state courts are bound to take judicial notice of the internal revenue laws of the United States, and not to suffer the collection of any debt prohibited thereby. Kessel v. Albetis, 56 Barb. 362. The same is true of the federal statutes creating territorial courts and defining their jurisdiction (Coughran v. Gilman, 81 Iowa, 442, 46 N. W. 1005), and of the acts providing for the appointment of a deputy controller of the currency and defining his powers and duties (Davis' Estate v. Watkins [Neb.] 76 N. W. 575), and of an act of congress granting swamp lands to the state (Hamilton v. Shoaff, 99 Ind. 63). Again, it is held that the congressional survey of the lands lying northwest of the Ohio river, under the various acts of congress, is a part of the public law, of which the state courts will take judicial notice. Murphy v. Hendricks, 57 Ind. 593. And see Atwater v. Schenck, 9 Wis. 160.

8. State Law in the Federal Courts.

The various courts of the United States will take judicial notice, without pleading or proof, of the public statutes of the several states, whenever the same are applicable in cases pending before them. Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Pet. 317, 8 L. Ed. 412; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 9 L. Ed. 246; Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65, 14 L. Ed. 847; Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 227, 15 L. Ed. 896; Griffing v. Gibb, 2 Black, 519, 17 L. Ed. 353; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 19 L. Ed. 604; Junction R. Co. v. Bank of Ashland, 12 Wall. 226, 20 L. Ed. 385; Elwood v. Flannigan, 104 U. S. 562, 26 L. Ed. 842; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. 398, 30 L. Ed. 519; Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747, 7 Sup. Ct. 757, 30 L. Ed. 825; Railroad Co. v. Roberson, 9 C. C. A. 646, 61 Fed. 592; Smith v. Tallapoosa County, 2 Woods, 574, Fed. Cas. No. 13,113; Bennett v. Bennett, Deady, 299, Fed. Cas. No. 1,318; U. S. v. Quinn, 8 Blatchf. 48, Fed. Cas. No. 16,110; Mewster v. Spalding, 6 McLean, 24, Fed. Cas. No. 9,513; Miller v. McQuerry, 5 McLean, 469, Fed. Cas. No. 9,583; Starr v. Moore, 3 McLean, 354, Fed. Cas. No. 13,315; Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Sumn. 401, Fed. Cas. No. 5,609; Jasper v. Porter, 2 McLean, 579, Fed. Cas. No. 7,229; Jones v. Hays, 4 McLean, 521, Fed. Cas. No. 7,467; Merrill v. Dawson, Hempst. 563, Fed. Cas. No. 9,469; Swann v. Swann (C. C.) 21 Fed. 299; L'Engle v. Gates (C. C.) 74 Fed. 513. The reasons for this rule were thus explained by Story, J., in the case of Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet, 607, 9 L. Ed. 246: "We are of opinion that the circuit court was bound to take judicial notice of the laws of Louisiana. The circuit courts of the United States are created by congress, not for the purpose of administering the local law of a single state alone, but to administer the laws of all the states of the Union, in cases to which they respectively apply. The judicial power conferred on the general government by the constitution extends to many cases arising under the laws of the different states; and this court is called upon, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, constantly to take notice of and administer the jurisprudence of all the states. That jurisprudence is, then, in no just sense a foreign jurisprudence, to be proved in the courts of the United States by the ordinary modes of proof by which the laws of a foreign country are to be established; but it is to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner as the laws of the United States are taken notice of by these courts."

In consequence of this rule, it is held that, in an action in a federal court, the refusal to allow state statutes to be introduced in evidence is not error. Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623, 11 Sup. Ct. 453, 34 L. Ed. 1086. And it should be observed that a court of the United States will take judicial notice of the constitution and public statutes of any of the states, when the same affect the decision of the question before it, and not merely the laws of the state in which the court happens to sit. In other words, a federal court sitting in one state will, if necessary, take judicial notice of the public statutes of another state. Knower v. Haines (C. C.) 31 Fed. 513; Newberry v. Robinson (C. C.) 36 Fed. 841; Bank v. McGraw, 8 C. C. A. 420, 59 Fed. 972; Andruss V. Association, 36 C. C. A. 336, 94 Fed. 575. It is also held that these courts may properly take judicial notice of statutes of the various states, although the same were in force before the adoption of the constitution of the United States. Loree v. Abner, 6 U. S. App. 649, 6 C. C. A. 302, 57 Fed. 159. They will also be officially cognizant of the laws of the various territories and of the acts of congress relating to the District of Columbia. Breed v. Railroad

