258 RUTLEDGE, J., dissenting. it of criminal contempt, regardless of the order's validity and of any of the usual restraints of criminal procedure, the way will have been found to dispense with substantially all of those protections relating not only to the course of the proceedings but to the penalty itself. But it is in relation to the flat criminal fine of $700,000 against the union that the Court's disregard of the constitutional and other standards is most apparent. By what measuring rod this sum has been arrived at as the appropriate and lawful amount, I am unable to say, unless indeed it is simply by a rough estimate of what the union should be forced to pay on all counts. Never has a criminal fine of such magnitude been heretofore laid and sustained, so far as I am able to discover. And only for treason, with one other possible exception," has Congress authorized one so large. Moreover, the Court's enumeration of factors to be taken into account indicates expressly, as I read the opinion, that one is the coercive effect of the imposition for the future, though it is thoroughly settled that in contempt criminal punishment is to be laid only for past conduct.62 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., supra, and authorities cited. Thus, the Court in effect imposes double coercive penalties, in view of the additional contingent award of $2,800,000 for that specific and sole purpose. I think the criminal fine of $700,000 not only constitutionally excessive, far beyond any heretofore sustained for violation of any statute or order of court. It is also an unlawful commingling of civil coercive and criminal penalties, without the essential contingent feature in the coercive phase, under our prior decisions. 61 Ibid. 62 The opinion states: "In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may properly take into consideration . . . the necessity of effectively terminating the defendant's defiance as required by the public interest . . . 330 U.S. 258, 303. . RUTLEDGE, J., dissenting. 330 U.S. Moreover, it is the District Court's function, not ours, in the first instance to fix the amounts of criminal fines. In equity proceedings for coercive relief, appellate courts including this one have power to revise and fix awards for such purposes, and if damages also are sought to review amounts awarded for this purpose for consistency with the proof. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., supra. But in a criminal proceeding which is at law even in contempt, ibid., our function is not in the first instance to fix the fines ourselves. That function is the District Court's. Ibid. We can only determine whether those imposed by it are excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 63 In its revision of the penalties therefore the Court in my opinion not only fails to unscramble the coercive and criminal elements, as the prior decisions here require to be done. It imposes grossly excessive criminal penalties, determined in amount by wholly arbitrary estimate related to no previously established standard legislatively or judicially fixed. And in doing so, it usurps the District Court's function. All this flows in part at least from its basic error, which is its failure to follow the rule of the Gompers and other cases that not only civil and criminal penalties, but also civil and criminal proceedings are altogether different and separate things, and under the Constitution must be kept so. Much more is involved in this controversy than the issues which have been discussed. The issues in the main suit have not been determined and it would be beyond our function to intimate opinion concerning them now. But 63 The statement in the Gompers opinion, 221 U. S. at 443, that criminal penalties have incidental coercive effects and civil ones incidental penal effects, was not intended to contradict its ruling that criminal penalties cannot be imposed in civil contempt proceedings or therefore commingled indistinguishably. 258 RUTLEDGE, J., dissenting. beyond this controversy as a whole lie still graver questions. They involve opposing claims concerning the right to strike and the power of the Government, as against this, to keep the nation's economy going. Those are indeed grave matters. No right is absolute. Nor is any power, governmental or other, in our system. There can be no question that it provides power to meet the greatest crises. Equally certain is it that under "a government of laws and not of men" such as we possess, power must be exercised according to law; and government, including the courts, as well as the governed, must move within its limitations. This means that the courts and all other divisions or agencies of authority must act within the limits of their respective functions. Specifically it means in this case that we are bound to act in deference to the mandate of Congress concerning labor injunctions, as in judgment and conscience we conceive it to have been made. The crisis here was grave. Nevertheless, as I view Congress' action, I am unable to believe that it has acted to meet, or authorized the courts to meet, the situation which arose in the manner which has been employed. No man or group is above the law. All are subject to its valid commands. So are the government and the courts. If, as I think, Congress has forbidden the use of labor injunctions in this and like cases, that conclusion is the end of our function. And if modification of that policy is to be made for such cases, that problem is for Congress in the first instance, not for the courts. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY joins in this opinion. 330 U.S. Counsel for Parties. TESTA ET AL. v. KATT. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR PROVIDENCE AND BRISTOL COUNTIES, RHODE ISLAND. No. 431. Argued February 14, 1947.-Decided March 10, 1947. Section 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 34, as amended, provides that a buyer of goods at above the ceiling price may sue the seller "in any court of competent jurisdiction" for three times the amount of the overcharge plus costs and a reasonable attorney's fee; and § 205 (c) provides that the federal district courts shall have jurisdiction of such suits "concurrently with" state courts. Having purchased an automobile at above the ceiling price, the purchaser sued the seller under § 205 (e) and obtained judgment for damages and costs in a state court having adequate general jurisdiction to enforce similar claims arising under state law. On appeal, the State Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the ground that the suit was for a penalty based on a statute of a foreign sovereign and could not be maintained in the state courts. Held: Assuming, without deciding, that § 205 (e) is a penal statute, the state courts were not free under Article VI of the Constitution to refuse enforcement of the claim. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1. Pp. 389-394. 71 R. I. 472, 47 A. 2d 312, reversed. A state court of competent jurisdiction awarded the purchaser of an automobile at above the ceiling price a judgment for damages and costs under § 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 34, as amended. The State Supreme Court reversed and, pursuant to local practice, remitted the case and record to the Superior Court. 71 R. I. 472, 47 A. 2d 312. This Court granted certiorari. 329 U. S. 703. Reversed and remanded, p. 394. Acting Solicitor General Washington argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Frederick Bernays Wiener, J. Raymond Dubee, William E. Remy, David London, Samuel Mermin and Albert J. Rosenthal. 386 Opinion of the Court. Paul M. Segal argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Henry G. Fischer, Bernard A. Helfat, Irving R. Panzer and John W. Willis. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 205 (e)' of the Emergency Price Control Act provides that a buyer of goods at above the prescribed ceiling price may sue the seller "in any court of competent jurisdiction" for not more than three times the amount of the overcharge plus costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. Section 205 (c)2 provides that federal district courts shall have jurisdiction of such suits "concurrently with State and Territorial courts." Such a suit under § 205 (e) must be brought "in the district or county in which the defendant resides or has a place of business The respondent was in the automobile business in Providence, Providence County, Rhode Island. In 1944 he sold an automobile to petitioner Testa, who also resides 1"(e) If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, except as hereinafter provided, bring an action against the seller on account of the overcharge. In such action, the seller shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court, plus whichever of the following sums is the greater: (1) Such amount not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the overcharges, upon which the action is based as the court in its discretion may determine, or (2) an amount not less than $25 nor more than $50, as the court in its discretion may determine: . . . . Any action under this subsection by either the buyer or the Administrator, as the case may be, may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction. . . 56 Stat. 34 as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640, 50 U. S. C. App., Supp. V, § 925 (e). 2 "The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal proceedings... and, concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all other proceedings under section 205 of this Act. . . ." 56 Stat. 32, as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640, 50 U. S. C. App., Supp. V, § 925 (c). |