appeal. Clark & Leonard Inv. Co. v. Way, 52 Neb. 204 (71 N. W. Rep. 1021). Purchasers at judicial sales must take notice of the terms of the decree. Where that and an order of sale issued in pursuance thereof differ, the decree governs, and it will not be presumed that bidders are misled or prevented from bidding by the variance. McKinley-Lanning Loan & T. Co. v. Hamer, 52 Neb. 709 (72 N. W. Rep. 1042). While a court may grant equitable relief in those cases where a purchaser has been deceived by the action of the court or the misrepresentation of its agents as to the amount of land sold, it is held that a purchaser is not entitled, as a matter of right, after confirmation of the sale to elect to stand by it and have credit for the deficiency in the quantity of the land purchased, where other parties in interest are asking a rescission on equitable principles. Trigg v. Jones' Adm'r, (42 S. W. Rep. 848). A bidder at a judicial sale, whose bid has been accepted, may appeal from an order setting the sale aside. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Creighton Theater Bldg. Co., 51 Neb. 659 (71 N. W. Rep. 279).

Ky.

Sec. 447. Liability of purchaser. A court of equity has power to make and enforce an order requiring a purchaser of property at a sale by its master, to pay the amount of his bid into court, but before making such order the court must confirm the sale. Allred v. McGahagan, 39 Fla. 118 (21 So. Rep. 802). Where one who bids off land as an attorney refuses to disclose his principal, he is personally liable for the amount of his bid. Long v. McKissick, 50 S. C. 218 (27 S. E. Rep. 636). Where a sale was made at a certain price per acre and on account of a miscalculation of the officer, he failed to collect the full amount due from the purchaser for the number of acres conveyed, the parties who owned the land may recover the unpaid price from such purchaser. Davies v. Gibbs, 168 Ill. 205 (48 N. E. Rep. 120). Where the report of sale for confirmation shows title to be in third persons, the purchaser cannot be made liable on his bid until the outstanding title has been adjudicated. Bird v. Smith,

Ky.

(40 S.W. Rep. 571). The mere fact that there is a deficiency in the number of acres contained in the land sold, is no defense to an action against a purchaser for the amount of his bid. Long

v. McKissick, 50 S. C. 218 (27 S. E. Rep. 636). A purchaser at a judicial sale, who instead of paying the amount of his bid to the officer making the sale, undertakes to disburse it in discharging liens, does so at his peril. Clark & Leonard, Inv. Co. v. Way, 52 Neb. 204 (71 N. W. Rep. 1021).

Sec. 448. Refusal to complete purchase-Purchaser's rights and liabilities. A purchaser at a foreclosure sale, who before paying the price or entering into possession discovers illegalities in the proceedings which have led to the sale, calculated to throw a cloud upon his title, may refuse to execute the purchase. Succession of Nash, Nash, 48 La. 1573 (21 S. E. Rep. 254). A purchaser who fails to complete his purchase or to comply with the terms of sale may be proceeded against by rule and compelled to do so. Robertson v. Smith, 94 Va. 250 (26 S. E. Rep. 579; 64 Am. St. Rep. 723). A purchaser is not liable for failure to complete his purchase, where he was misled as to the identity of the property upon which he was bidding by false representations of the person conducting the sale. Clay v. Kagelmacher, 98 Ga. 149 (26 S. E. Rep. 493). A purchaser at an auction sale made by a receiver under an order of court, of lands advertised as "subject to a mortgage of $1,600.00 to be at five per cent., three years to run," cannot refuse to perform his purchase because the mortgage contains a gold clause which was not disclosed to the public at the time of the sale. Bartlett and Haight, JJ., dissenting. Blanck v. Sadlier, 153 N. Y. 551 (47 N. E. Rep. 920; 40 L. R. A. 666). Where property is bid off for a certain sum under an agreement between the owner and the purchaser that he is to pay an additional sum before the expiration of the period for redemption, an assignee of such purchaser takes subject to such agreement, although he has no notice of it, and if the agreement is not performed a court of equity may order a resale upon refundment of the original purchase price to the party entitled to it. Bruschke v. Wright, 166 Ill. 183 (46 N. E. Rep. 813; 57 Am. St. Rep. 125).

Sec. 449. Purchaser's right to writ of assistance. A purchaser under a judicial sale is not entitled to a writ of

Vermont

assistance unless he can show a valid judgment. Loan & T Co. v. McGregor, Idaho (51 Pac. Rep. 104). One not a party to a decree under which a sale was made, cannot be dispossessed by a writ of possession issued to a purchaser thereat, without opportunity to be heard as to his title, although he claims as a purchaser from the defendant in the decree. Wright v. Carr, Ky. (41 S. W. Rep. 23). A purchaser's application for a writ of assistance to obtain possession should be dismissed where it appears from the pleadings filed that there will be a contest as to his title having been fully determined. Roach v. Clark, 150 Ind. 93 (48 N. E. Rep. 796; 65 Am. St. Rep. 353). The court say: "The application for the writ of assistance could never have been recognized to supply a remedy to quiet title concurrent with the statutory remedy. It was designed rather as a summary remedy for the enforcement of a right already determined by a court of equity, and which determination one of the parties refuses to recognize, and the other may enforce without resort to a new suit or action. But, when the rights of the parties have not been so determined, as to render further litigation necessary, the application for the writ may not be the basis of such further litigation. The necessity appearing upon the application for the writ, the court will deny the writ, and the parties will be left to the forum having jurisdiction of the question unsettled. It is certainly not customary to issue the writ where there is a bona fide contest as to the right to the possession under the sale, or where the rights of the respective parties have not been fully adjudicated in the principal suit. 2 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 980; Vanmeter v. Borden, 25 N. J. Eq. 414; Schenck v. Conover, 13 N. J. Eq. 220 (78 Am. Dec. 95); Hooper v. Yonge, 69 Ala. 484; Blauvelt v. Smith, 22 N. J. Eq. 32; Thomas v. De Baum, 14 N. J. Eq. 37; Wiley v. Carlisle, 93 Ala. 238 (9 So. Rep. 288); Barton v. Beatty, 28 N. J. Eq. 412; Knight v. Houghtalling, 94 N. C. 411; Frazier's Adm'r v. Beatty, 25 N. J. Eq. 343; Stanley v. Sullivan, 71 Wis. 585 (37 N. W. Rep. 801; 5 Am. St. Rep. 245); Ramsdell v. Maxwell, 32 Mich. 285; Flowers v. Brown, 21 Ill. 270; Hayward v. Kinney, 84 Mich. 591 (48) N. W. Rep. 170).”