Co. (C. C.) 35 Fed. 642. But private, special, or local laws of a state cannot be judicially noticed by the courts of the United States. Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Pet. 317, 8 L. Ed. 412. And the federal courts do not take judicial notice of the local laws of the various tribes in the Indian Territory; but such laws are on the footing of local usages and customs, and must be pleaded and proven, where they are at variance with the laws which have been extended over the territory for the guidance of the United States courts. Wilson v. Owens, 57 U. S. App. 500, 30 C. C. A. 257, 86 Fed. 571.

9. Laws of Foreign Countries.

The courts of this country, whether federal or state, will not take judicial notice of the laws of a foreign country. They must be pleaded, if relied on, and proved as matters of fact. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 2 L. Ed. 15; Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 2 L. Ed. 249; Strother v. Lucas, 6 Pet. 763, 8 L. Ed. 573; Armstrong v. Lear, 8 Pet. 52, 8 L. Ed. 863; U. S. v. Wiggins, 14 Pet. 334, 10 L. Ed. 481; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 14 L. Ed. 472; Dainese v. Hale, 91 U. S. 13, 23 L. Ed. 190; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788; Insurance Co. v. Fields, 2 Story, 59, Fed. Cas. No. 10,406; Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147; Bowditch v. Soltyk, 99 Mass. 138; Beach v. Workman, 20 N. H. 379; Thomas v. Railway Co. (Del.) 42 Atl. 987; McCraney v. Alden, 46 Barb. 274; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, 220; Hooper v. Moore, 5 Jones, 130; Tyler v. Trabue, 8 B. Mon. 306; Leatherwood v. Sullivan, 81 Ala. 458, 1 South. 718; Bagwell v. McTighe, 85 Tenn. 616, 4 S. W. 46; Templeton v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 50, 5 S. W. 441; Dempster v. Stephen, 63 Ill. App. 126; Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143, 42 L. R. A. 343. Consequently, where the validity, the nature, the obligation, or the interpretation of a contract depends upon the laws of a foreign country, those laws must be proved before they can become guides for judicial action. Crosby v. Huston, 1 Tex. 203; Bryant v. Kelton, Id. 434; Cox v. Morrow, 14 Ark. 603. The courts of this country, for example, cannot officially know what is the legal rate of interest in England or any other foreign country, nor what are the penalties for usury, if any there be, because they cannot take judicial notice of statutes fixing the rate of interest or denouncing usury. Coghlan v. Railroad Co., 142 U. S. 101, 12 Sup. Ct. 150, 35 L. Ed. 951; Campion v. Kille, 15 N. J. Eq. 476; Kermott v. Ayer, 11 Mich. 181. A payment of corporate debts by a stockholder in a foreign corporation will be deemed to have been voluntary, in the absence of proof that he was legally liable therefor, as the court cannot take judicial notice of a foreign statute imposing such liability upon stockholders. Eastman v. Crosby, 8 Allen, 206. A note made in France, but payable to a person in America, is valid here, although not stamped according to the laws of France; for our courts do not take notice of the revenue laws of foreign countries. Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. 94. It is also held that mere citations to English statutes and authorities cannot be accepted as showing the English law. Dickerson v. Matheson (C. C.) 50 Fed. 73. On the other hand, in a case where an oath appeared to have been taken before "A. B., Justice of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia," it was held that the court might infer that the person named had power to administer an oath, though that had not been expressly alleged. Saltar v. Applegate, 23 N. J. Law, 115.

10. Same-Laws of Former Sovereignty.

An important exception to the rule stated in the preceding section is this: When the territory over which the court has jurisdiction once constituted a part of the dominions of a foreign power (or another state), and was subject to the laws thereof, the court will take judicial notice of the laws and statutes of such foreign sovereignty or state, in so far as the same were in force prior to, and at the time of, the separation; for they are, quoad hoc, not foreign, but domestic, laws. U. S. v. Turner, 11 How. 663, 13 L. Ed. 857; City of Brownsville v. Cavazos, 2 Woods, 293, Fed. Cas. No. 2,043; Pecquet v. Pecquet's Ex'r, 17 La. Ann. 204. On this principle, it is held that the courts of the United States are bound to take judicial notice of the laws and regulations of Mexico which were in force prior to the cessions of territory by that country. U. S. v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, 16 Sup. Ct. 57, 40 L. Ed. 215.

