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672 Justice of the Peace.

INDEX.

Landlord and Tenant.

court on the return day that the party asking it wants the assistance
of counsel. Warner v. Comstock, 615.

appeal from; particulars of claim, 478 (1).

arrest on justice's warrant; false imprisonment, 451 (2).

docket entry of garnishment proceedings; title, 305.
entry of plea of title in trespass, 234 (1).

judgment not interfered with in equity. 295.

no standing attorney for receiving service, 412 (1).
presumption of regularity of magistrate's action, 451 (1).
proceedings to amend return of service. 412 (2).
Justification-by privilege, in libel, 224 (5).

of seizure of meat in market, 426.

Laches-in complaining of duress, 196 (2).
in equitable proceedings, 40 (4), 196 (1).
in pressing claim against relation, 298 (3).
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. A tenant cannot, by buying in a title adverse to his landlord's,
relieve himself of the obligations of his tenancy; and if he does so
and repudiates the tenancy the landlord can dispossess him. Morse
v. Byam, 594.

2. No particular form of words is necessary, in a lease from month to
month, to constitute a condition precedent to the vesting of the ten-
ant's estate, but unless the mutual intention that it shall be a condi-
tion appears from the language or circumstances, it will be treated
only as a covenant. Hilsendegen v. Scheich, 468.

3. A mere agreement by a tenant from month to month to pay rent in
advance is a personal covenant, and not a condition precedent to the
right of possession, especially if in practice the rent is not always
collected in advance; nor can it be construed as a series of successive
agreements made at the beginning of each month, for a month's ten-
ancy. Id.
4. Where a lease provides for monthly payments, but does not fix the
time for payment, rent is not due till the end of the month; but it is
competent to agree that it shall be paid in advance and to make such
payment a condition to the vesting of any estate in the tenant. Id.
5. The re-entry clause in a lease provides for its termination if the ten-
ant holds over contrary to the conditions or covenants thereof. Held,
that this refers to such conditions and covenants as are in the nature
of limitations, and not to the lessee's mere agreement to do certain
things. Langley v, Ross, 163.

6. The erasure of a re-entry clause in a lease divests the landlord of the
statutory remedy for recovering possession on the tenant's default in
paying rent, because no terms of limitation are left in the lease, and
the covenants are no longer linked with a condition. Id.

7. The common-law definition of a tenancy at will prevails in Mich-
igan in the absence of a statutory definition. Hilsendegen v. Sheich,
468.

8. A tenancy from month to month without other limitation, and deter-
minable at the choice of either party to the lease, is a tenancy at will,
and so is a holding over pending negotiations for a renewal of the
lease; and the tenant is entitled to notice to quit even if he holds
over without paying. How. Stat. § 5774. Id.

judgment against tenant; crops, 169.

mutuality in lease in common interest, 629 (1).

renting for half profits does not make one a partner, 187 (1).
right of tenant-in-common to claim all, 111 (2).

See LEASE.

LARCENY.

1. Whether taking merchandise away from the door of a store clandes tinely, is not a larceny from the store itself, and therefore a compound larceny under How. Stat. § 9137-Q. People v. Wilson, 507.

2. Where the evidence of a larceny would in itself be sufficient for conviction, the plea that the act was done for fun, and while the person doing it was drunk, is not enough to protect him from arrest. Id. arrest without a warrant, 507 (8).

evidence of, in prosecution for murder, 506 (2, 3).

Lease-by railway company does not release its obligations, 16 (4). form of condition precedent, 468 (2-4).

in common interest; mutuality, 629 (1).

outstanding, as breach of covenant, 196 (3).

Leave to file information in nature of quo warranto, 15 (2, 5).

Legislature-must take notice of contents of Legislative Journal, 94 (2).
Letters of administration, as evidence of right to sue, 336 (8).
Levy-interest therein of plaintiffs in separate actions, 297 (2).
priority of chattel mortgage over, 399 (1).

LIBEL.

1. A railroad company supplied certain of its agents with a tabulated list of employees who had been discharged, stating in parallel columns the name and occupation of the employee and under the heading "Why discharged" the reason. Held, where the reason given was stealing," the statement was libelous, and its issue to agents was a publication. Bacon v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 224.

2. The question whether a libel was not privileged cannot properly be raised in an appellate court after it has been excluded below by a ruling that publication has not been shown. Id.

3. It is for the court to determine whether the subject matter of a libel and its author's interest in and relations to it, make it a privileged communication; but it is for the jury to decide as to his good faith, belief in the statement and actual malice. Id.

4. Corporations, in Michigan, can be sued for libel.

Id.

5. Privilege is to be shown in an action for libel as a justification, after publication has been proved. Id.

LIEN.

