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balance between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The canal made it possible to pre-position certain types and tonnage, but always with the knowledge that the balance could be shifted to meet unforeseen situations. The Panama Canal gives the naval planner much flexibility and versatility that he would be deprived of without it. In effect, it permits using a one-ocean navy in two oceans.

As Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff I became even more sensitive to the strategic value of this U.S. canal as a means of protecting the security of the United States. My job as Chairman involved all of the Armed Forces of the United States-their collective requirements—and I was primarily responsible to the President for their ability to carry out their roles and missions as assigned by the Congress. Any commander acting in that capacity will immediately perceive that it is vital to U.S. interests to retain complete ownership and control of the Panama Canal.

It was at this juncture of my command responsibility, which was at the end of my active duty, that I became concerned about the proposals to surrender the Panama Canal to a leftist-oriented government allied with Cuba. There existed the potential danger for giving this U.S. advantage to a man who might allow or might be persuaded that it was in his best interest to permit Soviet power and influence to prevail by proxy over the canal, in much the same manner as happened in Cuba. I was convinced as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I remain convinced today-that if the Soviet Union ever gained even proxy sovereignty and control over the U.S. Canal Zone and canal through Cuba, U.S. security as well as U.S. prosperity would be placed in serious jeopardy.

The United States would be placed in jeopardy because interocean mobility would be threatened. The mobility of allied commercial shipping and naval forces would face the same threat. The economic lifelines of the entire Western Hemisphere would be needlessly jeopardized, and the point is: There is no point in surrendering this vital interest. I have yet to see any solid justification advanced as to why the United States should willingly sacrifice the strategic advantages afforded to us by our possession of the Panama Canal.

Also, by relinquishing control of the Canal Zone and the canal, we would force all those nations who depend on our power and leadership to accommodate to the adverse implications of such action on our part. The Canal Zone could become the satellite base of an adversary, and the advocates of giveaway do not appear to take this factor into account.

I might expand on that point to a degree-that is, the need for the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal is one of the four maritime gateways of the world. The four gateways are the Molucca Straits, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Panama Canal.

In addition to that, we have the situation today where we are heavily dependent upon Middle East oil. Middle East oil constitutes a large part of our imports. Although it is perhaps not generally known, we are now importing about 50 percent of the oil consumed in the United States. The so-called VL-CC's, the very large commercial carriers, must come around South Africa.

In just 5 years the U.S. strategic position in Africa has significantly deteriorated. There was a time, Mr. Chairman, about 5 years

ago when we could cover an oil convoy from the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea to either Western Europe or the Western Atlantic and use nothing but Portugese airfields, all of which were readily available to the United States. All of these airfields are gone. The Soviets are in every one of them. They are in Angola, as you know, by virtue of using the Cubans to get there.

Were the sealanes interdicted, then you would see a heavy, heavy demand on the Panama Canal for the transport of those critical materials which normally come around that Cape.

I think that the developments in Africa in the last 5 years have a very serious impact. To me, they certainly seem to make the Panama Canal a more valuable strategic resource than they have been in the past.

For the foregoing reasons and others not listed, I cosigned with three former Chiefs of Naval Operations a letter to President Carter. The key message in that letter was this:

Under the control of a potential adversary the Panama Canal would become an immediate crucial problem and prove a serious weakness in the overall U.S. defense with enormous potential consequences for evil.

The military and commercial considerations are obvious.

Although the large aircraft carriers and large supertankers cannot use the canal, 97 percent of the world's commercial and naval fleets can use the canal as it is. The canal, of course, always needs repair and certainly modernization from time to time.

About two-thirds of all the current canal traffic is bound to or from U.S. ports. When ships round the Horn instead of going through the canal, they must travel about 8,000 extra miles, have 8,000 extra miles of wear and tear, need 8,000 extra miles of fuel. On an average it takes 31 extra days to round the Horn. I have seen an estimate which indicates that it would cost the Navy in excess of $30 million annually just because of the difference in the fuel cost of coming through the canal and going around the Horn.

There is another interesting aspect of this that Judge Crowe made reference to. I do not think this is really understood by many. It is very expensive to transport the oil from the Middle East to the United States. It is very expensive. It is a long way.

If, as it now appears necessary, the oil from Alaska must be shipped from Valdez to either the gulf coast or the east coast of the United States where a large number of the refineries are, of course we will have to use the canal. This would mean that there would be something like 20 cents a barrel less in the overall transportation costs of the oil brought from Alaska to the east coast, as opposed to bringing it from the Persian Gulf to the east coast.