"The laws of Mexico in force in California, before and at the time of the transfer of California to the United States, upon which the title to lands in California depends, must be judicially noticed and expounded by the courts in like manner as other public laws of the state of California. They are laws to be noticed, not facts to be proved. They are not regarded as foreign laws, but as laws that pass with the territory." Bouldin v. Phelps (C. C.) 30 Fed. 547. On the same principle, the courts of Alabama will judicially notice the laws of Spain which regulated the conveyance of real property in Mobile, when that place was subject to the dominion of Spain. Doe v. Eslava, 11 Ala. 1028. And the courts of Missouri will take judicial notice of the laws of France and of Spain, which were in force in that state while it was a part of the territory of those governments. Chouteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo. 3; Ott v. Soulard, Id. 573. For the same reason, the courts of Kentucky are bound to know judicially what the laws of Virginia were before the separation. Delano v. Jopling, 1 Litt. 417. In a case in the New York supreme court, it was said that, if the court has no means of information as to what the law of a foreign country is, it will act upon its own laws; but if such country once constituted a part of the same kingdom or government with that where the court sits, and they were governed by the same laws, the court will take judicial notice of the laws which prevailed in both before their separation, as a matter of public history, and will presume them unchanged until the contrary be shown. The United States having once been a part of the British empire, our courts take judicial notice that the common law was in force within the British dominions at the time of the separation, and will presume that that law remains unchanged in England, unless the contrary be shown. Hence, if the rights or status of parties, in any suit before our courts, depend upon the law of England, they will be adjudicated according to the principles of the common law, unless some applicable British statute, changing the law, is produced in evidence. Stokes v. Macken, 62 Barb. 145.

11. Statutes of a Sister State.

As a general rule (subject to a few specific exceptions, and rejected in a very few states) the doctrine prevails that the several states of the Union are so far foreign to each other that the courts of one state will not take judicial notice of the laws and statutes of another state. If the issue in any suit is to be determined in accordance with the law of a sister state, whether it be the foundation of the cause of action or of the defense, that law must be pleaded and proved as matter of fact. The decisions hereinafter cited show this rule to be in force in the following states:

Alabama. Clarke v. Pratt, 20 Ala. 470; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382; Railroad Co. v. Whitney, 39 Ala. 468; Forsyth v. Preer, 62 Ala. 443; Bradley v. Harden, 73 Ala. 70; Insurance Co. v. Forcheimer, 86 Ala. 541, 5 South. 870.

Arkansas. Newton v. Cocke, 10 Ark. 169.

California. Cavender v. Guild, 4 Cal. 250; Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143, 42 L. R. A. 343.

Colorado. Polk v. Butterfield, 9 Colo. 325, 12 Pac. 216.

Connecticut. Hempstead v. Reed, 6 Conn. 480; Dyer v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384. Delaware. Bailey v. McDowell, 2 Har. 34; Thomas v. Railway Co., 42

Atl. 987.

Florida. Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 19 South. 172, 31 L. R. A. 484.
Illinois. Rand v. Insurance Co., 58 Ill. App. 665; Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill.

256.

Indiana. Billingsley v. Dean, 11 Ind. 331; Hollman v. Collins, 1 Ind. 24; Teutonia Loan & Building Co. v. Turrell, 19 Ind. App. 469, 49 N. E. 852; Rothrock v. Perkinson, 61 Ind. 39; Robards v. Marley, 80 Ind. 185. Iowa. Carey v. Railroad Co., 5 Iowa, 357; Taylor v. Runyan, 9 Iowa, 522; Neese v. Insurance Co., 55 Iowa, 604, 8 N. W. 450.

Kentucky. Tyler v. Trabue, 8 B. Mon. 306; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 5 J. J. Marsh. 280; McDaniel v. Wright. 7 J. J. Marsh. 475.

Louisiana. Syme v. Stewart, 17 La. Ann. 73.

Maryland.

Jackson v. Jackson, 80 Md. 176, 30 Atl. 752.