A judgment enforcing a lien upon logs for labor done thereon (How. Stat. 8412-8427) was affirmed by the equal division of the Supreme Court, which did not agree that the affidavit filed by the claimants was sufficient to sustain the judgment, if not objected to before. The objections considered fatal were that it did not agree that the parties represented by plaintiff had united their claims, or that they had designated plaintiff as their agent or attorney to enforce the lien, or that the respective sums claimed were less than one hundred dol lars each, or as to who was the owner of the logs. Babcock v. Cook, 1. of chattel mortgage, not affected by offset, 615 (3).

on filing creditor's bill, 39 (3).

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

1. Where notwithstanding a deed to one person another went into exclusive possession and exercised acts of ownership, and such possession was recognized by all mesne grantees of the first, the occupant's adverse title is a question for the jury in an action of ejectment against him by one claiming under the deed. McCall v. Wells,

171.

2. The State is bound by statutes of limitation, and can give no title by selling, after twenty years, an old tax bid for premises that have meanwhile been held adversely long enough to bar ejectment for them. Chamberlain v. Ahrens, 111.

3. Ejectment for land held under a tax deed is barred after ten

55 MICH-43

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674 Limitation of Actions.

INDEX.

Master and Servant.

years' adverse possession. How. Stat. § 8698. This will apply to a claim under a tax deed that conveys an undivided half of the premises, but does not specify which half; it is only necessary that the claim be consistent with the face of the deed; and the deed need not be good.

Id,

4. A payment made upon the same day with the last of a series of charges will render the whole account open and mutual, so as to take previous charges out of the statute of limitations. Hollywood v. Reed, 308.

5. A payment or new promise by one of several joint debtors will not in Michigan keep the obligation alive as to another who had no part or privity therein. Probate Judge v. Stevenson, 320. against sureties on guardian's bond, 320 (6). instructions as to effect of payment, 308 (3). probate claim where note is outlawed, 410. renewal of note to prevent outlawry, 230 (1). Limitations-upon legislative powers, 445 (3).

Lis pendens-identifying descriptions in different instruments, 370 (2). Logs-affidavit to establish lien thereon, 1.

obstruction of stream by booming logs, 535 (1-4). whether boom charges are reasonable, 113. Loss-estoppel by proofs of loss in insurance, 432 (2). of witnesses by death; laches, 196 (1).

Malice-a question for jury in case of libel, 224 (4).
MALICIOUS PROSEČUŤION.

In an action against a principal for malicious prosecution its agent was examined for the plaintiff and was asked if he had received a letter and telegram from his superior to go to a certain place and look after defendant's claim. Held error to exclude on cross-examination the question whether the telegram directed him to go and be a witness in the proceeding against the plaintiff. Turner v. Phænix Ins. Co., 237.

by general agent of insurance company, 236 (1).

Mandamus-costs on denial of, 485 (5).

defects in affidavit for attachment, 411.

Marriage as revocation of a woman's will, 173.

reputation as evidence of, 280 (2, 3).

when not questioned in suit by widow as administratrix, 336 (8) Married woman-as party defendant in foreclosure. 196 (5). debt from her husband her separate property, 362 (2).

testimony of, in action against husband, 362 (1).

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. The employer of a competent servant has a right to assume that the latter will behave properly in his service and under his direction. Pigott v. Lilly, 150.

2. An employee has a right to assume that it is safe to do what he is hired to do unless his knowledge warns him it is not. James v. Emmet Mining Co., 336.

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3. In an action on a contract of hire the question was whether the period of employment was by the year or by the month. The contract itself stated that the one party agreed to pay the other a specified sum per year, payable in monthly payments." Payments were in fact made monthly, but in the course of the third year of employ ment, the employee was discharged. Toward the close of the second year he had asked his employer if he was satisfied and the latter had said that he was. Held, that these facts were for the jury who were to determine what the understanding of the parties was as to the period of hire. Tallon v. Grand Portage Copper Mining Co., 147.

4. Whether a brakeman can recover against the railway company for an injury received in consequence of the conductor's managing the locomotive in the engineer's absence-Q. Judgment denying such liability affirmed by equal division. Rodman v. Mich. Cent. R. R. Co., 57.

5. A master is liable for injuries to servants that spring from such negligent acts of fellow servants as are due to their incompetency, if the master himself has been negligent in selecting competent servants, or has kept incompetent ones after hearing of their unfitness, or when he might have heard of it by using ordinary care in making inquiry. Hilts v. Chic. & G. T. Ry., 437.

6. A common workman employed about a mine, but not himself a miner, is not a fellow-employee of the miners in any such sense that he cannot recover for an injury caused him by the mining operations. And his employer is bound to see that the premises where he works are reasonably safe. James v. Emmet Mining Co., 336. evidence of incompetency of employee, 413 (6).

negligence in hiring incompetent servants, 437 (3). MAXIMS.

Actio personalis moritur cum persona is not a constitutional maxim; and the Legislature can give the representative of one who has been killed by negligent injury the right to sue therefor. James v. Emmet Mining Co., 335.

