Mass. 33 (37 Am. Rep 295); Learoyd v. Godfrey, 138 Mass. 315; Gordon v. Cummings, 152 Mass. 518 (25 N. E. Rep. 978); Hayward v. Miller, 94 Ill. 349 (34 Am. Rep. 229); Camp v. Wood, 76 N. Y. 92 (32 Am. Rep. 282); Gillvon v. Reilly, 50 N. J. L. 26 (11 Atl. Rep. 481. Where one without permission or knowledge of the owner of a building was injured by taking passage in an elevator out of repair and not in use, which he operated himself rather than wait for an elevator in active use and supplied with attendants, he is guilty of contributory negligence which prevents his recovering damages from the landowner. Hansen v. State Bank Bldg. Co., 100 Ia. 672 (69 N. W. Rep. 1020).

Sec. 159. Liability of owner-Particular cases. An abutting owner is liable to one of the public for an injury occasioned by a post which he planted on the edge of a highway to protect the public from an insecure sewer previously construced by him. Gunther v. Dranbauer, 86 Md. 1 (38 Atl. Rep. 33). The failure of an owner to enclose a dangerous excavation, as required by a city ordinance, does not render him liable for injuries to a trespasser who has been warned not to go upon the premises. Butz v. Cavanaugh, 137 Mo. 503 (38 S. W. Rep. 1104; 59 Am. St. Rep. 504). The owner of premises is not relieved from liability for injuries resulting from the fall of a fence thereon, on account of defects in its construction or from want of repair, by reason of the fact that he has granted to another a parol license to use the fence as a bill board. Chapman v. Boardman, 69 Conn. 93 (36 Atl. Rep. 1007). The owner of a grain elevator is not liable for injuries resulting to a third person, on account of a defecting railing along an approach to the elevator, which occurred on account of his leaning against the railing while engaged in conversation, thus putting it to a use for which it was not intended. Kinney v. Onsted, 113 Mich. 96 (71 N. W. Rep. 482; 38 L. R. A. 665). If the owner of a lot abutting upon a street of a municipality, for the use of his property, constructs a vault under the sidewalk, over which he negligently places and maintains a defective covering, he is liable directly to a footman injured thereby notwithstanding the omission by the municipality of the duty imposed upon

it by statute to keep the street in repair. Morris v. Woodburn, 57 O. St. 330 (48 N. E. Rep. 1097) Where the owner of premises upon which there is a defective structure executes and delivers a conveyance thereof, which is delivered to his grantee and the latter takes possession, such owner is not liable for injuries subsequently sustained by one of the public on account of such defective premises. Palmore v. Morris, 182 Pa. St. 82 (37 Atl. Rep. 995; 61 Am. St. Rep. 693). N. Y. Laws 1892, ch. 673, § 6, construed and applied -duties and liabilites of owner of factory building as to the construction of fire escapes. Huda v. American Glucose Co., 154 N. Y. 474 (48 N. E. Rep. 897; 40 L. R. A. 411).

DEDICATION.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 160. As to what constiutes-General principles. The fact that an owner of vacant and unoccupied land passively acquiesces in the public traveling over it on a certain route, does not show an intention to dedicate, Tutwiler v. Kendall, 113 Ala. 664 (21 So. Rep. 332); but in Utah it is held that where the public assumed to appropriate land for a public use and the owner interposes no objection, but acquiesces in its continual use by the public for such a length of time that the public convenience and accommodation might be materially affected by an interruption of the enjoyment, an intention to dedicate will be presumed. Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240 (51 Pac. Rep. 980). After a vendor has executed and recorded his agreement to sell an interest in land to another, he cannot dedicate it for a public square by subsequently filing his plat on which it is designated as such. South Baltimore Harbor Imp. Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537 (37 Atl. Rep. 27). Where one in a conveyance of land refers to adjacent land as a street the conveyance implies a covenant that the purchaser shall have the use of such street whether the consideration is valuable or nominal. Flersheim v. City of Baltimore, 85 Md. 489 (36 Atl. Rep. 1098). The

validity of a dedication of land for the purpose of a highway is not affected on account of such highway being advantageous to the private interests of the dedicator. Fairbury Union Ag. Board v. Holly, 169 Ill. 9 (48 N. E. Rep. 149). Where the mortgagee makes no objection, a third person cannot assail the validity of a dedication of land to highway purposes, on the ground that the premises had been previously mortgaged by the dedicator. McClung v. Missouri Trust Co., 137 Mo. 106 (38 S. W. Rep. 578).

