Sec. 164.

Acceptance of dedication-NecessityWhat constitutes. An acceptance by the public is necessary to the completion of a dedication. Steinaur v. City of Tell City, 146 Ind. 490 (45 N. E. Rep. 1056); Brown v. Taber, 103 Ia. 1 (72 N. W. Rep. 416); Sarver v. Chicago, B. & 2. R. Co., 104 Ia. 59 (73 N. W. Rep. 498). Until the city has accepted the dedication of streets and alleys, it has no rights in respect to them. Jordan v. City of Chenoa, 166 III. 530 (47 N. E. Rep. 191); Village of Crete v. Hewes, 168 Ill. 330 (48 N. E. Rep. 36). In North Carolina it is held that a private citizen cannot dedicate a public highway on his own motion without the sanction of the authorities. State v. Gross, 119 N. C. 868 (26 S. E. Rep. 91).

A town's acceptance of the dedication of land for an alley may be shown by its draining and otherwise improving it as a highway. Fairbury Union Ag. Board v. Holly, 169 Ill. 9 (48 N. E. Rep. 149). The city taking control of part of the alleys and streets designated on a recorded plat does not amount to an acceptance of others. Jordan v. City of Chenoa, 166 Ill. 530 (47 N. E. Rep. 191). The acceptance. by a municipality need not be evidenced in any formal way, yet if the act relied upon as constituting the acceptance is a iegislative act, it is insufficient if it is ultra vires, or lacks the necessary legislative formality. Thompson v. Ocean City R. Co., N. J. Eq. (37 Atl. Rep. 129). Dedication. of a highway upon country land, which is never accepted by the county in which it is located is not accepted by a city, to which such land is subseqently annexed, merely extending its jurisdiction over such such street. City of Baltimore v. Broumel, 86 Md. 153 (37 Atl. Rep. 648). Iowa Code 1873, § 527, providing that an acceptance of a dedicated street by a city can only be made "by an ordinance especially passed for such purpose," applies to cities only; and the statute only refers to the streets and alleys which are dedicated to the public use by the land owner, and not to streets and alleys, the title to which has been acquired by a city by purchase or by prescription. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. City of Columbus Function, 104 Ia. 110 (73 N. W. Rep. 501).

Sec. 165. Revocation or abandonment of dedication. Where an offer to dedicate land for a street is not accepted and it has not been used by the public for such purpose, the landowner may revoke the dedication. Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298 (49 Pac. Rep. 178; 59 Am. St. Rep. 186); Brown v. Taber, 103 Ia. 1 (72 N. W. Rep. 416), applying Ia. Code 1873, § 564. A dedication of land for a public square by the making of a plat and selling lots in reference thereto, cannot be revoked except by the joint. action of all the parties interested. Moore v. Kleppish, 104 Ia. 319 (73 N. W. Rep. 830). The dedication of land to be implied from a reference to it as a street in conveyance of adjacent land, is revoked by the subsequent conveyance of the land intended for a street to the same grantee before an acceptance of the dedication. Clendening v. Maryland Const. Co., 86 Md. 80 (37 Atl. Rep. 709). A dedication of land for use as a street by conveyances of adjacent land which refer to the street as such, is unaffected by a delay in opening the street, Flersheim v. City of Baltimore, 83 Md. 489 (36 Atl. Rep. 1098); but purchasers of platted lands entitled to insist upon the dedication of certain portions of the plat to use as streets and public grounds may bar their claim by acquiescing in the private occupancy and improvement of such portions by others for more than 20 years. Mason v. City of Chicago, 163 Ill. 351 (45 N. E. Rep. 567).

Sec. 166.

Miscellaneous notes. A statute (How. Ann. Mich. Stat., § 3323) authorizing a railroad company corporation to acquire lands by grant or by condemnation, does not authorize it to acquire lands by dedication. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste M. Ry. Co. v. Marble, 112 Mich. 4 (70 N. W. Rep. 319). See Ballards' Law Real Prop., Vol. IV, § 122. Where the fact of a removal of a fence is given in evidence to show a dedication of land to highway purposes, it is competent to show the intention of the party in removing the fence. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Noftsger, 148 Ind. 101 (47 N. E. Rep. 332). One making a dedication of a street may reserve the right to use a portion of it for railroad purposes, and persons acquiring lots adjacent to such street with knowledge of this reservation are

estopped to dispute its exercise. Tallon v. City of Hoboken, 59 N. J. L. 383 (36 Atl. Rep. 693); Tallon v. City of Hoboken, 60 N. J. L. 212 (37 Atl. Rep. 895). Grantees of land who take a conveyance of it after its dedication and acceptance as a street, from the owner who made the dedication, and with knowledge of the public use in accordance therewith, take subject to such dedication and the rights of abutting owners whose title was acquired previously. Elliott v. Jenkins, 69 Vt. 134 (37 Atl. Rep. 272).

