"We But to the citation of these authorities the court adds: are compelled to accept the general doctrine of these cases. But we are of the opinion that it is clearly subject to these limitations. An agreement for a separation which is to take place in the future is void as against public policy. So, too, after such an agreement is entered into, its terms must be immediately complied with on peril of nullity. And at the time of the making of such an agreement the relations between the husband and wife must be of such a character as to render the separation a matter of reasonable necessity for the health or happiness of the one or the other. There must be a moving cause for it in addition to the mere mutual volition of the parties. If it is the outcome of mutual caprice only, or a reckless disregard of the obliteration of the marriage tie, then the courts will not enforce it. In almost all the cases that we have investigated, either from the recitals in the agreement for the separation itself or from extrinsic evidence offered in connection therewith, the court has had before it an unhappy condition of marital relations as a moving cause for the contract. Judges have carefully discriminated between agreements for separation, outgrowths of domestic sorrow, entered into for the purpose of avoiding public scandal and notoriety, and those which have resulted from a wanton or reckless disregard of one of the highest obligations of life,—the duty which the husband and wife mutually owe to each other and to the public at large. In this view of the law, an agreement for separation of the latter kind would be a mere usurpation of the power conferred upon the courts alone to adjust marital dissensions in decrees of divorce." A stipulation in a deed of separation, fixing the property rights of husband and wife, otherwise valid, are not affected by the fact that the portion of the contract by which they agree to live separately is void, as against public policy. Luttrell v. Boggs, 168 Ill. 361 (48 N. E. Rep. 171). A proviso in a contract of separation between a husband and wife, which assumes to equally divide all their property, that each released the other" from all obligations and liabilities for the future acts and debts of each other," does not constitute a release by either of the right to succeed to the estate of the other. In re Jones' Estate, 118 Cal. 499 (50 Pac. Rep. 766; 62 Am. St. Rep. 251). Construing a contract of separation, whereby the husband conveyed to his wife certain real estate and paid her a sum of money, which stipulated that "each party releases any and all claim, right, title or interest, either vested or contingent, either to or in property present or future acquired belonging to the other," it is held that the effect of the language was to give to the husband the full dominion of his own property with power to dispose of it by will or otherwise, without the assent of the wife, during her life, but did not affect her right to inherit from him as his widow, property of which he died seised. Smith v. Smith, 57 O. St. 27 (48 N. E. Rep. 28). But in Illinois it is held that a stipulation in a deed of separation by which each party releases to the other "all interest, right and title to any and all real estate," owned by the other at the time of the marriage operates to defeat the husband's right to claim dower. Luttrell v. Boggs, 168 Ill. 361 (48 N. E. Rep. 171). Sec. 404. Contracts between husband and wifeValidity and construction. Forbearance to bring a wellfounded suit for divorce is a sufficient legal consideration for a contract between husband and wife. Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211 (45 N. E. Rep. 737; 36 L. R. A. 771). Construing Ia. Code 1873, § 2203, providing that "when property is owned by either the husband or wife the other has no interest therein which can be the subject of contract between them," it is held that the statute renders void an agreement by a husband with his wife to pay her a certain sum in consideration of her joining with him in a conveyance of his lands. Miller v. Miller, 104 Ia. 186 (73 N. W. Rep. 484). Under this statute the giving by the husband to the wife of one-half the proceeds of a sale of land for her dower interest therein is without consideration. Garner v. Fry, 104 Ia. 515 (73 N. W. Rep. 1079). A contract between husband and wife, free from fraud or undue influence on his part, whereby she releases her right to inherit property of the husband if she survives him, is valid. Leach v. Kains, 149 Ind. 152 (48 N. E. Rep. 858). Citing, "Dakin v. Dakin, 97 Mich. 284 (56 N. W. Rep. 562); Chittock v. Chittock, 101 Mich. 367 (59 N. W. Rep. 655); 1 Beach, Mod. Cont., § 475; 2 Beach, Mod. Cont., § 954; Thomas v. Brown, 10 O. St. 247; Miller's Ex'r v. Miller,16 O:St. 532; Farwell v. Johnston, 34 Mich. 342; Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563; Bissell v. Taylor, 41 Mich. 702 (3 N. W. Rep. 194); Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 309 (16 N. W. Rep. 659); Robertson v. Robertson, 25 Iowa 350; Bank v. Owens, 31 Md. 325; Glenn v. Clark, 53 Md. 580; Dillinger's Appeal, 35 Pa. St. 857, 361; Reed v. Beasley, 1 Blackf. 97; Dutton v. Dutton, 30 Ind. 452; Hilbish v. Hattle, 145 Ind. 59 (44 N. E. Rep. 20); Stew. Mar. & Div., §§ 182-190. A covenant by a husband to surrender, convey and transfer to his wife and her heirs, all his rights in her property which he may have acquired by reason of their marriage, she "to have the full and absolute control and possession of all the said property free and discharged of all the rights, claims or demands of every nature whatsoever" of the said husband, obligates him not to disturb his wife's enjoyment while she kept her property; to execute whatever instrument was necessary in order to release his right if she conveyed; and to claim no rights on her death, but to do whatever was necessary to clear the title from such rights then. Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211 (45 N. E. Rep. 737; 36 L. R. A. 771). In North Dakota it is provided by statute that a husband and wife may contract with each other with the respect to property the same as if they were unmar. ried. Laws 1899, p. 140. Sec. 405. Conveyances between husband and wife. In California, a deed from a husband direct to his wife is valid, and love and affection are a sufficient consideration therefor. Tillaux v. Tillaux, 115 Cal. 663 (47 Pac. Rep. 691). Where the rights of creditors are not involved, a conveyance of land by a husband to his wife for a valuable consideration, is valid. Reagle v. Reagle, 179 Pa. St. 89 (36 Atl. Rep. 191; Danforth v. Briggs, 89 Me. 316 (36 Atl. Rep. 452). The same is true as to a voluntary conveyance by a husband to his wife, no fraud or imposition being practiced upon him. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 168 Mass. 488 (47 N. E. Rep. 431). By the stringent rules of the common law, a conveyance from a husband directly to his wife without the intervention of a trustee is void, but in courts of equity the object to be accomplished, and the con siderations upon which such conveyances are made, will be considered, and if found meritorious, and free from imposi. tion and fraud, will be sustained; and this rule prevails even as against the husband's creditors. Hill v. Meinhard, 39 Fla. 111 (21 So. Rep. 805). Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 5534, which provides that " no contract between a husband and wife, the one with the other, relative to the real estate of either, or an interest therein shall be valid," renders absolutely void a mortgage executed by a husband to his wife on real estate, although made after they had separated. Phillips v. Blaker, 68 Minn. 152 (70 N. W. Rep. 1082). A married woman may convey her separate real estate to her husband, through the intervention of a trustee. Leach v. Rains, 149 Ind. 152 (48 N. E. Rep. 858). Applying Ala. Code, § 2349, it is held that a wife may convey her lands directly to her husband. Osborne v. Cooper, 113 Ala. 405 (21 So. Rep. 320). A conveyance of her separate property by a wife whose husband has refused to live with her because he believed her guilty of adultery, made to him in trust, the income to be paid part to her and part applied to the maintenance of their children, and as compensation to the husband in consideration of the renewal of their marital relations, which provides that she shall forfeit all interest in the property if she violates certain promises as to her martial conduct, is valid and will be enforced. Duffy v. White, 115 Mich. 264 (73 N. W. Rep. 363). Citing, Burkholder's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 33. All deeds and conveyances of real estate heretofore made in Connecticut by a married woman directly to her husband are validated by Laws, 1899, p. 108, § 8. (Approved June 20, 1899). Sec. 406. Husband's conveyance of wife's land. Where a wife is seised in fee of land not separate estate, and her husband makes a deed purporting to convey the fee, but void as to the wife, such deed vests in the grantee a life estate, either for the joint lives of the husband and wife, or by the curtesy, according to the facts, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the wife's reversion until the termination of said life estate. Arnold v.Bunnell, 42 W. Va. 473 (26 S. E. Rep. 359). Sec. 407. Estates by entireties- Conveyance and incumbrance. In Indiana it is held that where a mortgage given by a husband and wife upon land held by them as tenants by the entireties, to a building and loan association, does not purport to be a security for the repayment of the money borrowed, but only attempts to secure the agreement and liability of the husband as a member of such association, to pay weekly dues, interest, premiums, fines, and assessments, until the debt is cancelled by the maturity of his stock, it is, as to the wife, a contract of suretyship and void, under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 6964. Harrison Bldg. & Dep. Co. v. Lackey, 149 Ind. 10 (48 N. E. Rep. 254). Where a husband and wife join in a conveyance of real estate, owned by them as tenants by the entireties, to a third person, the latter conveying to the husband who mortgages the property to secure an antecedent debt, owing by him to another who knew of the purposes for which the several transfers were made, it is held that the deeds and mortgage constitute substantially one transaction and are void, as an evasion of the statute which prevents a married woman from entering into a contract of suretyship. Grzesk v. Hibberd, 149 Ind. 354 (48 N. E. Rep. 361). In Missouri it is held that a husband's conveyance of an estate held by the entireties containing the statutory covenant of "grant, bargain and sell," passes the whole title where he survives the wife. Hume v. Hopkins, 140 Mo. 65 (41 S. W. Rep. 784). Applying Md. Const., Art. 3, § 43, providing that the "property of the wife shall be protected from the debts of her husband;" it is held that an estate by entireties cannot be subject to the payment of a mortgage executed by the husband. McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378 (37 Atl. Rep. 214; 60 Am. St. Rep. 329). A recent statute in Indiana provides "That whenever a husband and wife shall own and hold any real estate as joint tenants or tenants by entireties, and one of them shall have been adjudged a person of unsound mind, by a court of competent jurisdiction, and when said insanity is probably permanent, they shall cease to hold and own said real estate as joint tenants or tenants by entireties, as the case may be, but the title to said real estate shall be owned and held by them as tenants in common. Said joint tenancy or tenancy by entireties shall not be converted into an estate in common, except |