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Wooden agt. Strew.

SUPREME COURT.

ELIZABETH WOODEN agt. WILLIAM W. STREW.

Where the allegations in the complaint consisted of averments of the occurring of various distinct acts, conversations, omissions, and intentions of the defendant, tending to show that he committed the fraudulent act for which he was prosecuted, each of these allegations asserting the occurrence of a circumstance that would be relevant testimony upon the trial of the cause, but neither of them, nor all combined, constituted the fraudulent act itself—held, to be irrelevant and redundant.

Because they would give to the complaint the effect of a bill of discovery, and would be an examination of the defendant by bill and answer, which is not permitted by the Code.

Besides, the words "facts constituting a cause of action" in the Code, (§ 142,) mean those facts which the evidence upon the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.

Kings Special Term, June, 1853.-Motion by the defendant to strike out portions of the complaint as "irrelevant and redundant."

The complaint is for relief, and concludes with the following prayer :

"And the plaintiff asks that the deed so fraudulently obtained be ordered by this court to be set aside and cancelled, or that the said defendant reconvey the said property to the said plaintiff, or that the said deed be re-formed, so as to give this plaintiff the possession of the premises during her life, with a right of way to the said grave-yard, and that the said plaintiff have damages to five hundred dollars for the waste committed upon said premises, or for such other relief as to this court shall seem meet, and that the defendant be enjoined in the meantime against conveying the same to any other party or parties."

The facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant in this case are,—

1st. The defendant, by fraud, obtained from the plaintiff a deed for real estate worth six thousand dollars.

2d. The defendant frauduently drew a deed different from what the plaintiff directed him to draw.

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IBRARY.

NEW-YORK PRACTICE REPORTS.

Wooden agt. Strew.

3d. The defendant fraudulently suppressed from the knowl edge of the plaintiff portions of the deed which plaintiff signed. These are the facts in the case-the conclusions-established by the various acts and circumstances alleged in the complaint. The defendant, by this motion, contends that the acts and circumstances alleged and set forth in the complaint are redundant, because they are mere evidence tending to establish the existence of the alleged frauds; and that the allegations in relation to the defendant's profession, the manner in which he became acquainted with the plaintiff, and his ceasing to visit the plaintiff after he had obtained the deed, are irrelevant, and could not even be introduced as evidence upon the trial of the

cause.

N. F. WARING, for plaintiff.

JOHN A. LOTT, for defendant.

MORRIS, Justice. The proper determination of this motion depends upon a correct construction of the Code of Procedure. The portions of the Code applicable to this question are the following: viz., §§ 140 and 142, in relation to the form and contents of a complaint. § 168, that all material allegations alleged in the complaint, and not controverted by the answer, are to be taken as true; § 159, that every subsequent pleading be verified (except a demurrer) when the previous pleading was verified; § 389, abolishing all suits for discovery, and directing that no party shall be examined by the adverse party except in the manner prescribed by the 6th chapter of the Code. Chapter 6 prescribes the manner in which an adverse party is to be examined, and § 395 provides, that when an adverse party is under examination by his opponent, he may be examined in his own behalf. Each of these provisions of the Code must be so construed and applied as to give full effect and power to the others. I will now apply the provisions of all these sections to the complaint under consideration.

The allegations in the complaint which are objected to consist of the averments of the occurring of various distinct acts, conversations, omissions, and intentions of the defendant, tendVOL. X.

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Wooden agt. Strew.

ing to show that he committed the fraudulent act, for which he is prosecuted. Each of these allegations assert the occurrence of a circumstance that would be relevant testimony upon the trial of the cause; but neither of them, nor all combined, are the fraudulent act for which the defendant is prosecuted. If these allegations are legally in the complaint, the complaint being upon oath, the defendant, by section 159, is obliged to answer upon oath whether they are true or false; or should he not deny them in his answer, they are, under the 168th section, deemed to be true, and would be read upon the trial as evidence in the cause. This construction would give the complaint the full effect of a bill of discovery, and would be an examination of the defendant by bill and answer. Such operation of a complaint is not permitted, because § 389 of the Code abolishes all suits for discovery, and directs that no party shall be examined by the adverse party except in the manner prescribed by the 6th chapter of the Code.

The 6th chapter of the Code provides that parties are to be examined in the same manner as witnesses; and that when a party is introduced as a witness by the adverse party, he may also be examined on his own behalf. These provisions of the Code are inconsistent with the right to retain in the complaint the allegations objected to.

