priated for levee purposes. Owens v. Yazoo-Miss. Delta Levee Board, 74 Miss. 269 (21 So. Rep. 12). Construing and applying Starr & C. Ann. Ill. Stat., Vol. 2, p. 982, providing that" if the premises are not occupied, the action shall be brought against some person exercising acts of ownership on the premises claimed, or claiming title thereto, or some interest therein, at the commencement of the suit, "it is held that where premises are not occupied the action may be maintained agains a person claiming title thereto at the commencement of the suit. Converse v. Dunn, 167 Ill. 25 (46 N. W. Rep. 747). The principle of this case is approved in Glos v. Bouton, 170 Ill. 249 (48 N. E. Rep. 949). Sec. 239. Sufficiency of the complaint. A complaint to recover possession of a mining claim need not allege that the plaintiff is a citizen of the United States or has declared his intention to become such, as is required to be shown in adversary proceedings under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2326; but where his allegation of ownership is to be established by virtue of a location under the statutes of the United States, it is necessary for him to prove all the facts necessary to qualify him for such location, one of which is citizenship or a declaration to become a citizen. Harris v. Kellogg, 117 Cal. 484 (49 Pac. Rep. 708). A complaint is insufficient where the description given of the property which it seeks to recover is so indefinite that it is impossible to definitely locate the land. Goodwin v. Forman, 114 Ala. 489 (21 So. Rep. 946). Where a complaint is insufficient on account of its failure to sufficiently describe the premises, it will not sustain a judgment correctly describing the portion of the land recovered. Bricken v. Cross, 140 Mo. 166 (41 S. W. Rep. 735). Particular amended complaint held insufficient to show title by adverse possession. Magnetic Ore Co. v. Marbury Lum. Co., 113 Ala. 306 (21 So. Rep. 36). Sec. 240. Parties to the action. Upon the death of the defendant the action shall be revived against his widow and heirs, and his administrator not in possession of the land is not a necessary party, although the decedent's will gave him a general power of sale. Estes v. Nell, 140 Mo. 639 (41 S. W. Rep. 940). Construing and applying the Statute of 11 Geo. II, ch. 19, § 13, it is held that a person applying to be admitted as a party defendant in an action of ejectment, must show by his application that his title is connected to, and consistent with, the possession of the occupier against whom such action is brought; and the court has no power on the ap. plication of a third person claiming, as landlord, the right to be admitted as a party defendant, to vacate and set aside a default and a verdict and judgment already entered against the defendant in such suit. State v. Call, 39 Fla. 165 (22 So. Rep. 266). Sec. 241. Title necessary to maintain ejectmentPrior possession. Under Okla. Code Civ., Proc. § 614, it is held that one having an equitable title to land may maintain the action. Laughlin v. Fariss, 7 Okla. 1 (50 Pac. Rep. 254). The title of the plaintiff will not be regarded as speculative because the deed under which he acquires title contains a covenant of warranty which he expects to enforce in case he loses the land. Bradley v. Drayton, 48 S. C. 234 (26 S. E. Rep. 613). Except as affected by the mining laws a trespasser in possession of the surface of land has the same right to eject a subsequent trespasser who enters beneath the surface as he would were he to enter upon the surface. Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Min. Co. v. Hendry, N.M. (50 Pac. Rep. 330). A person who holds possession of real estate under a claim of ownership is entitled to recover the same as against one who has no right or title to it. Hentig v. Pipher, 58 Kan. 788 (51 Pac. Rep. 229); Stephens v. Hambleton, Cal. (47 Pac. Rep. 51); Branch v. Smith, 114 Ala. 463 (21 So. Rep. 423). As against a defendant who relies upon possession only, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show an actual, peaceable possession, under color of title prior in point of time, to the possession of the defendant. John Henry Shoe Co. v. Williamson, 64 Ark. 100 (40 S. W. Rep. 703). Citing, Cook v. Bertram, 86 Mich. 356 (49 N. W. Rep. 42); McFarlane v. Ray, 14 Mich. 465; Christy v. Richolson, 48 Kan. 177 (29 Pac. Rep. 398). To the same effect is the case of Hall v. Gallemore, 138 Mo. 638 (40 S. W. Rep. 891). It is held proper to deny a defendant's motion for a nonsuit, where it appears that the plaintiffs bought the property from its owner and took a bond for the deed under which they entered into and held possession of the property claiming title thereto for more than two years before defendant entered and ousted them. Stephens v. Hambleton, Cal. (47 Pac. Rep. 51). As to what is sufficient proof of title by proof of possession, see Elofrson v. Lindsay, 97 Wis. 22 (71 N. W. Rep. 889). 