come of which is to be applied to the extent necessary to the keeping of the testator's family lot in a grave yard in order, the balance to be applied to other recognized charities, is valid. Nauman v. Weidman, 182 Pa. St. 203 (37 Atl. Rep. 863). The validity of a charitable bequest for the benefit of the poor of a certain town cannot be assailed because it relieves the burden of taxation. In re Strong's Appeal, 68 Conn. 527 (37 Atl. Rep. 395). A devise for a charitable purpose to a charitable corporation is not invalidated by the fact that the corporation will thereby acquire property in excess of the amount which the statute authorizes it to hold, and objection to the validity of such a devise can only be raised by the state. Farrington v. Putnam, 90 Me. 405 (37 Atl. Rep. 652; 38 L. R. A. 339). Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 3040, abrogates the rule against perpetuities so far as it applies to conveyances or devises of property for "meeting house, burying ground, or for residence of the preacher." Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141 (71 N. W. Rep. 1031; 38 L. R. A. 669; 65 Am. St. Rep. 559). Pa. Pub. Laws, 1891, p. 19, provides that no disposition of prop. erty made for the maintenance of any cemetery, church yard, etc., or monument or other erections on or about the same, shall fail by reason of such disposition having been made in perpetuity, but shall be held to be made for a charitable purpose. In re Smith's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 109 (37 Atl. Rep. 114). A devise of lands to a city for purposes charitable in their nature which perpetually suspends the power of alienation, is void under Wis. Rev. Stat., §§ 2038, 2039, the city not being a literary or charitable corporation within the exception provided for by § 2039. Beurhaus v. City of Watertown, 94 Wis. 617 (69 N. W. Rep. 986).

Sec 106.

Administration of charitable uses-Duties and powers of trustees-Power of courts. Failure to provide for conveyance by executors to a board of trustees provided for in a will creating a charity, even if it is an oversight, will not prevent the execution of the trust, as the property, even if it descends to the heirs of the executor or testator, will be held charged with the trust, and equity will place it in the proper channel of administration. In re John's Will, 30 Or. 494 (47 Pac. Rep. 341; 36 L. R. A. 242). If a trustee is

appointed by the testator, and the will shows that the object of the devise, though expressed in general terms, is for a charitable use, the trust will be declared valid. In such a case the duty devolves upon the trustee of devising a scheme for carrying the trust into effect. If a trustee is not appointed by the testator, and the will does not declare the manner in which the devise is to be made effectual, equity will not administer the trust. Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444 (26 S. E. Rep. 717; 59 Am. St. Rep. 724). Where a bequest to build a chapel at a particular place, title to which shall be vested in the bishop of the Roman Catholic church, fails of execution because the bishop refuses to co-operate in the scheme and the people of the locality are too poor to support the chapel, the fund cannot be diverted by the application of the doctrine of cy pres, to repairing and sustaining a neighboring parish church, but the bequest will be held to have failed. Teele v. Bishop of Derry, 168 Mass. 341 (47 N. E. Rep. 422; 60 Am. St. Rep. 401; 38 L. R. A. (629). The doctrine of cy pres does not prevail in Wisconsin. McHugh v. Mc Cole, 97 Wis. 166 (72 N. W. Rep. 631; 65 Am. St. Rep. 106; 40 L. R. A. 724). A trustee of a charitable trust cannot divest himself of his title without the consent of the proper court, by a conveyance executed in pursuance of a compromise made with the heirs of the creator of the trust. Nauman v. Weidman, 182 Pa. St. 263 (37 Atl. Rep. 863). Shannon's Tenn. Code, §§ 1430, 1441, giving school directors control of common school houses, does not authorize them to take control of property conveyed to trustees by individuals for certain well defined public purposes, including the use thereof as school property. Swadley v. Haynes, Tenn. (41 S. W. Rep. 1066).

Sec. 107.

Reversion of property upon abandonment of the trust. Where property is conveyed for a specific charity and the trust is abandoned, it will revert to the donor, although the deed contained no express provision for a reversion. Jenkins v. Jenkins University, 17 Wash. 160 (49 Pac. Rep. 247). The court say: "A great many cases have been cited by the appellant on the subject of somewhat similar gifts, and the right to a reversion, but many of them are not appli

cable. In most cases the property had been conveyed to a municipal corporation, and had been diverted to a different. use from that contemplated in the deed. But here was an entire abandonment of the purposes of the trust, and apparently of the property by the appellant, and the respondent's inquiry is a pertinent one,-that, if the land does not revert, what is to become of it? It can not be taken to satisfy the debts contracted, with the exception of that part which was authorized to be mortgaged; and it could not be devoted to another like charitable purpose, the specific one having failed, as is sometimes done in the case of a devise. If the plaintiff is not entitled to a reversion of the property under such circumstances, who is to have it? The authorities generally agree that it is not essential that such a deed shall contain a clause providing for a reversion, and, while it is to be construed againt the grantor, it must not be construed so strongly as to make it impossible to have a reversion where none is expressly provided for in terms. It seems to us, considering all the facts and the terms of the gift, that the plaintiff is entitled to a reversion; and even if the deed had contained an express condition to that effect, it could have made the case little, if any, stronger. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. (2 Ed.), § 1032; 1 Perry, Trusts (4th Ed.), §§ 159, 160; Gumbert's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 496 (1 Atl. Rep. 437); Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403 (21 N. E. Rep. 927; 28 N. E. Rep. 54); Schlessinger v. Mallard, 70 Cal. 326 (11 Pac. Rep. 728).”

