c. A person shall be punished by fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars, and forfeit his office, and the same shall thereupon become vacant, upon conviction of the offence of having knowingly (1) acted as a referee in a case in which he is directly or indirectly interested; or (2) purchased, while a referee, directly or indirectly, any property of the estate in bankruptcy of which he is referee; or (3) refused, while a referee or trustee, to permit a reasonable opportunity for the inspection of the accounts relating to the affairs of, and the papers and records of, estates in his charge by parties in interest when directed by the court so to do.

d. A person shall not be prosecuted for any offense arising under this Act unless the indictment is found or the information is filed in court within one year after the commission of the offense.

No such offence was prescribed by the last law as that contained in paragraph a.

1

The offence of concealing property may be committed at any time after proceedings in bankruptcy are begun (§ 1 (4)). Concealing property includes secreting, falsifying or mutilating it (§ 1 (22)), and would include hiding property by false transfers. It would seem also that a wilful destruction of property might be within the scope of the word "mutilate." But the act of concealing books of account is made a disqualification for a discharge, and the definition of concealing was apparently adopted with this matter in view.

2

Under the last law a concealment of property was an offence punishable by imprisonment and also a ground for refusing a discharge. It would probably have been a ground for refusing a discharge under that law if the bankrupt had wilfully omitted

1 Supra, §§ 35, 477.

3 Act of 1867, § 29, 14 Stats. 531,

2 Act of 1867, § 44, 14 Stats. 539, R. S. § 5110,

R. S. § 5132.

part of his property from his schedule, though there would always have been other means taken by him to conceal his property, and a bankrupt under such circumstances would have been subject to the disqualification incurred by taking a false oath to his schedule,2 which is an offence under clause 2 of this section.3

It must be shown that the bankrupt's oath was wilfully and knowingly false.1 The burden of proving this is on the objecting creditor.5

Presenting a false claim under oath was not an offence under the last law, but was a disqualification to the bankrupt from getting his discharge. In order to convict a person of this offence it must be shown that the false oath was wilfully and fraudulently made. Therefore an omission from a bankrupt's schedule if made in good faith does not make the oath to the schedule a false one.6

Clause 3 does not apply to an attorney presenting a false claim against the estate of a bankrupt except in composition proceedings. It is to be noticed that in such proceedings the act of using a false claim may give rise to two penalties. Thus where a person uses the claim through an agent or attorney the principal is liable to punishment and also the agent if the latter knew that the claim was false.

The disposition of property with intent to defeat or delay the operation of the act was an act of bankruptcy under the last law. It was under the scope of this fraud that general assignments were held bad.8

The

The offence described in clause b (4) would be committed though the operation of the act were not defeated. essential elements of the crime are receiving the property with

1 Re Hussman, 2 N. B. R. 437, Fed. Cas. No. 6951; Re Eidom, 3 N. B. R. 106, Fed. Cas. No. 4314; Re Connell, 3 N. B. R. 443, Fed. Cas. No. 3110; Re Smith, 13 N. B. R. 256, Fed. Cas. No. 12,995.

2 Act of 1867, § 29, 14 Stats. 531, R. S. § 5110.

3 Re Hill, 1 N. B. R. 431, Fed. Cas. No. 6483; Re Rathbone, 1 N. B. R.

the wrongful intent. But as this is made a crime and one of the elements of it is the intent, this must be proved and will not be presumed. It would seem therefore that the cases relating to preferences and other acts of bankruptcy, which hold that in certain circumstances intent may be presumed, are not to be followed in this connection.

The property of the bankrupt received with intent to defeat the act must be property which would be subject to be taken by trustees. Therefore although a person to whom a bankrupt had transferred property exempt from the act would be within the letter of this law strictly construed, it would probably be held that the case did not fall within its provisions, because the transfer did not defeat the act. Penalties are intended only for the punishment of acts which interfere with the due administration of the bankrupt law.

Under its true construction this section would cover a case where the act was interfered with, as well as one where its operation was totally stopped. The word " defeat" means only any hindrance or prevention of the disposition of the assets of the bankrupt as contemplated under the bankrupt law.

The provision of clause b (5) is aimed primarily at creditors who attempt to get an advantage to themselves as an equivalent for agreeing to a composition. The wrong would be committed, however, as well by a person who should extort money from a person in failing circumstances as a consideration for not bringing a petition against him or for not opposing a discharge or proving a claim or any other act in connection with bankruptcy. The section is broad enough to cover the wrongful act of a bankrupt who extorts money as a consideration for neglecting any of his duties under the act whereby certain creditors profit.

The word "person" is defined to include officers (§ 1 (19)). It seems therefore that the offences prohibited by clause (5) would apply to officers also. Officers are clerks, marshals, receivers, referees, and trustees, ( § 1 (18)).

1 See supra, § 33.

2 Supra, §§ 32, 73.

3 Supra, § 475.

§ 493. Act of 1898.-SEC. 30. RULES, FORMS, AND ORDERS. a. All necessary rules, forms, and orders as to procedure and for carrying this act into force and effect shall be prescribed, and may be amended from time to time, by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Supreme Court was given the same power under the former act, and the procedure under it was prescribed largely by the forms adopted.1

The rules and forms under the present act went into force on the first Monday of January, 1899.

494. Act of 1898. SEC. 31. COMPUTATION OF TIME. a. Whenever time is enumerated by days in this act, or in any proceeding in bankruptcy, the number of days shall be computed by excluding the first and including the last, unless the last fall on a Sunday or holiday, in which event the day last included shall be the next day thereafter which is not a Sunday or a legal holiday.

The same rule prevailed under the last law.2

$495. Act of 1898.-SEC. 32. TRANSFER OF CASES.a. In the event petitions are filed against the same person, or against different members of a partnership, in different courts of bankruptcy each of which has jurisdiction, the cases shall be transferred, by order of the courts relinquishing jurisdiction, to and be consolidated by the one of such courts which can proceed with the same for the greatest convenience of parties in interest.

1 Act of 1867, § 10, 14 Stats. 521, 2 Supra, § 46. R. S. § 4990.

Under former Rule XVI. of the Supreme Court, the court where a petition against a firm was first filed kept the control of the case. If petitions were filed against an individual in different districts, the court of the district where he had his domicile kept control.

The same provision is contained in Rule VI. of the General Orders established under the Act of 1898. In the case of a partnership, the court retaining jurisdiction may transfer the case to the court where it can be most conveniently disposed of. There is no such provision where petitions are filed in different districts against an individual. The rule seems in conflict with the provision of § 32.2

Rule VI. provides also for amending the earlier petition by alleging a different act of bankruptcy which was contained in the later petition.

1 Supra, § 468.

2 See supra, § 468.