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execution or any other judicial sale, does not bar her claiming such interest in land which has been sold on execution, as against a party who claims no title under the execution sale. Sherod v. Ewell, 104 Ia. 253 (73 N. W. Rep. 493). Miss. Code, 1892, § 1549, construed and applied-rights of widow as against husband's grandchildren by an illegitimate daughter. Hope v. Hoover, Miss. (21 So. Rep. 134).

Sec. 218. Widow's right of quarantine. A widow's right to remain on and enjoy the mansion house of her husband and the "messuages and plantation thereto belonging," until the assignment of her dower, does not give her even a possessory right to other lands of her husband. Sell v. McAnaw, 138 Mo. 267 (39 S. W. Rep. 779). This right is assignable. Carey v. West, 139 Mo. 146 (40 S. W. Rep. 661). Construing and applying N. J. Revision, p. 320, § 2 (Pub. Laws 1870, p. 22) which provides that "it shall be lawful for the widow to remain in and to hold and enjoy the mansion house of her husband, and the messuage or plantation thereto belonging without being liable to pay any rent for the same," until her dower be assigned, it is held that where the deceased husband occupied part of the building as a dwelling and the remainder was leased to a firm of which he was a member, his widow's right of quarantine is limited to that portion of the building which her husband used for a dwelling. She may bar her right of quarantine in lands by the execution of a lease thereof, although it is not binding on the executor and heirs of her husband who joined with her in its execution. Davis v. Lowden, 56 N. J. Eq. 126 (38 Atl. Rep. 648).

Sec. 219. Advancements. A voluntary conveyance from parent to child is presumed to be an advancement, and the burden of showing the contrary is upon the person who claims that it was not so intended. For the purpose of showing that such a deed was an advancement, parol evidence is admissible to show that it was made without any consideration. Finch v. Garrett, 102 Ia. 381 (71 N. W. Rep. 429). But where a conveyance recites a valuable and substantial consideration near the full value of the property, it will not be

presumed to be an advancement, and the burden of proving it an advancement is upon the person claiming it to be such. Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456 (26 S. E. Rep. 38). Where a father purchased land which he caused to be conveyed to his minor sons, it will be treated as a present advancement although the father retains possession and improves the property. Rhea v. Bagley, 63 Ark. 374 (38 S. W. Rep. 1039; 36 L. R. A. 86). An advancement to a child operates to satisfy a debt due the child if the advancement be in amount equal to or greater than the debt. Brooks' Assignee v. Summers, 100 Ky. 620 (38 S. W. Rep. 1047). Construing Ill. Rev, Stat. ch. 39, § 7, which provides that " no gift or grant shall be deemed to have been made in advancement unless so expressed in writing or charged in writing by the intestate as an advancement, or acknowledged in writing by the child or other descendant," it is held that a conveyance of land by a father to his sons, cannot be shown to have been made as an advancement by oral declarations and admissions of the parties to it. An advancement which is not evidenced in the manner required by statute, is in legal effect, no advancement at all, however clearly it may appear it was so intended. Bartmess v. Fuller, 170 Ill. 193 (48 N. E. Rep. 452). Under Ia. Code, § 2459, advancements are to be valued at what the property is worth at the time of the distribution. Finch v. Garrett, 102 Ia. 381 (71 N. W. Rep. 429).

One

Sec. 220. Rights of creditors as against heirs. inheriting land from his father, cannot subsequently claim the right of inheritance against his father's grantee in a warranty deed without offering to make good the father's warranty out of property received from his estate. Rhodes v. Rhodes,

Ky. (38 S. W. Rep. 706). The heirs are not bound to pay the debs or discharge the obligations of the ancestor unless they have received property from his estate. If they have received assets from the estate, then they are responsible to the extent of their inheritance, but beyond that they are liable neither in law nor in equity. If, then, a party seeks satisfaction for debts or obligations of the ancestor from the heirs, the burden is upon him to show that they inherited assets from the ancestor's estate. Bacon v. Thornton, 16 Utah 138 (51 Pac. Rep. 153). Citing, Cutright v. Stan

ford, 81 Ill. 240; Byrd v. Belding, 18 Ark. 118; Schmidtke v. Miller, 71 Tex. 103 (8 S. W. Rep. 638); Forman v. Stickney, 77 Ill. 575; Walker v. Deavir, 79 Mo. 664. Where an heir owes the estate more than the value of his share in it and does not pay his debt, he has no interest in the property of the estate which can be subjected to an execution sale by his judgment creditor. Tex. Rev. Stat. 1895, art. 1688, 1694, construed and applied. Oxsheer v. Nave, 90 Tex. 568 (40 S. W. Rep. 7; 37 L. R. A. 98). Under the common law, which prevails in Texas, where a deceased vendee was personally liable for the purchase money for land, payment of which was secured by a vendor's lien, as between those who take the personal property and those taking the real estate, the personal property is liable as the primary fund to discharge debt so secured. Tex. Rev. Stat. 1895, Arts. 1689, 2112; Rev. Stat. 1879, Art. 3129, construed and applied. Minter v. Burnett, 90 Tex. 245 (38 S. W. Rep. 350). Pa. Act, Feb. 24, 1834, § 34, construed and applied-defense by heirs. against claim to charge land in their possession. Paul v. Grimm, 183 Pa. St. 330 (38 Atl. Rep. 1017).