Massachusetts. Palfrey v. Railroad Co., 4 Allen, 55; Witters v. Bank, 171 Mass. 425, 50 N. E. 932; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253; Knapp v. Abell, 10 Allen, 485; Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 85.

Michigan. Chapman v. Colby, 47 Mich. 46, 10 N. W. 74; Millard v. Truax, 73 Mich. 381, 41 N. W. 328.

Minnesota. Brimhall v. Van Campen, 8 Minn. 13; Hoyt v. McNeil, 13 Minn. 390; Myers v. Railway Co., 69 Minn. 476, 72 N. W. 694.

Mississippi. Hemphill v. Bank, 6 Smedes & M. 44.

Missouri. Wilson v. Cockrill, 8 Mo. 1; Leak v. Elliott, 4 Mo. 446; Hite v. Lenhart, 7 Mo. 22; Houghtaling v. Ball, 19 Mo. 84; Babcock v. Babcock, 46 Mo. 243.

Nebraska. Scroggin v. McClelland, 37 Neb. 644, 56 N. W. 208, 22 L. R. A.

110.

New Jersey. Condit v. Blackwell, 19 N. J. Eq. 193; Ball v. Franklinite Co., 32 N. J. Law, 102.

New York. Miller v. Avery, 2 Barb. Ch. 582; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, 226.

Ohio. Smith v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 690; McCann v. Pennsylvania Co., 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 139.

Pennsylvania. Electric Time Co. v. Geiger, 147 Pa. St. 399, 23 Atl. 547. Rhode Island. Taylor v. Slater, 21 R. I. 104, 41 Atl. 1001.

South Dakota. Meuer v. Railway Co., 5 S. D. 568, 59 N. W. 945, 25 L. R. A. 81.

Tennessee. Bagwell v. McTighe, 85 Tenn. 616, 4 S. W. 46; Templeton v. Brown, 86 Tenn. 50, 5 S. W. 441. But see Code Tenn. § 3801.

Texas. Bradshaw v. Mayfield, 18 Tex. 21; Cooke v. Crawford, 1 Tex. 9; Ramsay v. McCauley, 2 Tex. 189; Jones v. Laney, Id. 342; Millinery Co. v. Lennox (Tex. Civ. App.) 50 S. W. 401; Anderson v. Anderson, 23 Tex. 639. Vermont. Territt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 182; Adams v. Gay, Id. 358; Taylor v. Boardman, 25 Vt. 581; Murtey v. Allen, 45 Atl. 752.

Washington. McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. St. 636, 29 Pac. 209. Wisconsin. Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Bank v. Wells, 73 Wis. 332, 41 N. W. 409; Osborn v. Blackburn, 78 Wis. 209, 47 N. W. 175, 10 L. R. A. 367. For example, a court cannot take judicial notice of a statute of another state regulating contracts for interest, or fixing the legal rate of interest. Cooke v. Crawford, 1 Tex. 9; Ramsay v. McCauley, 2 Tex. 189; Clarke v. Pratt, 20 Ala. 470; Insurance Co. v. Forcheimer, 86 Ala. 541, 5 South. 870; Millard v. Truax, 73 Mich. 381, 41 N. W. 328; Cavender v. Guild, 4 Cal. 250. Nor can the court notice the statute of limitations of another state. If relied on as a defense to the plaintiff's cause of action, it must be pleaded and proved. Smith v. Bartram. 11 Ohio St. 690. Neither can judicial. notice be taken of the laws of another state regulating the action of replevin. Osborn v. Blackburn, 78 Wis. 209, 47 N. W. 175, 10 L. R. A. 367. In an action against the indorsers of a promissory note, made and payable in another state, the court will not, on demurrer, take judicial notice of a law of that state, relating to the liability of indorsers, which is not pleaded. Bank v. Wells, 73 Wis. 332, 41 N. W. 409. Nor can the courts of one state take notice of a statute of another state giving a judgment creditor a lien upon real estate. Miller v. Avery, 2 Barb. Ch. 582. In a suit based on a contract made with

a corporation chartered in another state, the court cannot take judicial notice · of the laws under which it was incorporated; but they must be proved, and its charter produced, before the rights and liabilities of the parties can be determined. Chapman v. Colby, 47 Mich. 46, 10 N. W. 74; Duke v. Taylor, 37 Fla. 64, 19 South. 172. In an action in Pennsylvania by a New Jersey corporation to recover from a stockholder assessments on his stock, an affidavit of defense, which avers that notice of the calls was not published in newspapers, as required by the statutes of New Jersey, but fails to set forth a copy of those statutes, is insufficient. Time Co. v. Geiger, 147 Pa. St. 399, 23 Atl. 547.

