of his death and without having disposed of the land by deed or will, the title shall pass to others, is valid and the execution by the grantee of a deed of trust is not a disposition of the land within the meaning of the conveyance, where no sale has been made thereunder before the death of the grantee. ridge v. Mc Common, 90 Tex. 234 (38 S. W. Rep. 33).

Lock

Sec. 178. Construction of particular deeds. Where, in a deed, the vendor declared that he sells the property with full warranty without a word of reservation, exception or limitation, a clause at the very close of the deed which declares: "In trust that said premises shall be used and kept, maintained and disposed of as a place of divine worship, for the use of the ministry and membership of the Colored Episcopal Church in America, subject to the discipline, usage and ministerial appointments of said church, or from time to time authorized and declared by the general conference of said church and the annual conference within whose bounds the said premises are situated," is no part of the contract between the vendor and his vendee; it is an enuciation foreign to the disposal of the property, in which the vendor who has parted absolutely with his entire interest had no concern. It is merly a clause declaratory of the object for which the purchase was made. Board of Trustees of Seventh St. Col. M. E. Church v. Campbell, 48 La. 1543 (21 So. Rep. 184). Where a grantor in contemplation of marriage to a certain woman executed a deed of trust in which he directed the trustee to make certain conveyances to the beneficiary at the grantor's death if he "should die unmarried to such woman," or if she survived him, it is held that the condition as to his dying "unmarried," did not mean that he should not marry such woman, but meant only that she should not be his wife at the time of his death. Muller v. Balke, 167 Ill. 150 (47 N. E. Rep. 355). To the same effect is the case of Peters v. Balke, 170 Ill. 304 (48 N. E. Rep. 1012). A warranty deed executed by a father to his daughter is not void because it stipulates that it is "only to take effect at the death of the grantor," but it will be construed to convey to the grantee the fee subject to a life estate in the grantor. Harshbarger v. Carroll, 163 Ill. 636 (45 N. E. Rep. 565). Where the granting clause of a deed of real estate to "L. wife

of E.," contained no words of inheritance but was followed by a habendum clause reading, "to have and to hold the said lots to the said L., to the children of her body begotten by the said E., to her heirs. executors, and to the assigns of the said L. and E., forever," it is held that the deed conveyed to L. a life estate with an estate in fee in expectancy to her or her heirs or to the assigns of herself and E., subject to a contingent life estate in her children begotten by E. Downing v. Birney, 112 Mich. 474 (70 N. W. Rep. 1006). A conveyance of a meeting house, by an academy to a religious corporation, on condition that the grantor may use it for "public exhibitions and other purposes," does not authorize its use of such property for daily morning prayers by its students. Trustees of Philips Exeter Academy v. New Parish in Exeter, N. J. Eq. (36 Atl. Rep. 548). Construing the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47, which declars that "in all creeks, coves and other places about and upon the salt water where the sea ebbs and flows, the proprietor of the land adjoining shall have propriety to low water mark," it is held that the conveyance of uplands are commonly expected to convey the adjoining flats. But the proprietor of the upland and adjoining flats or shore has "the propriety" of both, and hence may convey the whole or any part of his "propriety." He may convey the uplands alone and retain the flats, or convey the flats alone and retain the uplands. In an instrument of conveyance of land bordering upon tide water, a description of the boundary lines as running "to the shore" and" thence by the shore and upland to the first bound," operates to sever the shore from the upland, and to exclude it from the conveyance. Freeman v. Leighton, 90 Me. 541 (38 Atl. Rep. 542). Particular instrument construed and held to constitute a deed and not a mortgage. Knowles v. Williams, 58 Kan. 221 (48 Pac. Rep. 856). For construction of particular deed as to power of sale, see Adams v. Mauermaun, 90 Tex. 438 (39 S. W. Rep. 280). For constructian of particular deed conveying a mine and a mill site, see Idaho Gold-Min. Co, v. Union Min. & Milling Co., Ida. (47 Pac. Rep. 95). For construction of particular conveyance as to whether it conveyed the island referred to by Act of Congress, Sep. 27, 1850 (9 Stat. 496), see Lovejoy v. Willamette Falls Elec. Co., 31 Or. 181 (51 Pac. Rep. 197).

Sec. 179. Recitals in deeds. A recital that the grantor is a widow is presumptively true, although it appears that she was previously married. Harman v. Stearns, 95 Va. 58 (27 S. E. Rep. 601). Recitals in a deed referring to another deed which creates an outstanding title in another, charges the grantee with notice of such title. Simms v. Freiherr, 100 Ga. 607 (28 S. E. Rep. 288).

Sec. 180.

