the Spraggins, Buck & Co.'s litigation, and perpetually if the property held by him should be subjected to the debts of those complainants. Upon the facts thus averred in his bill, we are of opinion that Montgomery is not entitled to the relief he prays, or any equitable relief. If the transfer by Williams to him is untainted with fraud, and therefore valid, he has a perfect defense at law against the garnishment proceeding, and hence could have no standing in equity. On the other hand, if Montgomery has been guilty of the fraud alleged in the bill of Spraggins, Buck & Co., et al. and in the contestation of his answer in garnishment, he is debarred from invoking the interposition of equity by the application and operation of the maxim, he who comes into equity must come with clean hands; or, as otherwise expressed he that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity.-1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 397-99, 401. On this latter phase of the case, the complainant is seeking protection from a situation resulting from his own fraud and wrong committed against the party who is attacking that fraud and wrong, and whose efforts to that end he thus endeavors to forestall. The [Southern Railway Co. v. Hubbard.] bill was without equity. The motions to dismiss it and to dissolve the injunction for its want of equity should have been granted. The decree of the chancellor overruling said motions is reversed; and a decree will be here entered dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill. Reversed and rendered. Southern Railway Co. v. Hubbard. Action against a Railroad Company to recover Damages for Personal Injuries. 1. Evidence; depositions; part of answer can not be introduced for the purpose of contradicting a witness.—Where, in a pending suit, interrogatories to the adverse party are filed, as provided by section 2816 of the Code of 1886, (Code of 1896, § 1850), the party filing the interrogatories can not introduce parts of the answers thereto for the purpose of showing that the facts testified to by such opposite party, when examined on the trial as a witness, were untrue, or to contradict the facts so testified to. APPEAL from the City Court of Birmingham. This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries, brought by the appellee, Joe Hubbard, against the appellant, the Southern Railway Company. The appeal is from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The facts pertaining to the only question reviewed on the present appeal, are sufficiently set forth in the opinion. SMITH & WEATHERLY, for appellant.-The defendant's only purpose was to offer proof of previous contradictory statements made by the plaintiff, the witness then being examined. The entire deposition was not needed for such purpose, and all but the particular parts offered would have been wholly useless for such purpose; indeed, would have defeated such purpose, inasmuch as the offering of the whole deposition by the defendant at whose instance it had been taken under the statute, might have had the effect of making the plaintiff the de [Southern Railway Co. v. Hubbard.] fendant's witness, and of putting the defendant in the attitude of vouching for the credit and credibility of the witness. Wilson v. Maria, 21 Ala. 359. But the proof was not offered under the statute, but wholly independently, and under the general principle of evidence regulating the impeachment of witnesses, by proof of previous contradictory statements. As such proof the rejected passages were clearly admissible.-1 Greenleaf on Evidence, (15th ed.), §§ 463–465. B. M. ALLEN, contra.-When a party files interrogatories under the statute to his adversary, it is optional with him to read the answer or not; but if he offers a portion of it, he thereby makes the whole of it evidence. Saltmarsh v. Bower & Co., 22 Ala. 221; Crocker v. Clements, 23 Ala. 296. The answers of the plaintiff taken under the provisions of sections 2816-2818, Code of 1886, could only be offered by the party taking them. Code of 1886, § 2818. COLEMAN, J.-The action is in case, and brought to recover damages for personal injuries. Only one assignment of error is insisted upon in the brief and argument of counsel for appellant. The defendant, the appellant here, filed interrogatories to the plaintiff under the provisions of section 2816 of the Code of 1886. By section 2818, the answers to these interrogatories are made evidence in the cause, when offered by the party taking them. During the progress of the trial, the appellant offered in evidence a part of the answer to the third interrogatory, and a part of the answer to the 6th interrogatory, which upon objection was excluded, and this is the error assigned. It is the settled construction of the statutes which authorize the filing of interrogatories to the opposite party and offering the answers in evidence, that only the party taking them can make them evidence, and if he offers a portion of the answers in evidence he thereby makes the whole evidence.-Saltmarsh v. Bower & Co., 22 Ala. 221; Crocker v. Clements, 23 Ala. 296. Appellant concedes this to be the law, but says the purpose of offering the specified portions of the answers in evidence was not to make such portions evidence, but for the purpose of impeaching the witness, by showing that he |