DESCRIPTION OF REAL ESTATE.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 221. Sufficiency of-General principles. A description of premises in a summons in an action for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it can be rendered certain by extrinsic evidence. Simpkins v. White, 43 W. Va. 125 (27 S. E. Rep. 361). A description, otherwise sufficient, will not be held bad because of a false statement in regard to the grantor's source of title. Langley v. Honey, 20 R. I. 698 (38 Atl. Rep. 699). Where the description in a deed or devise of real estate is impossible of ascertainment the instrument is void. If the starting point of a boundary line cannot be identified, no sufficient description may be had. Edens v. Miller, 147 Ind. 208 (46 N. E. Rep. 526). A description which furnishes means of identifying the land intended to be affected by the instrument is sufficient. Ashland Bldg. & Sav. Ass'n v. Jones,

Ky. (41 S. W. Rep. 437). A mortgage of real estate will not be invalidated by reason of an error in the description of the property, in case the remainder of the description, after rejecting the erroneous portion, is sufficiently definite to enable the land to be located. Carpenter Paper Co. v. Wilcox, 50 Neb. 659 (70 N. W. Rep. 228). The same rule applies to a description of buildings in an insurance policy. Baker v. State Ins. Co., 31 Or. 41 (48 Pac. Rep. 699; 65 Am. St. Rep. 807). But an error in the description of property in a deed cannot be disregarded unless there is a sufficient description in the deed, not only to plainly indicate the property intended, but also to show that there is an error which can be disregarded, and the property still be clearly identified. Heller v. Cohen, 154 N. Y. 299 (48 N. E. Rep. 527). If a direction or course given in a deed is impossible or senseless it must be omitted or disregarded; and if other calls or parts of the description are sufficient to identify the land conveyed, the deed must be sustained. Brose v. Boise City Ry. & Ter. Co., (51 Pac. Rep. 753). Where the sufficiency of a description depends upon the existence of a certain building and streets referred to by it, they will be presumed to exist until the contrary appears. Kleiner v. Bowen, 166 Ill. 537 (46 N. E. Rep. 1087). While the government authorities do not survey and subdivide lands within a Mexican grant, there is no reason why the owners of a Mexican grant cannot have the same surveyed and subdivided in the same way that it would be if it were a part of the public domain; and where such owners have adopted the government method of surveying and subdividing their land and have caused a map to be made showing such subdivisions, a description in accordance with the survey so made, although the map is not referred to, will be held sufficient as against all persons having notice of the map. Rea v. Haffenden, 116 Cal. 596 (48 Pac. Rep. 716).

Idaho

Sec. 222. Sufficiency of-Particular cases. A description in a tax receipt as "west half of lot 1, N. E. (N. W. N. E.) Sec. 1, T. 6, N. R. 6," was held sufficient to identify the land as "west half of lot one, N. E. quarter Sec. 1, T. 6, N. R. 6," though each lot was in fact the S. W of

said section, the letters included in the parentheses being rejected as immaterial. Perkins v. Bulkley, 166 Ill. 229 (46 N. E. Rep. 733). A description of a water ditch in a conveyance thereof, which gives general particulars as to its head and course and designates it by its descriptive name, there being no other ditch in the same county having the same name, was held sufficient. Murray v. Tulare Irrigation Co., 120 Cal. 311 (49 Pac. Rep. 563.) A description of land as one acre in a designated corner of a certain block is sufficient and the validity of the description is not affected by the fact that a highway runs through the acre. The description will be held to embrace an acre in the form of a square in the corner of the designated block. Richey v. Sinclair, 167 Ill. 184 (47 N. E. Rep. 364). A description in an administrator's deed and the probate proceedings upon which it is based, of the land sold as the interest of the decedent "in and to 830 acres" of a certain survey, is held not too indefinite to pass title, where it is made to appear that the decedent held the record title to a half interest in such tract, described by metes and bounds. Hermann v. Likens, 90 Tex. 448 (39 S. W. Rep. 282). For particular description held sufficient, see Hitchcock v. Southern Iron & Timber Co., Tenn. (38 S. W. Rep. 588). A deed which does not show the state and county in which the land is situated, the meridian to which the range should be referred, nor whether the township named in the description is north or south, is insufficient to convey title. Hartigan v. Hoffman, 16 Wash. 34 (47 Pac. Rep. 217). A description of premises embraced in a lease as "commencing at the north line of H.'s claim, running thence north up to the south line of K. and A.'s claim, thence 50 yards from low tide the full length of said claim back from said low water mark," was held to be so defective as to render the lease void. Bingham v. Honeyman, 32 Or. 129 (51 Pac. Rep. 735; 52 Pac. Rep. 755). Particular description held insufficient to sustain a judgment in ejectment. Boyer v. Robertson, 149 Ind. 74 (48 N. E. Rep. 7).

Sec. 223. Construction of descriptions. In a deed where quantity is expressed in terms of feet frontage, the words 66 more or less" will not cover a deficiency of fifty-five

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