* * **

Sec. 450. Setting aside sales-Fraud and irregularities. One seeking to set aside a sale on the ground that competition in bidding on the property sold was prevented and defeated through fraud and collusion on the part of the purchaser and his attorney, imposes upon himself the burden of making that charge clear by a fair preponderance of evidence. Schlater v. Brusle, 49 La. 1704 (22 So. Rep. 925). The fact that a sale advertised for 10 o'clock A. M., occurred at about half past 10 o'clock is not sufficient ground for setting it aside. Lothrop v. Tracy, 24 Colo. 382 (51 Pac. Rep. 486; 65 Am. St. Rep. 229). Citing, Mc Govern v. Insurance Co., 109 Ill. 151; Lester v. Bank, 17 R. I. 88 (20 Atl. Rep. 231). The failure of an attachment affidavit to state that the debt or demand "is a just claim," as required by statute (Mill. & V. Tenn. Code, § 4210), will not render a sale of land thereon subject to a collateral attack, where the plaintiff had attached to his declaration an itemized account swore to as "true, just and correct." McElwee v. Steelman, Tenn. (38 S. W. Rep. 275). Where the sale is otherwise regular, its confirmation will not be set aside, because the purchaser voluntarily raised his bid in open court, without being required to do so or giving any reason for his action. Griffith v. Jenkins, 50 Neb. 719 (70 N. W. Rep. 256). The only persons who can complain on account of the deed being executed to the wrong person, are the persons who made the successful bids at the sale. Davies v. Gibbs, 168 Ill., 205 (48 N. E. Rep. 120).

Sec. 451. Setting aside sales-Inadequacy of price. Mere inadequacy of price alone is not sufficient cause for setting aside a sale. Carson v. Ambrose, 183 Pa. St. 88 (38 Ati. Rep. 508); Lothrop v. Tracy, 24 Colo. 382 (51 Pac. Rep. 486; 65 Am. St. Rep. 229); Keith v. Browning, 139 Mo. 190 (40 S. W. Rep. 764). While inadequacy of price will not warrant the setting aside of an execution sale for the reason that the opportunity to redeem affords the owner of the property full protection, yet, if he does not know of the sale, and is not chargeable with knowledge thereof until the time for redemption has expired, gross inadequacy of price, coupled with unconscionable conduct on the part of the judgment creditor,

will constitute a reason for annulling the sale when the judgment creditor buys the property at the sale, and the deed is executed and delivered to an assignee of the certificate of sale, who is not a bona fide purchaser, and who is cognizant of all the facts excusing the owner of the property from not knowing of the fact of sale in time to redeem. Warren v. Stinson, 6 N. Dak. 293 (70 N. W. Rep. 279). A trustee's sale under a decree of foreclosure, will not be set aside on account of inadequacy of price unless such inadequacy is so gross and inordinate as to indicate misconduct or want of judgment on the part of the trustee. Hughes v. Riggs, 84 Md. 502 (36 Atl. Rep. 269). A sale of property worth $2,500.00 for $400.00 may be set aside where it appears that all the parties supposed the property to be subject to a mortgage for $2,000.00, which was in fact discharged. Stroup v. Raymond, 183 Pa. St. 279 (38 Atl. Rep. 626; 63 Am. St. Rep. 758). The failure of property to bring its full value on account of a financial stringency, is not sufficient ground for setting aside a sale, where there is no evidence that the property would bring more if resold. Lathrop v. Tracy, 24 Colo. 382 (51 Pac. Rep. 486; 65 Am. St. Rep. 229). If property brings its market value at the time of the sale, the sale will not be set aside because, owing to a general depreciation in values, the price realized was not equal to its former value. Lipscomb v. New York Life Ins. Co., 138 Mo. 17 (39 S. W. Rep. 465). Persons who have an opportunity to attack a foreclosure sale on account of inadequacy of price at the time of its confirmation, cannot subsequently maintain an independent action to set aside the sale on that ground. Phillips v. Love, 57 Kan. 828 (48 Pac. Rep. 142).

Sec. 452. Guardians' sales-Practice. In Mississippi it is held that a guardian's sale which is not reported to, or confirmed by, the court ordering it, is void. Hicks v. Blakeman, 74 Miss. 459 (21 So. Rep. 7). A guardian's sale made upon the application of one assuming to act as guardian, who in fact has no authority as such, is an absolute nullity and is not cured by the provision of Neb. Comp. Stat., ch. 23, § 64, prohibiting collateral attacks upon such sales where certain facts appear. Wells v. Steckleberg, 50 Neb. 670 (70 N.