In short, if we are denied use of the canal, we would have to build a much larger Navy, much larger storage and harbor facilities on both the east and west coasts of the United States, and provide more merchant ships as well as escorts.

Surrender of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone would inevitably lead to the transformation of the entire friendly character of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Everything would depend on the attitude of those who held sovereignty and ownership.

Mr. Chairman, there are those who say that the fact that a great big country like the United States dominates the small countries like

Panama is looked on with disfavor by many of the other countries in this hemisphere. I do not believe that. I think that there may be a few who have expressed this feeling, such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, perhaps Mexico and Colombia, but on balance, in my view, I feel that these nations recognize that the stability and security and the fairness and objectivity and the efficiency provided by the United States in the Panama Canal is significant to their interests. They do not have confidence that this would continue in the event that the situation was changed.

I might say that in military affairs there is no substitute for ownership of the territory and the ability to control or to deny the waters and the airspace.

After having lived through three decades of conflict I do not believe it takes much imagination to envision some of the pitfalls we might face in turning the U.S. Canal Zone and the canal over to any government that might see fit to deny its use or use it against us.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to include in the record the letter signed by the four Chiefs of Naval Operations, including myself as part of my statement.

Senator ALLEN. Without objection, it will be included in the record. [The aforementioned letter was subsequently supplied for the record:]

The PRESIDENT,

The White House,
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 6, 1977.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS former Chiefs of Naval Operations, fleet commanders and Naval Advisers to previous Presidents, we believe we have an obligation to you and the nation to offer our combined judgment on the strategic value of the Panama Canal to the United States.

Contrary to what we read about the dec'ining strategic and economic value of the Canal, the truth is that this inter-oceanic waterway is as important, if not more so, to the United States than ever. The Panama Canal enables the United States to transfer its naval forces and commercial units from ocean to ocean as the need arises. This capability is increasingly important now in view of the reduced size of the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific fleets.

We recognize that the Navy's largest aircraft carriers and some of the world's super-tankers are too wide to transit the Canal as it exists today. The supertankers represent but a small percentage of the world's commercial fleets. From a strategic viewpoint, the Navy's largest carriers can be wisely positioned as pressures and tensions build in any kind of a short-range, limited situation. Meanwhile, the hundreds of combatants, from submarines to cruisers, can be funneled through the transit as can the vital fleet train needed to sustain the combatants. In the years ahead as carriers become smaller or as the Canal is modernized, this problem will no longer exist.

Our experience has been that as each crisis developed during our active service World War II, Korea. Vietnam and the Cuban missile crisis-the value of the Canal was forcefully emphasized by emergency transits of our naval units and massive logistic support for the Armed Forces. The Canal provided operational flexibility and rapid mobility. In addition, there are the psychological advantages of this power potential. As Commander-in-Chief, you will find the ownership and sovereign control of the Canal indispensable during periods of tension and conflict.

As long as most of the world's combatant and commercial tonnage can transit through the Canal, it offers inestimable strategic advantages to the United States, giving us maximum strength at minimum cost. Moreover, sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Canal Zone and Canal offer the opportunity to use the waterway or to deny its use to others in wartime. This authority was especially helpful during World War II and also Vietnam. Under the control of a potential

adversary, the Panama Canal would become an immediate crucial problem and prove a serious weakness in the over-all U.S. defense capability, with enormous potential consequences for evil.

Mr. President, you have become our leader at a time when the adequacy of our naval capabilities is being seriously challenged. The existing maritime threat to us is compounded by the possibility that the Canal under Panamanian sovereignty could be neutralized or lost, depending on that government's relationship with other nations. We note that the present Panamanian government has close ties with the present Cuban government which in turn is closely tied to the Soviet Union. Loss of the Panama Canal, which would be a serious set-back in war, would contribute to the encirclement of the U.S. by hostile naval forces, and threaten our ability to survive.

For meeting the current situation, you have the well-known precedent of former distinguished Secretary of State (later Chief Justice) Charles Evans Hughes, who, when faced with a comparable situation in 1923, declared to the Panamanian government that it was an "absolute futility" for it "to expect an American administration, no matter what it was, any President or any Secretary of State, ever to surrender any part of (the) rights which the United States had acquired under the Treaty of 1903," (Ho. Doc. No. 474, 89th Congress, p. 154). We recognize that a certain amount of social unrest is generated by the contrast in living standards between Zonians and Panamanians living nearby. Bilateral programs are recommended to upgrade Panamanian boundary areas. Canal modernization, once U.S. sovereignty is guaranteed, might benefit the entire Panamanian economy, and especially those areas near the U.S. Zone.

