v. Wakefield, 19 Mont. 23 (47 Pac. Rep. 5). Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 103, § 22, sufficiency of report of commissioners-recommital of report-writ of seisin. Skolfield v. Skolfield, 90 Me. 571 (38 Atl. Rep. 530.) Neb. Comp. Stat. ch. 23, §§ 8-11, construed and applied-jurisdiction of county court to assign dower. Clemons v. Helehan, 52 Neb. 287 (72 N. W. Rep. 270). Under R. I. Gen. Laws, ch. 264, § 23, upon the waiver of the right to appeal from a decree assigning dower, it becomes final. Hammond v. Hammond, 19 R. I. 400 (37 Atl. Rep. 14).

Sec. 154. Death of widow pending action to determine dower rights. Applying Mont. Code Civ. Proc., § 22, it is held that where a widow dies pending an action brought by her for dower and for rents and profits, the right to collect the rents and profits of the dower estate survives to her personal representative. Lynde v. Wakefield, 19 Mont. 23 (47 Pac. Rep. 5). Citing, Pollitt v. Kerr, 49 N. J: Eq. 65 (22 Atl. Rep. 800); Curtis v. Curtis, 2 Brown Ch. 620; Magruder v. Smith, 79 Ky. 512; McLauglin v. McLaughlin 20 N. J. Eq. 190; Paul's Ex'rs v. Paul, 36 Pa. St. 270; Harper v. Archer, 28 Miss. 212; Price v. Hobbs, 47 Md. 359. Where, pending an assignee's application to sell the land of her husband, it is adjudged upon the wife's consent that she receive in lieu of her dower interest its value in money, and a determination of the value of such interest is reserved for the further judgment of the court, prior to which determination she dies, it is held that her right to receive dower will be treated as adjudicated and her legal representative will be entitled to receive the value of her dower interest. Brooks' Assignee v. Summers, 100 Ky. 620 (38 S. W. Rep. 1047).

DANGEROUS PREMISES.

Sec. 155.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Liability of owner to his tenant.

Where

steps to the entrance of a building are used in common by the tenants thereof, a tenant injured on account of a defect in a

step cannot recover damages from his landlord, unless it is shown that he knew of the unsound condition of the step or could have known it by the use of reasonable care. Lynch v. Swan, 167 Mass. 510 (46 N. E. Rep. 51). Where it does not appear that the landlord warranted the premises free from defects or agreed to keep them in repair at the time of the leasing, he is not liable to his tenant for an injury resulting to him from a defect in the premises which existed at the time of the leasing, although he was afterwards notified of such defect and promised but failed to remedy the same. Dowling v. Nuebling 97 Wis. 350 (72 N. W. Rep. 871). Where a portion of a building is let and the tenant has the right of the use of the elevator in common with the landlord and other tenants, such elevator to be operated by the tenant when required by his business necessities, and the landlord expressly covenants in the lease that he will keep the elevator and approaches in constant repair and in perfect condition for the lessee's use, and the landlord retains the general control over the elevator and its approaches, there is no such leasing as will exonerate the landlord from all responsibility for the safe condition of the elevator. Olson v. Schultz, 67 Minn. 494 (70 N. W. Rep. 779; 64 Am. St. Rep. 437; 36 L. R. A. 790). Particular case in which the question whether or not a tenant was guilty of contributory negligence in using defective premises was held to be a question of fact for the jury. Johnson v. Collins, 98 Ga. 271 (26 S. E. Rep. 744).

Sec. 156. Liability of owner for injury to servants or visitors of his tenant. Where a landlord retains possession of a roof, used in common by his tenants in a building for hanging clothes to dry and for other purposes for which the roof of a dwelling house is commonly put, he is liable for injuries resulting from its defective condition, to a servant of one of his tenants while rightfully thereon. Wilcox v. Zane, 167 Mass. 302 (45 N. E. Rep. 923). Where property, at the time of the demise, is not a nuisance and an injury happens to a third party performing an act for the lessee while he has entire possession and control of the premises, the owner is not liable. Hanson v. Beckwith, 20 R. I. 165 (37 Atl. Rep. 702; 38 L. R. A. 716). In Massachusetts it is held that a

landlord is not liable for injuries resulting from a defective tenement to one who calls on the tenant for purely business purposes and not on business in which the tenant is engaged. Ganley v. Hall, 168 Mass. 513 (47 N. E. Rep. 416). One who enters upon a private driveway at the invitation of a tenant, cannot recover from the landowner for injuries resulting to him on account of his frightened horse throwing him into a dangerous excavation on the owners' premises, twenty feet distant from the driveway. Gorr v. Mittelstaedt, 96 Wis. 296 (71 N. W. Rep. 656). The court say: "Where the dangerous place is so far removed from the boundaries of the premises designed for travel that a traveler thereon, in the exercise of ordinary care, is not liable to be injured, if in fact there is a substantial space between the boundaries of the traveled way and the dangerous place, so that to reach such place the traveler must necessarily wander from or pass wholly outside such traveled way, and become a trespasser, in order to reach the danger, then, as a matter of law, such place cannot be held to be substantially adjoining such way so as to render it unsafe, within the meaning of the rule governing the subject, and a verdict to the contrary by a jury cannot change the fact. Such fact being conclusive, it is the law as well, and not open to consideration by a jury."