242. Proof required of plaintiff-Tracing title to common source. In order for the plaintiff to recover, he must prove not only the legal title in himself, but a present right to possession. Wells v. Steckelberg, 52 Neb. 597 (72 N. W. Rep. 865; 66 Am. St. Rep. 529). He cannot recover where he shows no title, whether the defendant's title be valid or not, Stephens v. Moore, 116 Ala. 397 (22 So. Rep. 542); and he must show that defendant was in possession at the time his suit was brought. Sowles v. Carr, 69 Vt. 414 (38 Atl. Rep. 77). Under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 1069, the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and he is not aided by the defendant's failure to establish any title. Graham v. Lunsford, 149 Ind. 83 (48 N. E. Rep. 627). A special finding will not support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, where it fails to allege that she was the owner and entitled to possession at the time of the commencement of the action. These facts will not be presumed from other facts found. Craig v. Bennett, 146 Ind. 574 (45 N. E. Rep. 792). Proof of adverse possession by the plaintiff for the prescriptive period is sufficient, where such possession, during all that time, was so open that any other person could have brought suit to eject the plaintiff. Beecher v. Farris, 112 Mich. 584 (70 N. W. Rep. 1106). In Idaho it is held that a party bringing an action of ejectment is required to establish, in order to recover, the right to possession, possession in the plaintiff, and ouster by defendant. Proof of a state of facts that might entitle a party to recover in an action to quiet title, under Rev. Stat. § 4538, is not sufficient. McMasters v. Torsen, Idaho (51 Pac. Rep. 100). A plaintiff cannot recover solely upon the ground that he was in adverse possession of the land at the time defendant purchased it. Moran v. Higgins, Ky. (40 S. W. Rep. 928). Where plaintiff and defendant claim title from a common source, plaintiff is not required to prove his title beyond such source. Cave v. Anderson, 50 S. C. 293 (27 S. E. Rep. 693); Preiner v. Meyer, 67 Minn. 197 (69 N. W. Rep. 887). In such a case it is enough for the plaintiff to show a better title through the common source than the defendant can show from the same source. Before a defendant can be allowed to impeach the common source he must establish that he has acquired a superior title. To show a better title outstanding will not help him. Sell v. McAnaw, 138 Mo. 267 (39 S. W. Rep. 779). The rule is not changed by a claim on the part of the defendant that the title to the land is in the United States, he showing no conveyance or certificate connecting him with title from that source. N. W. Rep. 887). Preiner v. Meyer, 67 Minn. 197 (69 Sec. 243. Defenses in ejectment-Plea of "not guilty"-Equitable defenses. In Alabama under the plea of "not guilty," anything that operates as a bar to the action may be given in evidence. Smith v. Cox, 115 Ala. 503 (22 So. Rep. 78). In Florida it is held that equitable estoppels are proper defenses in actions of ejectment and evidence of such estoppels, is admissible under the plea of "not guilty." Hagan v. Ellis, 39 Fla. 463 (22 So. Rep. 727; 63 Am. St. Rep. 167). Citing, Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578; Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68; Berry v. Seawall, 13 C. C. A. 101 (65 Fed. Rep. 742); Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313 (17 S. W. Rep. 319; 27 Am. St. Rep. 337); Mayer v. Ramsey, 46 Tex. 371. In Minnesota it is held that where the plaintiff has the legal title to the property in controversy, a defendant who depends upon an equitable title as a defense, must set up and allege his equities in his answer so fully and completely that a court of equity would, under the old practice, have granted him adequate relief and have confirmed his right of possession as against the holder of the adverse legal title. Freeman v. Brewster, 70 Minn. 203 (72 N. W. Rep. 1068). Md. Code, Art. 75, § 83 applied-pleading an equitable defense. Shartzer v. Mountain Lake Park Ass'n, 86 Md. 335 (37 Atl. Rep. 786). Sec. 244. Defenses in ejectment-Title by adverse possession-Outstanding title. A defendant may defend by showing title by adverse possession. Jennings v. Gorman, 19 Mont. 515 (48 Pac. Rep. 1111.) Under an answer deny. ing plaintiff's title and right to possession of the premises, the defendant may show title in himself by adverse possession. Fink v. Dawson, 52 Neb. 647 (72 N. W. Rep. 1037); Oldig v. Fisk, 53 Neb. 156 (73 N. W. Rep. 661). A certificate of purchase at a tax sale is sufficient evidence of title to support a defense of adverse possession thereunder. Worthen v. Fletcher, 64 Ark. 662 (42 S. W. Rep. 900). A defense based upon a claim of title by adverse possession, must show that the claim of title was perfected by a sufficient lapse of time at the time the suit was commenced. Starr & C. Ann. Ill. Stat., Vol. 2, p. 1547, applied. Converse v. Dunn, 166 Ill. 25 (46 N. E. Rep. 747). To defeat an action of ejectment by an outstanding title in a stranger, the defendant must show it to be a present, subsisting, operative, legal title, on which the owner could recover if asserting it in an action. It is not for the plaintiff to disprove its validity. Parkersburg Industrial Co. v. Schultz, 43 W. Va. 470 (27 S. E. Rep. 255). A defendant who is a mere trespasser cannot defend by showing an outstanding title in a third person with which he in no way connects himself, Sullivan v. Eddy, 164 Ill. 391 (45 N. E. Rep. 837); nor can a mortgagor or vendor as against his mortgagee or vendee. Stanley v. Johnson, 113 Ala. 344 (21 So. Rep. 823) vendee. Sec. 245. Defenses in ejectment-Particular cases. One who defends his right of possession upon the ground that the government, state or national, has placed him in possession, must show that the right of the government is paramount to the right of the plaintiff. Scranton v. Wheeler, 113 Mich. 565 (71 N. W. Rep. 1091). A defendant in ejectment who has conveyed his interest to a co-defendant, may confess judgment in favor of the plaintiff, where it does not appear that such confession was induced by any improper motive or desire to injure his vendee. Virginia & T. Coal & I. Co. v. Fields, 94 Va. 102 (26 S. E. Rep. 426). Under a general denial and claim of title in an action |