feet in a total of 156 feet. Haynie v. American Trust Inv. Co., Tenn. (39 S. W. Rep. 860.) When a deed contains two descriptions of the land which are inconsistent with each other, that description must control which best expresses the intention of the parties as manifested by the whole instrument and the surrounding circumstances. Beardsley v. Town of Nashville, 64 Ark. 240 (41 S. W. Rep. 858). A description of land in a tax deed as block 23 "original grantee R. R1 Add." is held not to authorize the grantee to recover block 23 of Railroad Addition, the original grantee of which is W. G. Eustis. Ozee v. City of Henrietta, 90 Tex. 334 (38 S. W. Rep. 768). The fact that the conveyance of a designated lot which is described by metes and bounds states that it is the lot upon which a certain building is situated, does not cause it to convey other land over which the building extends. Baltimore Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Bethel, 120 N. C. 344 (27 S. E. Rep. 29). A particular description of premises conveyed, when such particular description is definite and certain, will control a general reference to another deed as the source of title. Nor will a clause in a deed at the end of a particular description of the premises by metes and bounds, "meaning and intending to convey the same premises conveyed to me," either enlarge or limit the grant. Smith v. Sweat, 90 Me. 528 (38 Atl. Rep. 554). A description of lots marked on a properly executed plat, by reference to them according to their designated numbers, has the same effect as a description by metes and bounds delineated on the plat and does not include lands within an abutting street which has been previously vacated by the owner before the acceptance of the plat. Brown v. Taber, 103 Ia. 1 (72 N. W. Rep. 416). A deed conveying the "west half" of a fractional lot which contains less than the legal subdivision of forty acres, conveys an equal half of the lot in area. Owen v. Henderson, 16 Wash. 39 (47 Pac. Rep. 215; 58 Am. St. Rep. 17). Where one reserved from a devise of an eighty acre tract of land upon the west side of which there was located a family burying ground of definite dimensions, "One acre of land, to be kept as a family burying ground, and to be taken in a square from out of the west side" of said eighty, "so as to comprise the present burying ground near the orchard," it is

held that, it being impossible to identify a starting point for the boundary lines, only such portion of the land as had been used for burial purposes within the acre could be claimed under the reservation. Edens v. Miller, 147 Ind. 208 (46 N. E. Rep. 526). For construction of particular descriptions, see Steelman v. Atlantic City Sewerage Co., 60 N. J. L. 461 (38 Atl. Rep. 742); Penrose v. Steelman, N. J. Eq. (38 Atl. Rep. 807); Hyatt v. Clever, 104 Ia. 338 (73 N. W. Rep. 831); Lord v. Wentworth, N. H. (36 Atl. Rep. 17); Cunningham v. Village of Willow River, 68 Minn. 249 (71 N. W. Rep. 532); Smith v. Sweat, 90 Me. 528 (38 Atl. Rep. 554); Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535 (39 S. W. Rep. 930).

Sec. 224. Evidence in aid of descriptions-Latent and patent ambiguities. A patent ambiguity cannot be removed by the application of extrinsic evidence. Bingham v. Honeyman, 32 Or. 129 (51 Pac. Rep. 735; 52 Pac. Rep. 755). Parol evidence is admissile to locate the commencement corner of a grant and to show that by an inadvertent error its location is improperly designated in the written. description. Davidson v. Shuler's Heirs, 119 N. C. 582 (26 S.E. Rep. 340). But where a deed describes the boundary line as running from a given point in a certain direction to a specified quarter section corner to a stake, there is no latent ambiguity and parol evidence is inadmissible to show that there is no stake at the designated corner, but that there is a stake on the line at another point. Donchoo v. Johnson, 113 Ala. 126 (21 So. Rep. 70). In Georgia it is held that parol evidence is admissible to explain an ambiguity as to the county in which particularly described lands are situated. Mayor of Chauncey v. Brown, 99 Ga. 766 (26 S. E. Rep. 763). Where a lease describes the premises as "lot No. sor's subdivision of Whiting's block No. 8," in a certain town and county, it is held that the omission of the num. ber of the lot is such an ambiguity as may be removed by parol evidence. Marske v. Willard, 169 Ill. 276 (48 N. E. Rep. 290). Where a testator devised all his "up lands," and there was evidence tending to show that he owned no uplands, strictly so called, but that his lands were in part

in asses

Miss.