There are, however, a few specific exceptions to this rule. Thus, where the statutes of one state recognize or give validity to acts done in pursuance of the laws of another state, the courts of the former will take judicial

cognizance of those laws, so far as it may be necessary to determine the validity of the acts alleged to be in conformity with them. This is the case where a statute provides that deeds, conveying land within the state, but executed in some other state, shall be entitled to record in the former state if proved or acknowledged in conformity with the laws of the state where executed. Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513, 19 L. Ed. 426. And in a case in Michigan, it was said that, where a deed of land executed in another state is acknowledged before a justice of the peace, whose official capacity is certified to by a person who describes himself as clerk of the supreme court of that state, and affixes the seal of such court thereto, the conveyance will be entitled to record, or be admissible in evidence; for the court will take judicial notice that the "supreme court" of another state is a court of record. Shotwell v. Harrison, 22 Mich. 410. In another case it was said that, to ascertain the official character of the judicial officer certifying a transcript of a judgment from another state, the court might take judicial notice of the laws of such state. Foster v. Taylor, 2 Overt. 191. Again, state laws and regulations which are, by implication or expressly, incorporated into a public act of congress, will be judicially recognized by the courts of another state. Flanigen v. Insurance Co., 7 Pa. St. 306; Apollos v. Staniforth, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 502, 22 S. W. 1060. Again, the courts must know, as a matter of public history, that the Roman civil law is the foundation of the jurisprudence prevailing in some parts of the country, while the English common law forms the substratum of the institutions and regulations which are in force in other parts. Hence the courts of Louisiana will take judicial notice of the fact that the vendor's privilege upon movables (lien on personal property) is not recognized by the other states of the Union. McIlvaine v. Legare, 34 La. Ann. 923.

In a few of the states, the rule of not taking judicial notice of the laws of a sister state has been abrogated by statute. Thus, in West Virginia, the Code provides that "whenever, in any case, it becomes material to ascertain what the law, statutory or other, of another state or country, or of the United States, is, or was at any time, the court, judge, or magistrate shall take judicial notice thereof, and may consult any printed book purporting to contain, state, or explain the same, and consider any testimony, information, or argument that is offered on the subject." Code W. Va. c. 13, § 4. On the construction and application of this statute, the reader may consult Bank v. Willis, 7 W. Va. 31; State v. Goodrich, 14 W. Va. 834; Manufacturing Co.. v. Bennett, 28 W. Va. 16; Wilson v. Manufacturing Co., 40 W. Va. 413, 21 S. E. 1035; Heffernan v. Harvey, 41 W. Va. 766, 24 S. E. 592. In Tennessee, by virtue of a statutory direction, the supreme court of the state (though not, it seems, the inferior courts) will take judicial notice of the statutes of all the other states of the Union. Hobbs v. Railroad Co., 9 Heisk. 873, citing Code Tenn. § 3801. In an early case in Georgia, it was said that the court, on the trial of a cause, may proceed on its own knowledge of the law of another state, and it is not necessary in that case to prove such law; and the judgment of the court will not be reversed, when it proceeded on such knowledge, unless it should appear that it had decided wrongly as to such foreign law. Herschfeld v. Dexel, 12 Ga. 582. And the Code of that state now provides that the public laws of the several states, as published by authority, shall be judicially recognized without proof. Code Ga. § 3824. See Railroad' Co. v. Jackson, 86 Ga. 676, 13 S. E. 109.

When an action is begun in a state court, founded on a right of action given by the laws of another state, and is thence removed into a United States circuit court for trial, under the act of congress in that behalf, the federal court will take judicial notice of the statute under which the cause of action arises, although it be neither pleaded nor proved, and notwithstanding the fact that the state court from which the action was removed would not have taken official cognizance of such statute without proof. For the removal of a cause from a state court to a federal court is not in the nature of an appeal, but brings the case into the United States court to be proceeded with de novo, or as if originally commenced there. Breed v. Railroad Co. (C. C.) 35. Fed. 642.