DEEDS.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 167. As to what constitutes a conveyanceConsideration-Use of seal. Where an instrument in addition to containing all necessary provisions of a lease provides that if the person named as a lessee faithfully performs certain conditions the grantor and his wife "do hereby grant to him one day after my and my wife's death, the farm or tract of land described in this agreement his heirs and assigns forever," it is held that the instrument is a valid present grant of the lands described. Fitz v. Menges, 179 Pa. St. 122 (36 Atl. Rep. 213). Love and affection are a sufficient consideration. for a deed from a husband to his wife. Tillaux v. Tillaux, 115 Cal. 663 (47 Pac. Rep. 691). Making provision for a minor child is a meritorious consideration for a deed. Hutsell v. Crewse, 138 Mo. 1 (39 S. W. Rep. 449). Particular evidence held sufficient to establish an agreement on the part of a son to support his father in consideration of a conveyance by the latter to him. Walker v. Walker, 104 Ia. 505 (73 N. W. Rep. 1073). Where there are several signers there need not be a separate seal for each as several may adopt one seal. Warder, Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Stewart, 2 Marvel (Del.) 275 (36 Atl. Rep. 88).

Sec. 168. Grantor and grantee - Designation and name-Grantee's knowledge of execution of deed. When

a middle initial is added to a name or omitted from it in a conveyance so as to raise a doubt that the maker of a deed is the owner of the land, a further description of the maker in the deed as the heir of a certain other person deceased, and a statement in the notary's certificate of acknowledgment that she is known to him to be the same person described in, and who executed the deed, will remove such doubt, and establish prima facie the identity of the maker. Blomberg v. Montgomery, 69 Minn. 149 (72 N. W. Rep. 56). In Alabama it is held to be well settled "that when a deed of conveyance is subscribed by more names than one, and some of the subscribers' names are not shown in the body or granting clause, 'while others are there shown, such instrument is not the deed, and does not convey the interest, of those whose names are omitted from the granting clause, and shown only in the signatures, when there is nothing in the deed to indicate an intention on their part to become grantors." Johnson v. Goff, 116 Ala. 648 (22 So. Rep. 995). A deed made to an intended grantee, by the wrong name, is not void and his identity may be established by parol. Salmer v. Lathrop, 10 S. Dak. 216 (72 N. W. Rep. 570). Where a grantee named in a deed subsequently conveys in due form the land described, it is immaterial that the deed was executed without his knowledge, and was not actually delivered to him, but was delivered to the party who actually purchased the land and procured the execution of the deed in which he was named as grantee. He acquiesces and assents to the transaction by his subsequent conveyance. Nor is the validity of the deed to him affected by the fact that the grantor had no knowledge, when executing and delivering the same, that the real purchaser was not named as grantee therein. Crowley v. C. N. Nelson Lum. Co., 66 Minn. 400 (69 N. W. Rep. 321).

Sec. 169. Filling blanks. A blank in a deed, left for the grantee's name, may be filled by an agent under authority given by parol by the maker of such deed. Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 783 (26 S. E. Rep. 262). Citing, Speake v. U. S., 9 Cranch 28; Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24; Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119, 128 (3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517); Cribben v. Deal, 21 Or. 211 (27 Pac. Rep. 1046; 28 Am. St.

Rep. 746). Filling a blank in a deed to trustees for the benefit of creditors with the name of the attorney who is employed to defend the conveyance and his charge for services, after the execution of the deed, will not invalidate it when done with the consent of the parties. Martin v. Buffaloe, 121 N. C. 34 (27 S. E. Rep. 995).

Sec. 170. Effect of failure to affix revenue stamp. The failure to affix a revenue stamp to a deed as required by Act of Congress, July 13, 1866, does not of itself render the deed invalid or inadmissible in evidence. Trowbridge v.

Addoms, 23 Colo. 518 (48 Pac. Rep. 535). The court say: "The first ground of the objection, based upon the fact that there was no revenue stamp affixed to the deed, was not well taken. Assuming that the mere notations in the margin of the records was sufficient to show the want of such stamp, nevertheless the deed was not invalidated thereby, nor rendered inadmissible in evidence. To render the deed void as a conveyance, under the terms of the United States statute of 1866 relating to stamps upon written instruments, it was incumbent upon the party questioning its validity to show that the stamp had been omitted with intent to evade the provisions of the act. In the case of Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243 (3 Am. Rep. 339), the court had under consideration the provisions of this act, and after noticing the prior acts upon the subject, and the changes and modifications thereof that had been made by the latter statute, held that it was not the intent or purpose of that act to render unstamped deeds and instruments which passed title absolutely void, and said: 'The only reasonable construction of all these provisions, taken together, is that an instrument not duly stamped at first is not by reason thereof absolutely void, but only voidable by proof that the stamp was bmitted with intent to defraud the revenue.' Patterson v. Gile, 1 Colo. 200. In the case of Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452, it was held that 163, which enacted that no deed, instrument, etc., required by law to be stamped, should be recorded or admitted in evidence without being duly stamped, applied only to courts of the United States, and could not be construed to extend to or bind the state courts. To the same effect are