part of foreigners as to taking, holding, possessing, conveying and transmitting land, had incorporated into the Revised Statutes of 1857 the following provision, originally enacted in May, 1854 (Supplement, p. 994), and which I cite, though it only partially meets the particular grievance which I had proposed to bring especially to your Excellency's notice: "Real estate belonging or hereafter coming or descending to any woman born in the United States, or who has been otherwise a citizen thereof, shall, upon her death, notwithstanding her marriage with an alien and residence in a foreign country, descend to her lawful children of such marriage, if any, and their descendants in like manner and with like effect, as if such children or their descendants were native born or naturalized citizens of the United States." (Revised Statutes of Rhode Island, ed. 1857, p. 318.)

Several other States of the Union, to whose laws it will be proper hereafter to refer, have likewise assimilated the tenure by aliens of land to that of citizens of the United States.

I have thus far considered the law in regard to the transmission of property to aliens, as it was understood to be before the passage of the "act concerning the rights of American citizens in foreign States," of July 27, 1868, and the conclusion of several naturalization treaties between the United States and other powers, determining the nationality of their respective citizens and subjects.

No cases, as far as I am aware, have come before

the courts since these measures were adopted, nor were the treaties in question preceded in this country by any discussions as to the important changes which, by defining the status of aliens and citizens, they might introduce into the laws of property in the several States of the Union. But we have ample commentaries on the effects of the treaties in the diplomatic correspondence between the British Secretary of State and the minister of that government at Washington, in the report of the royal commissioners for inquiring into the laws of naturalization and allegiance, with its valuable appendix, in the publications which the subject elicited in England, including the essay of the Lord Chief Justice (Cockburn), devoted to an examination of "the law relating to subjects and aliens, with a view to future legislation," and especially in the act of Parliament (33 Vict., ch. xiv), entitled "An act to amend the law relating to the legal condition of aliens and British subjects," passed the 12th of May, 1870. This act embodies the result of all previous investigations as to the changes that would be effected by the convention, which was signed the next day (13th May, 1870), between Great Britain and the United States, not only in the political status of their respective subjects and citizens, but in the law of England relating to the acquisition and transmission of property by aliens.

It cannot escape observation that the British publicist, in adapting the existing laws to the new order of things, enjoys an advantage over the American in

having the whole field of legislation before him, while here it is the federal power which determines the national status by which the municipal law of property must be interpreted. An act of Parliament prepared under such circumstances to meet an exigency, equally arising in all countries, where the English common law prevails, commends itself to our careful consideration.

Not only does the power of naturalization exist in the United States to the exclusion of State authority, but the several departments of the federal government, from the very origin of our institutions, have maintained different doctrines as to the effect of a foreign naturalization on the prior allegiance of an American citizen.

The acts of Congress require, besides the oath of allegiance to the United States, a renunciation by the applicant for naturalization of all foreign allegiance, particularly to the power or State of which he was a subject or citizen.* In all our diplomatic discussions, as well in those that grew out of the impressment question, itself one of the principal causes of the war of 1812 with England, as in the recent negotiations, leading to the conclusion of the naturalization treaties, the United States have ever contended that naturalization by a foreign State, whether with or without the consent of the country of the individual naturalized, absolves him from all allegiance to the State of his origin. The only difference between the earlier and later cases has

* See Appendix A, I.

been as to the effect of a voluntary return of a naturalized citizen to his native country on his claim while there to the protection of the United States.

Contrary to the course of the Executive and of Congress, the courts of the United States, as well as those of the States generally, have in common with the English courts and with the ancient legislation of Parlia ment, considered naturalization, not as creating a new nationality substituted for that of origin, but as one superadded to it, leaving it to the party to reconcile the conflicting obligations of allegiance as best he might. Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, said: "From an historical view of the principal discussions in the federal courts, the better opinion would seem to be that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without the permission of government, to be declared by law, and that as there is no existing legislative regulation in the case, the rule of the English common law remains unaltered."

He added: "The naturalization laws of the United States are, however, inconsistent with this general doctrine, for they require the alien who is to be naturalized to abjure his former allegiance without requiring any evidence that his native sovereign has released him." (Kent's Commentaries, vol. II, p. 49.)

So late as 1863, in a case in the Court of Appeals of New York, the judge who pronounced the decision declared that he could not concur in the opinion expressed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and by Secretary

Cass, that a citizen has a right to renounce his allegiance at pleasure. (Ludlam v. Ludlam, New York Reports, vol. XXVI (Smith, vol. XIII), p. 356.)

In order to meet the embarrassment arising from a conflict of allegiance, in cases of inheritance of property, the doctrine of double allegiance has been resorted to by the English and American courts. "By the law as established in Great Britain, as well as in this country,' said an eminent New York judge, "there is of necessity, in many cases, a double allegiance. Thus, where the citizens of one country are naturalized in the other, and where issue are born, in the one, of parents who are citizens of the other country." (Sandford's Chancery Reports, vol. I, p. 583, Lynch v. Clarke.)

The same views are expressed in the case in the Court of Appeals of Ludlam v. Ludlam, already cited, where it is said, quoting an English authority: "As to the anomaly and inconsistency of Americans being citizens of the United States, while there, and being British subjects born when here, this is not a novelty, nor is peculiar to Americans. It may happen to any British subject, and is allowable in our law, which recognizes the double character of being, as was before shown, ad fidem utriusque regis." (Chalmer's Colonial Opinions, p. 702-3.)

As to the double allegiance of married women— "In every country, except where the English law prevails," said the Lord Chief Justice of England, in 1869, "the nationality of a woman on marriage merges in