Restraints upon alienation. A condition in a deed conveying an estate in fee simple, prohibiting any alienation by the grantee for a specified time, is void. Latimer v. Waddell, 119 N. C. 870 (26 S. E. Rep. 122). See opinion for review of authorities. In the recent case of Zillmer v. Landguth, 94 Wis. 607 (69 N. W. Rep. 568), the supreme court of Wisconsin say: "It now seems well settled that, when a conveyance or devise is made in fee, a condition attempted to be annexed thereto to the effect that the purchaser or devisee shall not for any period of time convey or alien the estate is void for repugnancy. Potter v. Couch, 141 U. S. 296 (11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005); Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (18 Am. Rep. 61); Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476 (9 N. E. Rep. 919); Conger v. Lowe, 124 Ind. 368 (24 N. E. Rep. 889; 9 L. R. A. 165); Todd v. Sawyer, 147 Mass. 570 (17 N. E. Rep. 527); De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N. Y. . (2 Selden) 467 (57 Am. Dec. 470); Van Horne v. Campbell, 100 N. Y. 287 (3 N. E. Rep. 771); Schouler, Wills, § 602. See, upon this subject generally, Saxton v. Webber, 83 Wis. 617 (53 N. W. Rep. 905); Van Osdell v. Champion, 89 Wis. 661 (62 N. W. Rep. 539; 46 Am. St. Rep. 864; 27 L. R. A. 773)." Where a testator devised all of his property to his wife "on condition that in no case shall she give or bequeath one cent of such estate to any member of my family or to any relation of her own," it is held that the condition is against public policy and void for being in restraint of alienation. Morse v. Blood, 68 Minn. 442 (71 N. W. Rep. 682). The court say: "Conceding that, as a general proposition, a condition against alienation to particular classes of persons is good, still such a condition may be so vexatious as practically to prohibit all alienation for at least a limited time. Thus, in the present case there are many parcels of land. If the con

dition is good, any purchaser from plaintiff of any parcel takes it at the peril of subsequent forfeiture by any act done by plaintiff after the purchase amounting to a breach of the condition. Thus, plaintiff might give one of her relatives or one of the testator's family a meal of victuals out of the property left her by her deceased husband, and it would forfeit the whole estate so devised to her, as well that part of it which she had conveyed away to strangers as that part which she still held. If this condition is good, it is a most effectual method of restraining all alienation of the property during the life of the plaintiff, and until such time after her death as it can be definitely ascertained that she committed no breach of the condition in her lifetime. No one would during this period of time pay a fair price for the property, and take the risk of such forfeiture of his title. There is much authority for holding that a condition wholly restraining the alienation of a fee simple title for a length of time is void. Gray, Restr. Alien. Prop. § 47, 54."

Sec. 181. Restrictions as to the erection of buildings. A condition in a deed that "no building other than one single dwelling-house shall be erected, placed, or maintained on said lot," is not violated by the occupancy of a dwelling-house as an institute in which to administer the gold cure to patients having the liquor, opium, tobacco and morphine habits. Stone v. Pillsbury, 167 Mass. 332 (45 N. E. Rep. 768). Where the authorities of a county having control of a public square agree with one conveying property to them for a jail site, that no public buildings shall be erected on such public square in front of said party's house, they cannot subsequently sell the square to private parties for the erection of private buildings, and the owner of property in favor of which such covenant was made may restrain the erection of private buildings thereon. Sturmer v. County Court, 42 W. Va. 724 (26 S. E. Rep. 532; 36 L. R. A. 300). A covenant establishing building restrictions which runs with the land. and creates an easement in favor of adjoining premises may be contained in a mortgage. Brown v. O'Brien, 168 Mass. 484 (47 N. E. Rep. 195). Where a recorded deed contains an express provision that the building line shall be a specified.

distance from the street, although inserted in the descriptive part of the deed, it is binding on purchasers from the grantee whose deeds contain no reference thereto. Appeal of Townsend, 68 Conn. 358 (36 Atl. Rep. 815). Particular case in which similar restrictions as to the erection of buildings in separate deeds made to the grantees of adjoining premises are held not to create reciprocal negative easements between them. Goodwin v. Hamersley, 69 Conn. 115 (36 Atl. Rep 1065).

Sec. 182. Reservations and exceptions. A reservation of a right of way in a deed can affect only the lands conveyed and not other lands of the grantee; such a reservation is void when made in favor of one not a party to the deed. S. K. Edwards Hall Co. v. Dresser, 168 Mass. 136 (46 N. E. Rep. 420). A quitclaim deed by a husband to his wife with a reservation that she is not to convey the premises in any manner without his written consent or joining in the conveyance, and if she died before he did she was to have no further interest in the land, and if he died before she did, then the title in fee simple should pass to her, is valid, and its effect is to leave the title to the survivor. Bassett v. Budlong, 77 Mich. 338 (43 N. W. Rep. 984; 18 Am. St. Rep. 404). A stipulation in a deed which conveyed a fee subject to a life estate in a grantor, "reserving the right to occupy and use the premises * * * as freely as I might do if the fee and title remained in myself with full power to mortgage said property to raise money for my own personal benefit at any time I may desire for and during my natural life," was held to reserve to the grantor power to mortgage the fee, and not merely his life estate for the purpose therein specified. Bouton v. Doty, 69 Conn. 531 (37 Atl. Rep. 1064). Where a deed conveyed a city lot, except so much thereof as was "set apart for sidewalk purposes," it is held that the exception includes only the land actually used for sidewalk purposes, although such amount is less than the amount designated on the plat of the grant. Vincent v. City of Kalamazoo, 111 Mich. 230 (69 N. W. Rep. 501).

Sec. 183. Cancellation of deeds. A deed will not be set aside on account of mere inadequacy of price. Barry