"bottom land" and the rest, "second bottom "or "bench lands," there is a latent ambiguity and it is competent to show by other evidence that he regarded second bottom or bench lands as up lands and in that sense employed the term upland in his will. Vandiver v. Vandiver, 115 Ala. 328 (22 So. Rep. 154). Where a deed conveys the "west half" of a tract of land, parol evidence is inadmissible to show that there are twenty acres in the tract known as the "west half" as there is no ambiguity on the face of the deed. Owen v. Henderson, 16 Wash. 39 (47 Pac. Rep. 215; 58 Am. St. Rep. 17). Where land was assessed to an unknown owner and sold for taxes under a description as the "east fractional section 12, township 6, range 6 W.," parol evidence was held admissible to show that it was the same land as "lot 6 McLeod's addition west side of river, section 12, township 6, range 6 W.," which had been assessed to another and taxes paid thereon. Gordon v. Kitrell, (21 So. Rep. 922). Applying Miss. Code, § 3776, it is held that where a tax deed describes property as "fractional thirtyeight acres in S. E. of N. W. " assessed to C., evidence of the location of a two-acre tract in such forty-acre tract, assessed to another person, is admissible to identify the thirtyeight acres. Illinois Cent, R. Co. v. Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 650 (21 So. Rep. 760). A description of land as "a certain tract or parcel of land lying between P.'s land and C.'s creek and the old mill race," is not too indefinite to be aided by parol evidence. Sherman v. Simpson, 121 N. C. 129 (28 S. E. Rep. 186). A description of land conveyed as "a certain quantity of land containing 350 acres, being in six different deeds, the courses and distances referred to the original grants, which are six,lying on" a certain river, is too indefinite to permit the introduction of parol evidence to identify another deed to the grantor for fifty acres as being part of the land conveyed. Hemphill v. Annis, 119 N. C. 514 (26 S. E. Rep. 152).

EASEMENTS.

CLEMENTS V. PHILADELPHIA CO.

(184 Pa. St. 28.)

Abandonment of easement for gas pipe line-, Removal of pipes-Measure of damages. A gas company which has acquired an easement by appropriation under Pa. Act May 29 1885, to lay and maintain a pipe line for the transportation of natural gas may upon the failure of gas, remove its pipes from the land and abando the easement. Upon such removal the company is liable to the landowner for any actual injury to growing grain or grass, and, if the field be in meadow, for any substantial injury to the turf beyond the mere opening and filling of the trench in which the pipe lay.

WILLIAMS, J.

This case presents

Sec. 225. Statement of the case. a somewhat novel question. The defendant company is engaged in the production and transportation of natural gas. In 1888 it acquired, by proceedings under the act of May 29, 1885, the right to lay its line of pipes by means of which its gas was transported in and upon the lands of the plaintiffs, and damages were duly assessed and paid to them for the injury sustained by reason of the appropriation of the easement to the use of the company. In 1893 the wells supplying the pipe line ceased to produce natural gas in marketable quantity, and the line became useless. It was abandoned as a line of transportation, and the pipe composing it became useless where it was, and was taken up and removed. It had been buried, as "the law required" not less than two feet below the surface, and its removal required the opening of the trench in which it had been placed, the lifting of the pipes to the surface and the hauling of them away upon wagons. This was done in March, 1893, and this action was thereupon brought to recover the damages sustained by the plaintiffs in consequence of the abandonment and removal of the line from their lands. The question thus raised is over the measure of damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled. This

must depend upon the consideration of two preliminary questions; first. What was the character and extent of the easement acquired by the defendant under the proceeding had under the act of May 29, 1885? This is a question of law. The other is to what extent, if at all, the defendent has exceeded the limits of its right under the easement so acquired. This is a question of fact.

Sec. 226. Construction of statute providing for the acquisition of an easement for laying gas pipe lineRight to remove pipes- Measure of damages. The act of 1885 confers the right of eminent domain "for the laying of pipe lines for the transportation and distribution of natural gas," to be exercised in the manner pointed out. If the line is laid "upon or over lands cleared and used for agricultural purposes, the line of pipe shall be buried at least twenty-four inches below the surface; and if any line of pipe shall be laid over or through any waste or wood land, which shall be changed to farming land, then it shall be the duty of the corporation to immediately bury the said pipe to the depth of at least twenty-four inches as aforesaid." The easement acquired by the company is for the laying of the gas pipe beneath the surface of cleared land, or, as expressed by the act itself, for "burying" the pipe at least twenty-four inches below the surface in all such lands. The company does not require, nor is it to the interest of the land owner, that it should appropriate a definite strip of surface of 12 feet in width, as suggested by the learned judge of the court below, or of any other width, to which it shall have an exclusive right of possession as against the landowner. What is needed is the space under the surface in which the pipe may rest, together with the right to deposit or "bury" it out of the landowner's way, and the right of access to it for purposes of maintenance and repairs. Subject to the easement so defined, the landowner continues in the possession and use of the entire surface as freely as before the "burial" of the pipe took place; and if the "burial" of the pipe is properly done, and the joints are made secure, the presence of the pipe line under the soil will in no way interfere with its cultivation or use. But the unlooked for failure of the gas wells compel the abandonment of the line as a