The Panama Canal represents a vital portion of our U.S. naval and maritime assets, all of which are absolutely essential for free world security. It is our considered individual and combined judgment that you should instruct our negotiators to retain full sovereign control for the United States over both the Panama Canal and its protective frame, the U.S. Canal Zone as provided in the existing treaty.

Very respectfully,

ROBERT B. CARNEY.
ARLEIGH A. BURKE.
GEORGE ANDERSON.
THOMAS H. MOORER.

Admiral MOORER. Regarding the question of sovereignty, ownership, and control of the U.S. Canal Zone and the canal, I am not a lawyer, but I am satisfied with the Supreme Court's decision of 1907 in the famous Wilson v. Shaw case that the United States does have legal sovereignty and ownership for the purposes enumerated in the treaty of 1903. Judge Crowe described that much better than I.

This ruling, I think, was reaffirmed by a lower court as recently as 1972. Also, our Constitution states in article IV, section 3, clause 2, that only Congress has the authority to dispose of U.S. territory and other property of the United States.

The language in the Supreme Court's decision of 1907 is quite precise. It is not ambiguous. So is the language in our Constitution. Since the Supreme Court's decision of 1907 still stands-it has never been overruled and since the Constitution, in my opinion, is still the best governing document in existence, I can only conclude that we would be well advised to abide by these documents in our negotiations with other countries.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. Admiral Moorer, thank you for your very fine statement. I must say that you do not leave much unsaid in opposition to the giveaway of the Panama Canal. You leave very little that can be said by those who favor giving away the canal. Your logic is unanswerable and certainly unassailable. As you pointed out, the experience that you have had in the Navy, and all the way up the ladder to the

very highest rank in the Navy-from Commander of the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet and the Supreme Allied NATO Commander and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsin all of these capacities you saw the great value and necessity of our ownership and control of the canal.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. Absolutely.

Senator ALLEN. I do not know of anybody in the entire country that is better qualified to speak on the value of the Panama Canal to the American people than you. I think that you have made a fine statement. You pointed out the danger of the Panama Canal falling into the hands of our adversaries. I have in mind that you feel that there is an excellent chance that it would fall under Communist domination, greatly to our detriment. I agree with you that very little has been brought forward to show the necessity of doing this.

Why give the canal away? The postulated necessity for that is something you cannot understand, and something we cannot understand. I feel that you have made a fine statement not only on the question of the provisions of the Constitution on the disposal of American property, but of the tremendous value from a national security standpoint of the Panama Canal. Certainly it seems to be a great folly on our part to even consider doing this, but certainly we feel that not only the Senate should pass on this question, but if a treaty is agreed upon we further believe that the Constitution should be followed in the matter of the disposition of American property.

This disposition would require statutory action by both Houses of Congress. I certainly agree with your analysis and feel that your testimony makes a valuable contribution to the solution of the problem and the direction that we should take. I think you have performed a service to the committee and to your country, which has been your way of life all of your life.

We appreciate it.

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say that during the Cuban crisis and immediately thereafter I made a speech wherein-everybody was quite excited about Russian missiles. in Cuba. It really did not concern me, because you could deploy a submarine and do the same thing.

I said at the time that it would be far better to have an agreement with the Russians to leave the missiles and take the Russians out. Who would have thought at that time that we would have 12,000 Cubans by proxy in Angola? Anyone in this country who thinks that Soviet Russia is not staring down the throat of the Panama Canal is very naive, and I think it says something to note that the Soviets understand the importance of the Panama Canal apparently far more. than many in our own country.

Senator ALLEN. You are certainly correct.

Admiral Moorer, I think you and I, as Alabamians, can take pride in the work of Senator John P. Morgan in pushing for a canal, because he favored the Nicaraguan route and almost won out there in the Senate. The Panama route was decided on, so he switched to that, as you know. He has been called "the father of the Panama Canal."

I guess we wish now that he had won out on the Nicaraguan route, because it might not be as difficult now. I recall Senator Morgan with pride when we talk about the Panama Canal.

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