an operating line. McKay v. Ripley & M. C. V. R. Co., 42 W. Va. 23 (24 S. E. Rep. 685). But in Ohio it is held that while one who has a lien on a specific part only of the property of a railroad corporation, is not entitled to a sale of such part,where the sale will have the effect to break the continuity of the road, and interfere with the public interests, he may by a proceeding in equity to which all parties in interest are made parties, enforce his lien by subjecting the whole of its property to sale, and obtaining a proper application of the proceeds. Stewart v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Co., 53 O. St. 151 (41 N. E. Rep. 247; 29 L. R. A. 438). If a railroad corporation has ceased to discharge its duties and has for a long time not used its franchise and right of way for any purpose, and has abandoned all further work, the land occupied by it for a right of way and all the title of the corporation therein are subject to sale under execution. Gardner v. Mobile & N. W. R. Co., 102 Ala. 635 (15 So. Rep. 271; 48 Am. St. Rep. 84). The court say, " Now, conceding that the property of the appellee essential to the exercise of its franchises and to effect the public purposes contemplated in its creation may be exempt from levy and sale under general process, can the exemption continue after the franchises have been abandoned? Can it exist when the necessity for its existence has terminated? We think it is coextensive with the performance of the public purposes the corporation was intended to promote, and, when these purposes are abandoned, the exemption ceases, and the property stands in the condition of property not necessary to enable the corporation to perform its duties to the public." Citing and approving Benedict v. Heineburg, 43 Vt. 231. Depot grounds are subject to execution sale under a constitutional provision that "real and personal property" of a railroad corporation, or any part thereof, shall be liable to execution and sale in the same manner as the property of individuals." Texas Mex. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 88 Tex. 346 (31 S. W. Rep. 613; 31 L. R. A. 200). EPITOME OF CASES. Sec. 330. What real estate may be sold on execution. The estate of a devisee under a will providing that he takes nothing until his sister becomes of age, although a vested interest, cannot be sold on a creditor's bill until the happening of such contingency. Mears v. Lamona, 17 Wash. 148 (49 Pac. Rep. 251). Where a vendor retains the legal title to land sold to secure the payment of notes given for the purchase price, the title remaining in him, is subject to levy and sale under an execution against him, but after he has sold the notes to another he has no such interest in the property as is subject to execution. Leitch v. May, 98 Ga. 714 (27 S. E. Rep. 151). Under Ga. Code, §§ 1969, 1970, one to whom land has been conveyed as a security for a debt, cannot cause the land to be levied upon and sold under a judgment for the debt without having previously had recorded a reconveyance of the land to the debtor; and where the land lies in more than one county, the deed must be recorded in each of the counties. Cade v. Larned, 99 Ga: 588 (27 S. E. Rep. 166). A mandamus will not be issued to compel a sheriff to sell on execution land claimed as a homestead, where it appears that the lien of the judgment on which the execution is issued has been divested by a previous sale. Mathews v. Nance, 49 S. C. 389 (27 S. E. Rep. 408). In Maine, the real estate of certain corporations may be sold on execution without first exhausting the remedy against personal property. Laws 1899, p. 119. Sec. 331. Exemption of property from execution sale. No exemption is allowed, as against a judgment for damages rendered in favor of a landlord in an action by him, under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 7106, to recover possession and damages from his tenant unlawfully holding over; and the rental value of the premises from that time is recoverable as damages. Thomas v. Walmer, 18 Ind. App. 112 (46 N. E. Rep. 695). Where land is exempt from execution sale, the judgment debtor may convey it without regard to any judgment against him and the purchaser may maintain an action to quiet his title against any lien asserted by virtue of a judg ment rendered against his grantor, Citizens' State Bank v. Harris, 149 Ind. 208 (48 N. E. Rep. 856); but where an execution creditor's right to have certain property exempt from sale is dependent upon asserting a claim of exemption before sale is made, one who acquires his title before the execution. sale of the property must duly assert the claim of exemption if he desires the benefit of it. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, §§ 715, 725, construed and applied. Moss v., Jenkins, 146 Ind. 589 (45 N. E. Rep. 789). Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 690-property exempt from execution-amended, Laws 1899, p. 19. Utah Rev. Stat., § 3245- property exempt from execution - amended, Laws 1899, p. 99. Sec. 332. Exemption of property from execution sale-Public property. The fact that Mont. Comp. Stat. 1887, div. 1, § 321, subd. 9, after exempting public property from execution provides that "but no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall be exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its price or upon a mortgage thereon," does not render a public school house. liable to a sale on execution to satisfy the claims of a subcontractor for work done or materials furnished in its erection, and for which he can not enforce a mechanic's lien. Whitesides v. School Dist. No. 5, 20 Mont. 44 (49 Pac. Rep. 445). The court say: 66 But we think that the language quoted is entirely inapplicable to the case of a subcontractor who is seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien. Not having the right to subject the property to the lien, it should not be subjected to a sale to enforce such lien. State v. Tiedemann, 69 Mo. 306 (33 Am. Rep. 499). Whatever may be the rights of a direct judgment creditor of the school district, who