her full power and authority to sell the whole or any part of my said real estate and execute deed or deeds therefor; and in case any of my said real estate be left after the death of my said wife I order it to be divided amongst my children share and share alike," is held to give the wife a life estate only. In re Schmid's Estate, 182 Pa. St. 267 (37 Atl. Rep. 928). Substantially the same is held in Skinner v. McDowell, 169 Ill. 365 (48 N. E. Rep. 310; 61 Am. St. Rep. 183). A devise of the residuum of a testator's estate to his wife "to have and to hold the some to her use and benefit forever,” which provided that it is distinctly understood that my wife is to be amply supported and maintained out of said estate during her natural life and use and dispose of the same as she sees fit; and at her decease the remainder of said estate, if shall go any, to my brothers S. N. and J. T. L., is held to give the wife a life estate only. Langley v. Tilton, 67 N. H. 88 (36 Atl. Rep. 610). Where, by one sentence in his will which closes with the words, "this to be hers during her natural life, and what is left at her death to go to my heirs at law," a testator devised certain described real estate, numerous items of personal property and lastly a sum of money, to his wife, it is held that she took a life estate only in the land. Rusk v. Zuck, 147 Ind. 388 (45 N. E. Rep. 691). A devise of the residuum of the testator's estate to his wife "to have and to use and to dispose of during her natural life, and after her death to be divided equally among my three youngest heirs," is held to give a life estate to the widow with added power to dispose of the fee and the property undisposed of by her at her death descends to the three heirs. Ernst v. Foster, 58 Kan. 438 (49 Pac. Rep. 527).

A devise by a testator of the residue of his estate to his wife" for her to dispose and live on during her lifetime; and, if there be anything at her deceast after left after her deceast and burial, I give and bequeath to the B. C. Church, for poor children, for their tuition" is held to give her a life estate with power of disposition during her lifetime. Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S. C. 444 (26 S. E. Rep. 717; 59 Am. St. Rep. 724). A devise to the testator's widow of all his property "to do with it in whatever way she may think proper as long as she remains single and lives, and after her death to my

children who may be living, or the legal heirs of them who may die, to them and their heirs, forever," is held to give the widow only a life estate with power to sell, manage and control it in any way she thought proper while she lived and remained single. Loeb v. Struck, Ky. (42 S. W. Rep. 401). Applying Vt. Stat. § 2201, which provides that where by the common law a person might become seised in fee tail of lands by virtue of a devise, gift, grant, or other conveyance, or by other means, such person instead of being seised thereof in fee tail, shall be seised thereof for his natural life only, and the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whom the estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee, or donee, in tail, first pass, according to the course of the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or conveyance, it is held that where a testator gave his wife the use of his real estate during her natural life, and devised one-half of what should remain of his real estate at the decease of his wife to his daughter M. P. to be held by her in her own right and the heirs of her body forever, the daughter, upon the death of the wife, took an estate for life only and the remainder passed in fee to the heirs of her body. In re Kelso's Estate, 69 Vt. 272 (37 Atl. Rep. 747). For construction of particular devises held to create life estates, see Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237 (70 N. W. Rep. 545); McMillan v. Farrow, 141 Mo. 55 (41 S. W. Rep. 890); Wilson v. Curtis, 90 Me. 463 (38 Atl. Rep. 365).

Lari

Sec. 292. Conveyance of life estate. Where, by the terms of the instrument creating it, the continuance of a life estate is dependent upon the life tenant occupying the premises, and he is forbidden to transfer the same, a conveyance by him followed by a termination of his occupancy of the premises operates to terminate the life estate. verre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276 (70 N. W. Rep. 583). Where a trust deed created a life estate with a remainder over to a certain class a sale and conveyance by the personal representative of the life tenant after his death, made indirectly to himself, does not pass any title as against the person who is subsequently determined to be entitled to the ectate in remainder. Simms v. Freiherr, 100 Ga. 607 (28 S. E.

Rep. 288). Where a life tenant who is also an heir of the reversioner attempts to convey the fee, his grantee takes the fee of such life tenant's interest as heir. Wilson v. Watkins, 48 S. C. 341 (26 S. E. Rep. 663). Where the holder of a life estate in land devised" for her entire use and benefit so long as she shall live, with permission to sell and use the same or any part of it if she shall need it for her comfortable support and maintenance," without investigating the value of the land, unnecessarily sold it for less than half its value, the remainderman may have equitable relief against the purchaser charged with notice of his equities. Price v. Bassett, 168 Mass. 598 (47 N. E. Rep. 243). Pa. Act, Oct. 13, 1840; Act, Jan. 24, 1849, construed and applied-execution sale of life estate by creditors. Kunselman v. Stine, 183 Pa. St. 1 (38 Atl. Rep. 414). A new statute in Virginia authorizes the sale of an estate given by deed or will to a person for life, with a vested remainder to another, whether the remainderman be an infant or adult. Laws 1897-98, p. 404.