Sec. 157. Liability of owner for injury to children. It is not negligence for a landowner to permit surface water to accumulate in a pond on his land without fencing or enclosing the same and he is not liable for the death of a trespassing infant drowned therein. Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345 (47 Pac. Rep. 113; 56 Am. St. Rep. 106). Citing, Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271 (32 N. W. Rep. 223; 60 Am. St. Rep. 854) ; Overholt v. Vieths, 93 Mo. 422 (6 S. W. Rep. 74; 3 Am. St. Rep. 557); Hargraves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1; Gillespie v. McGowan, 100 Penn St. 144 (45 Am. Rep. 365); Richards v. Connell, 45 Neb. 467 (63 N. W. Rep. 915.) A waterworks company which maintains upon its grounds deep reservoirs of water, attractive to small boys, who, to its knowledge, and with its permission, resort thereto for fishing and for play, and which takes no reasonable precaution to prevent accidents to them while engaged in such amusements, is liable in damages

if one of them without negligence on his part, falls in and is drowned. Price v. Atchison Water Co., 58 Kan. 551 (50 Pac. Rep. 450; 62 Am. St. Rep. 625). Citing, Car Works v. Cooper, 60 Ark. 545 (31 S. W. Rep. 154; 46 Am. St. Rep. 216); City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141 (39 N. E. Rep. 484; 45 Am. St. Rep. 114). Criticising the cases cited above it is held by the supreme court of Texas in the case of Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 60 (41 S.W. Rep. 62; 66 Am. St. Rep. 856; 38 L. R. A. 573), that the railroad company is not liable for the death of a child, occurring without negligence on the part of its parents, occasioned by its drowning in a pool of water which the company had permitted to remain on its right of way within a few feet of a path leading to its station which path was designed for the use of persons going to and from such station on business, it not appearing that the child was or had been traveling or attempted to travel said path at or just before it got into the pool. The court say: "The common law imposes no duty upon the owner to use care to keep his property in such condition that persons going thereon without his invitation may not be injured. In considering the question as to whether a duty exists, there is no distinction between a case where an infant is injured, and one where the injury is to an adult, though where the duty is imposed the law may exact more vigilance in its discharge as to the former. If there be no duty, the question of negligence is not reached, for negligence can in law only be predicated upon a failure to use the degree of care required of one by law in the discharge of a duty imposed thereby. Since the common law imposes no duty on the railroad to use care to keep its right of way in such condition that persons going thereon without its invitation may not be injured, and since there is no evidence in the record from which the jury could have found such invitation to the child, it was no more liable in law for its death than would have been a neighbor had it wandered onto his uninclosed lands and been drowned in his tank or creek, or been killed by falling down his precipice. Since the principles above stated have been so fully and ably discussed heretofore by many learned jurists, we deem it unnecessary to undertake to elaborate them, but will content ourselves by referring to the opinion of the

court of civil appeals, Missouri, K. &. T. Ry. Co.v. Dobbins, Tex. Civ. App. (40 S. W. Rep. 861), and the following cases decided upon similar facts: Hargraves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1; Railway Co. v. Edwards, 90 Tex. 65 (36 S. W. Rep. 430; 32 L. R. A. 825); Moran v. Car Co., 134 Mo. 641 (36 S. W. Rep. 659; 56 Am. St. Rep. 543; 33 L. R. A. 755); Charlebois v. Railroad Co., 91 Mich. 59 (51 N. W. Rep. 812); Clark v. Manchester, 62 N. H. 577; Greene v. Linton, 27 N. Y. Supp. 891; Murphy v. City of Brooklyn, 118: N. Y. 575 (23 N. E. Rep. 887); Witte v. Stifel, 126 Mo. 295 (28 S. W. Rep. 891; 47 Am. St. Rep. 668); Galligan v. Manufacturing Co., 143 Mass. 527 (10 N. E. Rep. 171); O'Connor v. Railroad Co.,44 La. 339 (10 So. Rep. 678); Richards v. Connell, 45 Neb. 467 (63 N. W. Rep. 915); Benson v. Traction Co., 77 Md. 535 (26 Atl. Rep. 973; 39 Am. St. Rep. 436; 20 L. R. A. 714); Sterger v. Van Sicklen, 132 N. Y. 499 (30 N. E. Rep. 987; 28 Am. St. Rep. 594; 16 L. R. A.. 640); Frost v. Railroad, 64 N. H. 220 (9 Atl. Rep. 790; 10 Am. St. Rep. 396); Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271 (32 N. W. Rep. 223; 60 Am. Rep. 854); Oil Co. v. Morton, 70 Tex. 400 (7 S. W. Rep. 756; 8 Am. St. Rep. 611); Clark v. City of Richmond, 83 Va. 355 (5 S. E. Rep. 369; 5 Am. St. Rep. 281); Ratte v. Dawson, 50 Minn. 450 (52 N. W. Rep. 965); City of Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530 (9 N. E. Rep. 155)."

Sec. 158. Liability of owner-Defective approaches, entrances or elevators. The owner of a building, constructed and occupied by stores and offices, which the public have an implied invitation to enter, is bound to exercise reasonable care and prudence to provide a safe and suitable entrance to such stores and offices, and to have the approaches thereto so constructed and maintained, that visitors are not liable to step into dangerous pitfalls by reason of misleading doors and deceptive landings. Foren v. Rodick, 90 Me. 276 (38 Atl. Rep. 175). Citing, Stratton v. Staples, 59 Me. 94; Campbell v. Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552; Sawyer v. McGillicuddy, 81 Me. 318 (17 Atl. Rep. 124; 10 Am. St. Rep. 260; 3 L. R. A. 458); Shipley v. Associates, 101 Mass. 251 (3 Am. Rep. 346); Readman v. Conway, 126 Mass. 374; Looney v. McLean, 129