has sold property to the trustees for public uses, it is certain that the statute does not mean to limit the previous general words of exemption by permitting a school house to be sold under an execution in favor of a subcontractor who has no special lien, for a small part of its value, and perhaps to be forever lost to the school district before funds could be collected by a tax levy wherewith to pay the amount of the debt." Sec. 333. Issue and return of execution-Description of property. In North Carolina, notwithstanding the lien of a judgment has ceased, a motion to issue execution thereon is not barred if execution has been regularly issued once in every period of three years. McCaskill v. McKinnon, 121 N. C. 192 (28 S. E. Rep. 265; 61 Am. St. Rep. 659). McClain's Ia. Code, § 4221, construed and applied-issuance of execution against deceased judgment debtor. Hansen's Empire Fur Factory v. Teabout, 104 Ia. 360 (73 N. W. Rep. 875). While an officer is yet in office he may amend his return of an execution so as to make it conform to the real truth of the transaction at the time the original return was made. McLeod v. Brooks Lum. Co., 98 Ga. 253 (26 S. E. Rep. 745). The return of an execution long after the day fixed for its return, endorsed, "further proceedings stayed by order of plaintiff," operates to relinquish all rights acquired by its previous levy. Ashland Bldg. & Sav. Ass'n v. Jones, Ky. (41 S. W. Rep. 437). Hill's Wash. Code, § 3124, construed and applied-notice by laborers having claims against execution debtor-priority of claim. Gleason v. Tacoma Hotel Co., 16 Wash. 412 (47 Pac. Rep. 894). Construing and applying Ga. Code, § 3640, providing that the levy" shall plainly describe the properiy levied on and the amount and the interest of the defendant therein," it is held that a levy on the land is void for uncertainty which fails to describe the land levied upon with such precision as to inform the purchaser what he is buying and to enable the officer selling to place the purchaser in possession. Bird v. Burgsteiner, 100 Ga. 486 (28 S. E. Rep. 219). The description need not be technically accurate, it being sufficient if the property can be located by it. Textor v. Shipley, 86 Md. 424 (38 Atl. Rep. 932). The failure of the sheriff to properly describe the land in his return cannot be construed to retroact upon the sale so as to affect the rights of the purchaser. Guelot v. Pearce, Ky. (38 S. W. Rep. 892). Sec. 334. Levy of execution-What constitutes a levy. As against subsequent purchasers and creditors, it is not essential to the validity of a levy of an execution on land that the debtor be without chattel property on which to levy; nor will the levy be rendered invalid, or ineffectual to create a lien, by the omission of the officer to endorse on the writ, no goods. Ohio Rev. Stat., § 5383, construed and applied. Wheeling, L. E. & P. Coal Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 55 O. St. 233 (45 N. E. Rep. 630). An endorsement upon the return of a tax execution reciting "levy made " is sufficient to show that there was a seizure by entry. Textor v. Shipley, 86 Md. 424 (38 Atl. Rep. 932). Particular entry upon the return of an attachment held insufficient to show a valid levy. New England Mortg. & Sec. Co. v. Watson, 99 Ga. 773 (27 S. E. Rep. 160). Ga. Code, § 3644, construed and applied— levy on land in two counties. Cade v. Larned, 99 Ga. 588 (27 S. E. Rep. 166). It is held that in order for an officer to make a proper levy of an execution on lands already subject to the lien of a judgment on which the writ is issued, under Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 691, it is not necessary for him to file a copy of the writ and description of the property or a notice of the levy with the recorder of the county as in cases of attachment. Lehnhardt v. Jennings, 119 Cal. 192 (51 Pac. Rep. 195). The court say: "The term 'levy,' when employed to connote the acts by which an officer manifests the intent to appropriate land to the satisfaction of an execution, and when not defined by statute, has considerable elasticity of meaning; so, probably for the reason that the common law permitted no levy of the writ on lands, it never ascertained the procedure for such a purpose. In one state a statute provided that a 'levy' should be understood to be the actual seizure of property by the officer executing the writ. It was held that this applied only to property capable of being seized, that it was not necessary to enter on land to make a levy, and that the law was silent as to what should be evidence of a levy on this species of property. Duncan v. Matney, 29 Mo. 368 (77 Am. Dec. 575). In Louisiana only, it appears, is the levy on land assimilated to that of goods, and the officer is required to take and hold actual possession. Pipkin v. Sheriff, 36 La. Ann. 782. Quite in contrast with which practice is the doctrine in North Carolina, that the levy 'may be made in the office, although it (the land) may be ten miles distant, and the officer has never seen it.' Bland v. Whitfield, 46 N. C. 125. See, also, 2 Freem, Ex'ns, § 280a; 8 Enc. Pl. & Prac., p. 511, et seq. In Wood v. Colvin, 5 Hill 228, it was held that, when the judgment on which execution has issued is a lien upon land, it is unnecessary to make a formal levy of the writ before proceeding to sell, and this has been said here to be the correct rule. Bagley v. Ward, 37 Cal. 132 (99 Am. Dec. 256). * * It * was remarked in Southern Cal. Lumber Co. v. Ocean Beach Hotel Co., 94 Cal. 223 (29 Pac. Rep. 627; 28 Am. St. Rep. 115), that the act of the officer by which he indicates the par. ticular property which he intends to sell under the execution i called a 'levy.' The conclusion stated more at large by Shaw, C. J., in Hall v. Crocker, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 245, is similar: 'The statute having fixed upon no specific act which will constitute the seizure of land on execution, the court are of the opinion that when an execution has been delivered to an officer, with directions to levy the same on the real estate of the |