Mines and mining-declaration for injury in mine, 335 (3).
Mistake-in acknowledging set-off, 610 (3).

mistake of fact, as affecting estoppel, 142 (3).

Money had and received-is a basis of set-off, 610 (3). where count therefor lies; novation, 622 (4).

MORTGAGE.

1. The wife of a defendant in foreclosure is properly made a party because she is interested in the question whether the mortgage was for purchase-money so that its foreclosure would cut off her right of dower. But if the subpoena served on her has no underwriting to let her know the purpose of the suit, and if, in consequence, she appears and disclaims and replication is filed to her disclaimer, she is entitled to the costs of a solicitor's fee on the dismissal of the suit as to her, and if it is not allowed, to a solicitor's fee on appeal. Haldane v. Sweet, 196.

2. In a proceeding against a garnishee to whom a chattel mortgage had been given before he was put in possession of the property, questions as to the validity of the mortgage were of no consequence so long as there was no showing that he took possession by virtue of it. Folkerts v. Standish, 463.

3. A mortgage on a stock of goods need not be filed to establish its priority over levies subsequently made, if the mortgage was given to secure the negotiable notes of a purchaser who was not the execution defendant nor a creditor of his, and did not claim in hostility to the owner of the mortgage. Henry v. Ferguson, 399.

4. A chattel mortgage cannot be taken from the files in the town clerk's office: it is part of the public records; a certified copy of it will serve to show the filing, and to use in taking possession of the goods covered by it. Warner v. Comstock, 615.

5. Where one in good faith buys a mortgage on goods without notice of prior levies thereon, his rights under it cannot be affected by the fraud of his assignee or notice thereto. Henry v. Ferguson, 399. 6. The statutory provision that the mortgagee of land is not entitled to possession until after foreclosure is for the mortgager's benefit, and he can waive it by permitting the mortgagee to take possession, and such consent would be good until revoked. Morse v. Byam, 591.

676

Mortgage.

INDEX.

Municipal Corporations.

7. A mortgage in Michigan is a conveyance (How. Stat. § 5689) and cannot be foreclosed under the power of sale until it is recorded (id.

8948); and any assignment of it for the purpose of foreclosure must also be of record and so must be the assignor's authority. A foreign administrator cannot therefore assign a mortgage on Michigan land for the purpose of foreclosing it, nor can he discharge it; new letters must be taken out within the State before the mortgage can be foreclosed and the land sold. Reynolds v. McMullen, 568. 8. Where a mortgage upon real property in Michigan belongs to a person who dies in another State and whose estate is in course of regular and valid administration under a local administrator in Michigan, no foreign administrator can sell the mortgage claim to strangers; the title thereto is in the local administrator for purposes of administration, and only he can sue on it or assign or discharge it of record. Id. 9. The right of defendant in foreclosure to all the time the decree allows him for making payment, cannot be presumed waived in order to sustain a sale prematurely made without notice to him. Shier v. Prentis, 175.

10. A chattel mortgage does not cease to be a lien and the debt it secures is not to be considered paid merely because the mortgager has an offset against his creditor exceeding the debt. Warner v. Comstock,

615.

11. Partners holding an executory land contract mortgaged each his undivided interest to secure an antecedent debt. A portion only of the land was afterwards conveyed to them, and they released the rest and mortgaged their new interests to another person. The later mortgagee foreclosed and bid in the land under his decree, after which the earlier mortgagee sued and recovered on the debt to himself, and levied on the same land, which he bought at the execution sale. He then sought to foreclose against the later mortgagee. Held by an equally divided court, affirming the decree below, that his bill would lie. Edwards v. McKernan, 520.

12. A foreclosure sale in a proceeding by advertisement is void if one advertisement is made to cover two mortgages in which the descriptions were not identical, and if the mortgagce has both parcels struck off to himself on one bid and for one gross sum. Morse v. Byam,

594.

13. A mortgagee who buys in the property on foreclosure by advertisement can only convey the rights of a mortgagee if the foreclosure should turn out to be invalid; and his rights as mortgagee would entitle him to proceed to a foreclosure in equity. Id.

14. A foreclosure sale is illegal if made without a notice to defendants before the date fixed by the decree for the payment, in default of which sale may be made. Shier v. Prentis, 175.

as affected by previous notice of rights, 246 (1). deduction of, from claim against estate, 312 (5). mortgagee put on inquiry by occupancy, 8 (6). quitclaim enuring to benefit of, 370 (2).

right of general owner to mortgage goods, 399 (3). sale of, by public administrator, 468 (1).

to secure antecedent debt, 64 (2).

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. Act 394 of 1879 discontinuing the township of Sherman, which was composed of four cornering sections taken from four cornering townships in Wexford county, was enough to invalidate the contemporaneous action of the board of supervisors in establishing the township of Concord, to consist in part of the former township of Sherman. Atty Gen. v. Marr, 445.

2. The failure of a municipal council to follow strictly the provisions of

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