Section 142, subdivision 2, in relation to the form and contents of a complaint, is as follows:

§ 142. "The complaint shall contain,"

2d. "A plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, without unnecessary repetition."

This section must be so construed as to give full effect to the other provisions of the Code alluded to, and that can only be done by deciding that the words "facts constituting a cause of action" mean those facts which the evidence upon the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of the fact.

Motion of defendant granted, with $10 costs of motion.

Wetmore agt. Roberts and others.

SUPREME COURT.

WILLIAM C. WETMORE, executor, &c., agt. ENOCH C. ROBERTS

and others.

A foreclosure of a mortgage under the statute, without giving a junior mortgagee notice, does not take away his right to redeem.

An assignee, whose assignment has been recorded, has the same rights as incumbrancer as the mortgagee-consequently has the same right to redeem. Where the assignee of a junior mortgage, whose assignment was recorded, was not notified of a statute foreclosure, and sale under a prior mortgage-held, that he had a right to redeem. But it appearing that at the time of such sale, the interest of the assignee in the premises was not worth anything; and that the purchaser purchased in good faith, supposing he was getting a good title in fee to the premises, went on and made valuable permanent improvements -held, in an action by the assignee for a foreclosure of his junior mortgage, and sale of the premises, that the value, at the time of this latter sale, of the permanent improvements so made upon said premises, must be deducted; out of which sums the mortgagees of the purchaser who made the improvements, and other liens created by him, were to be paid according to their priority, and the balance, if any, paid to the original purchaser-the remainder, if any, after such deduction, to be applied to the junior mortgage assignee and his costs.

This was an action to foreclose a mortgage, made by the defendants, Enoch C. Roberts, Frederick W. Allen, and William Hickock, to Daniel A. Galloway, on the 28th of July, 1842, to secure the sum of $2,129.25, upon certain premises situated in the town of Waterford, N. Y., consisting of water-power, which were then subject to a mortgage of $1,500, previously given by John Pettit and wife (from whom the mortgagors in this case derived title) to one Mahala Van Nort; subject to the payment of this last-mentioned mortgage, the mortgage in this action was given. Daniel A. Galloway, on the 26th of August, 1842, duly assigned this mortgage to John H. Howland of the city of New-York. The mortgage and assignment were recorded in Saratoga county, clerk's office, September 3d, 1842. The plaintiff is the executor of the estate of John H. Howland, deceased. The complaint states that the whole principal sum of $2,129.25 is due, with interest thereon from

Wetmore agt. Roberts and others.

the 28th of July, 1848; and demands that the premises may be decreed to be sold according to law; that the moneys arising from the sale may be brought into court; that the plaintiff may be paid the amount due on the bond and mortgage, with interest to the time of such payment, and the costs and expenses of the action so far as the amount of such moneys properly applicable thereto will pay the same; and that the defendants, Enoch C. Roberts, Frederick W. Allen, and William Hickock, may be adjudged to pay any deficiency which may remain after applying all of said moneys properly applicable thereto; and that the plaintiff may have such other or further relief, or both, in the premises as shall be just and equitable.

The defendants, John Cramer, committee of the estate of Charles Burr, Edward F. Bullard, Francis S. Claxton, and Charles Wetmore, put in their joint and several answer to the complaint; by which it appeared that the mortgage upon said premises given to Mahala Van Nort for $1,500, dated June 17, 1839, and recorded July 19, 1839, was afterward duly sold and assigned to Charles Burr, a lunatic, of whose estate John Cramer was the committee; that on the 22d day of November, 1849, the sum of $78.93 was due and unpaid thereon; and on that day notice that said mortgage would be foreclosed by a sale of the mortgaged premises on the 23d day of February, 1850, was duly given and published as the statute requires, and by serving a copy at least twenty-eight days prior to the day of sale on all persons having a lien on said premises, and upon the subsequent mortgagees, including said Galloway; that on the said 23d day of February, 1850, the said premises were duly sold at public auction to Alfred W. Sexton, of Waterford, N. Y.; that said premises were sold in parcels, and the whole bids amounted to $85, being less than the amount due and unpaid on said mortgage, including costs of foreclosure; that said premises were then subject to four or five years' back rent; that they sold for all they were worth at that time, as the buildings on said premises were totally destroyed by fire in July, 1849. Subsequent to the mortgage sale, the defendant, Claxton, purchased said premises of said Sexton, and erected buildings

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