Sec. 293. Life tenant with power of dispositionRights of creditors and purchasers. Construing and applying, Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 4309, which provides "When an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by any trust, is given to the owner of a particular estate for life or years, such estate shall be changed into a fee; absolute in respect to the rights of creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future estate limited thereon in case the power is not executed, or the lands are sold for the satisfaction of debts; 4312, which provides "When a general and beneficial power to devise the inheritance is given to a tenant for life or for years, such tenant will be deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition within the meaning and subject to the provisions of the three preceding sections;" and § 4313, which provides that "every power of disposition shall be deemed absolute by means of which the grantee is enabled in his lifetime to dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit," it is held that a devise of land to R. for life with a general and beneficial power to devise the remainder in fee, gives R. an absolute power of disposition of the lands, and his life estate is changed into a fee simple as respects the rights of creditors and pur

chasers. Hershey v. Meeker Co. Bank, 71 Minn. 255 (73 N. W. Rep. 967).

Sec. 294. Rights and liabilities of life tenant and remainderman. The interest of a remainderman is not liable

for taxes which have accumulated against the life tenant. Loeb v. Struck, Ky. (42 S. W. Rep. 401); State v. Campbell, Tenn. (41 S. W. Rep. 937). For discussion of the relative rights of life tenant and remaindermen as to improvements, repairs and insurance, see Stevens v. Melcher, 152 N. Y. 551 (46 N. E. Rep. 965). A life tenant may purchase the interest of a remainderman, and the conveyance of such interest to him will not be set aside solely on the ground of inadequacy of price. Ware v. Fronk's Adm'r, Ky.

(38 S. W. Rep. 1061). Surface stone which is an obstruction to his reasonable enjoyment of the estate, may be removed by a life tenant, but he must account to the remainderman for any profit realized from the sale of such stone. Roberts v. Armstrong, Ky. (40 S. W. Rep. 459). It is waste for a tenant for life to take petroleum oil from the land. The rule is the same where the life tenant owns the fee in a proportionate part of the real estate. In an action for waste against a life tenant for removing petroleum oil without right, he is not entitled to have the proceeds thereof invested so that he may have interest thereon durng the life estate, but they go at once to the owner of the next vested estate of inheritance. Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 652 (27 S. E. Rep. 411; 64 Am. St. Rep. 891; 38 L. R. A. 694). Compensation to a life tenant for the grant of a right of way over the premises, which is intended to cover only the damages sustained by him, belongs to him and not to the remainderman. Roberts v. Armstrong, Ky. (40 S. W. Rep. 459). Where a tort upon real estate affects both the estate of the tenant and that of a reversioner or remainderman, each may sue separately; and as the damages are apportionable, each recovers damages to cover the injury done to his estate. Neither can recover damages covering the entire injury to both estates. Fordan v. City of Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312 (26 S. E. Rep. 266; 57 Am. St. Rep. 859; 36 L. R. A. 519); Yeager v. Town of Fairmont, 43 W. Va. 259 (27 S. E. Rep. 234). In

the second case cited, it is held that where the owner of the life estate and the owner of the remainder in fee, are engaged as partners in a mercantile business in a store room upon real estate affected by the tort, they cannot recover in the same action for damage done to the life estate, the remainder and the joint mercantile business. Where, before the expiration of his lessee's term a life tenant dies, the lease is terminated and the lessee may quit possession. If he continues in possession he becomes liable to the reversioner for the reasonable value of the use, and occupation of the premises, but the latter cannot recover of the life tenant's administrator money paid to him by such lessee as rental for the remainder of the term under the lease. Guthmann v. Vallery, 51 Neb. 824 (71 N. W. Rep. 734; 66 Am. St. Rep. 475). A life tenant cannot litigate the validity of a devise on account of its being in violation of the statute against perpetuities, where that question cannot arise unless she dies without issue. In re Well's Estate,, 69 Vt. 388 (38 Atl. Rep. 83). N. Y. Code Civ. Proc., § 1680, providing that, "where a tenant for life or for a term of years suffers judgment to be taken against him by consent or by default in an action of ejectment or action for dower, the heir or person owning the reversion or remainder may, after the determination of the particular estate, maintain an action of ejectment and recover the property," authorizes an action by a remainderman claiming under a manorial lease to set aside default or consent judgments in ejectment against the life tenant, to have his title determined and an accounting as to rents; and N. Y. Rev. Stat., Vol. 2, p, 506, §§ 33, 34, which permits the tenant at any time within six months after the landlord has been placed in possession under an ejectment suit, to pay up all rent in arrear, together with the costs, and failing in that, is barred. and foreclosed from all relief or remedy in law or equity, does not apply so as to bar such action. Sands v. Church, 152 N. Y. 174 (46 N. E. Rep. 609).

Sec. 295. Estates in joint tenancy. The common law, as to joint tenancies, prevailed in Kansas until abolished by Laws 1891, ch. 203, and a will of a father executed before the enactment of that statute, which reads: "I bequeath to my son, Thomas, the sum of one dollar, and to Amanda Anne,