Sec. 161. As to what constitutes-Particular cases. A proposition by a land owner to a city, to change the location of a street, which is accepted and kept open by the latter, constitutes a dedication of the ground occupied by the street as re-located. Swetman v. City of Deadwood, 9 S. Dak. 380 (69 N. W. Rep. 582). Where the owner of a tract of land to the edge of which L street extended, by his conveyance of parcels thereof, left a strip the width of the street properly located for its extension and in one of the deeds referred to a boundary line as intersecting "the east side of what will be L street when the same shall be extended," it was held that such acts constituted a dedication of the strip as an extension of the street. Kentucky Refining Co. v. Selvage, Ky. (41 S. W. Rep. 288). Cal. Stat. 186768, p. 379; Stat. 1869-70, p. 586, construed and applieddedication of land by city of San Franciseo as a Home of Inebriates-transfer of title to private corporations. Home for Care of the Inebriate v. City and Co. of San Francisco, 119 Cal. 534 (51 Pac. Rep. 950).

Sec. 162. As to what constitutes-Maps and plats. Where the owner of a tract of land makes a town plat of it, with spaces on it that appear to form no part of any of the platted lots but indicate streets or avenues and the lots are sold with reference to the plat, the presumption is that such spaces are dedicated to the public as streets or avenues; and purchasers have a right to rely upon such presumption unless there is something in the plat to remove it. Porter v. Carpenter, 39 Fla. 14 (21 So. Rep. 788). Citing Meier v. Railway Co., 16 Or. 500 (19 Pac. Rep. 610; 1 L. R. A. 856) ;

Shea v. City of Ottumwa, 67 Ia. 39 (21 N. W. Rep. 582); City of Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 472; Hanson v. Eastman 21 Minn. 509; City of Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200 (51 Am. Rep. 749). Where a vendor represents to his vendee that certain strips adjoining the land conveyed, which he has designated by stakes are for streets, the vendee takes the right to use such strips as streets, though his deed described the land conveyed by metes and bounds and made no reference to streets. Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298 (49 Pac. Rep. 178; 59 Am. St. Rep. 186). A conveyance of land in reference to a plat may establish a dedicatian of a street marked thereon as to all persons who obtained title to lots sold according to such plat although the record of the plat is a nullity. Town of Woodruff Place v. Raschig, 147 Ind. 517 (46 N. E. Rep. 990). The fact that a plat of a town fails to clearly distin. guish a triangular lot, large enough for the erection of a building, lying at the intersection of streets, does not establish a dedication of such lot to the public in the absence of other evidence showing an intention on the part of the owner to dedicate the ground to a public purpose and an acceptance of it by the public. Steinaur v. City of Tell City, 146 Ind. 490 (45 N. E. Rep. 1056). Where, before the acceptance of a dedication by plat of a street extending to an adjacent river, the several owners of the land affected joined in partition deeds, in which a ferry owned and operated by them from the end of the street is excepted and reserved, the right of the public in the street terminates at the water's edge. Bartlett, J., dissenting. Mark v. Village of West Troy, 151 N. Y. 453 (45 N. E. Rep. 842).

Sec. 163. Dedication of public squares or parksRights of abutting owners. Where a land company platted lands for a town and designated on the plat a large tract as "Avondale Park," which it claimed exempt from taxation and improved for park purposes, with reference to which it sold lots representing the park tract as a public park and charging more for lots fronting thereon, it is held that such acts constitute an irrevocable dedication to the public use. Avondale Land Co. v. Town of Avondale, 111 Ala. 523 (21 So. Rep. 318). A public square in a town or village, which

for more than eighty years has been treated as such by the county court of the county, has been recognized as such by the municipal authorities of the town, and used as a public square by the court and the public generally, must be considered as dedicated as a public square for the use of the public. Sturmer v. County Court, 42 W. Va. 724 (26 S. E. Rep. 532; 36 L. R. A. 300). Construing Neb. Comp. Stat., ch. 14, § 106, which provides that a plat duly acknowledged and recorded is equivalent to a deed in fee simple of such portion of the premises platted, as is on such plat set apart for streets and other public uses, it is held that a plat, properly acknowledged and recorded, showing the subdivision of land into blocks and lots, with streets traversing the same, with a block in the center thereof not subdivided into lots, and with no alley traversing the same, as was the case with other blocks, said block being designated "Ehmen's Park" (Ehman being the owner of the land subdivided), operated as a statutory dedication of that block for a public park; and the frequent use of the donors's name to designate the park, does not imply a reservation of the land for his private use. Ehmen v. Village of Gothenburg, 50 Neb. 715 (70 N. W. Rep. 237). Where plats of land in the city of Chicago designated certain portions as "Open ground. No buildings." "Public ground. Forever to remain vacant of buildings;" all of which land the city declared by resolution should be enclosed as a public park, which was designated by successive ordinances as "Lake Park," it is held that such acts amounted to a dedication for public use and created a restriction against the erection of buildings upon the land so designated, which restrictions. were not destroyed by the temporary submergence by water of portions of the land, and they extend to adjacent land subsequently acquired by the city by filling in the shoal waters of the lake adjacent to them. Owners of abutting lots may maintain an injunction to prevent a violation of the restriction against the erection of buildings, and their right to do so is not barred by the fact that they have consented to the erection of some buildings, or by the change of the use of buildings abutting thereon, from residence to business purposes. City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392 (48 N. E. Rep. 927; 61 Am. St. Rep. 185; 38 L. R. A. 849).