Sec. 108. Church controversies-Title to property. Where there has been a schism in a church the members which adhere to its constitution and doctrine have the right to the possession of the church real estate although they may be in the minority. Lemp v. Raven, 113 Mich. 375 (71 N. W. Rep. 627). Following, Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich. 279 (57 N. W. Rep. 270). See Ballard's Law of Real Prop., Vol. V. § 64. Where a church organization holding property and funds in trust for the benefit of its members is divided into two new and independent organizations by an ecclesiastical body having authority to make such division the two new organizations become the successors of the original organization, and the money and property should be apportioned

according to the numerical strength of each; and this is true, although the original organization was incorporated under Cal. Civ. Code, § 595. Wheelock v. First Presbyserian Church 119 Cal. 477 (51 Pac. Rep. 841). Citing, Gaff v. Greer, 88 Ind. 122 (45 Am. Rep. 449); Winebrenner v. Colder, 43 Pa. St. 249; Nicholls v. Rugg, 47 Ill. 47; Ferraria v. Vasconcellos. 31 Ill. 53. The condition in a deed upon which title of lands conveyed for church purposes shall revert to the grantor cannot be invoked by one faction of the grantee to the prejudice of another. Where the rights of a faction of a church to control its property or records is mainly dependent upon matters of religious doctrine as to which the disputing factions entertain diverse views, civil courts should decline to interfere. Moseman v. Heitshousen, 50 Neb. 420 (69 N. W. Rep. 957). Under the government and usages of the Missionary Baptist denomination in Missouri the congregation of a church has the sole power to appoint its trustees, and the legal title to the property is vested in those regularly appointed and cannot be divested by the vote of a small minority acting independently, though they may alone of the membership truly represent and be governed by the "rules, usages and faith of the Missionary Baptist church of the state of Missouri." Turpin v. Bagby, 138 Mo. 7 (39 S. W. Rep. 455). For particular case determining the rights of conflicting claimants to church property see White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403 (70 N. W. Rep. 1024). Under Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 32, § 41, upon the incorporation of a church, title to its property. vests in the corporation, and it is a necessary party to any suit affecting such property. Dubs v. Egli, 167 Ill. 514 (47 N. E. Rep. 766). Minn. Sp. Laws, 1887, ch. 373, appliedconstruction of powers of the Central Park Methodist church of St. Paul, Minn.-validity of devise to. Lane v. Eaton, 69 Minn. 141 (71 N. W. Rep. 1031; 38 L. R. A. 669; 65 Am. St. Rep. 559).

COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

[In Vol. III, §§ 70-87; Vol. IV, §§ 68-71; Vol. V, §§ 65-69, will be found a compilation of the statutes and decisions of the several states and territories on the subject of Community Real Estate. Below we give such amendments, changes and additional constructions as have been made.]

Sec. 109. Arizona. (See Vol. III, § 79.) Revised Statutes § 2102 has been amended so as to read as follows: "All property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage, except that which is acquired by gift, devise or descent, or earned by the wife and her minor children, while she has lived or may live separate and apart from her husband, shall be deemed the common property of the husband and wife, and during the coverture may be disposed of by the husband only; Provided, that the wife joins in all deeds or mortgages to real estate." Laws 1899, p. 43. All property purchased during coverture whether the conveyance be taken in the name of the husband or that of the wife or in their joint names, is to be deemed prima facie community property and during his life the husband has entire control over commuity property and can sell and convey it without his wife's joinder in it. Rev. Stat. 1887, § 2102. Tuttle v. Green, Ariz. (48 Pac. Rep. 1009).

Sec. 110. California. (See Vol. III, § 80; Vol. IV, § 68; Vol. V, § 65.) The provisions of Civ. Code, § 172, as amended March 31, 1391, Acts 1891, p. 425 (see Ballards' Law of Real Property, Vol. III, § 80), which provides that the husband " cannot make a gift of such community property or convey the same without a valuable consideration unless the wife in writing consents thereto," is unconstitutional as to community property acquired before its passage. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339 (48 Pac. Rep. 228; 58 Am. St. Rep. 170; 36 L. R. A. 497). A surviving wife has no rights under Civ. Code, § 1402, in community property which are not subject to an allotment of the probate homestead, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1465. In re Still's Estate, 117 Cal. 509 (49 Pac. Rep. 463). Particular evidence held sufficient to rebut the presumption that a husband's interest in partnership property, upon a division thereof, was community property. In re Boody's Estate, 119 Cal. 402 (51 Pac. Rep. 634). Construing Civ. Code, § 679, which provides that "the ownership of property is absolute when a single person has absolute dominion over it," in connection with § 172, which before its amendent by the act of March 31, 1891, gave the husband "the management and control of the community property, with the like absolute power of possession (other