W. Rep. 242). In a subsequent opinion rendered upon a rehearing in this case, it is held that a person making such sale as a guardian is estopped, as against the purchaser, from asserting an estate in his own right in the same land. Wells v. Steckelberg, 52 Neb. 597 (72 N. W. Rep. 865; 66 Am. St. Rep. 529). A guardian's sale of real estate for more than $1,000 at private sale without notice, which under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 2697, should have been made at public sale with notice, will not be held void where the court ordering the sale, as made, had jurisdiction. Eliason v. Bronnenburg, 147 Ind. 248 (46 N. E. Rep. 582). W. Va. Code, ch. 83, construed and applied-guardians' sales-application of proceeds-bond of guardian. Kester v. Hill, 42 W. Va. 611 (26 S. E. Rep. 376).

Sec. 453. Guardians' sales-Liability of guardian's bondsmen. The liability for a guardian's failure to properly account for the proceeds of a sale rests upon his sureties on a special sale bond and not on the sureties upon his bond given at the time of his appointment. Kestler v. Hill, 42 W. Va. 611 (26 S. E. Rep. 376); Findley v. Findley, 42 W. Va. 372 (26 S. E. Rep. 433). In the last case the court say: "The general rule is that, where an officer is required to perform a duty special in nature, and give a special bond for its performance, no liability therefor attaches to his general bondsmen, in the absence of any declaration that they shall also be liable. Board of Sup'rs v. Ehlers, 45 Wis. 281. These principles will be found ably discussed and sustained in Morrow v. Wood, 56 Ala. 1, and Throop, Pub. Off., § 220. So, in Board of Sup'rs v. Pabst, 70 Wis. 352 (35 N. W. Rep. 337); Board v. City of Paris, 66 Tex. 119 (18 S. W. Rep. 342); Com. v. Toms, 45 Pa. St. 408; Henderson v. Coover, 4 Nev. 429."

Sec. 454.

Miscellaneous notes. An objection that property, sold under a decree in equity, was appraised too low comes too late when made for the first time after the sale. Omaha Loan & T. Co. v. Bertrand, 51 Neb. 508 (70 N. W. Rep. 1120). A sale of land under a decree will pass title notwithstanding a misdescription in the judgment and com

missioner's deed, where the land intended to be sold is manifest. Hildebrand v. Bunnschu, Ky. (40 S. W. Rep. 920). Particular evidence held sufficient to authorize the setting aside of a sheriff's sale on account of mutual mistake. Howlett v. Central, Car. L. & Imp. Co., 50 S. C. 1 (27 S. E. Rep. 533).

Sec. 455. Statutes amended and new statutes. Mass. Pub. Stat., ch. 140, § 1-sales of real estate by guardian -amended, Laws 1899, p. 75. Mich. Comp. Laws 1897, § 9160-sales of real estate by guardian-amended, Laws 1899, p. 368. For general statute validating judicial sales in Montana, see Laws 1899, p. 145. New Jersey has a new statute prescribing the requisites of a notice of sale. Laws 1898, p. 535. And so has Ohio in reference to the description of property in the notice when the property to be sold is situated in any hamlet, village, town or city. Laws 1898, p. 256. In Virginia where a deed made in pursuance of a judicial sale shows on its face that such sale has been regularly made, it is prima facie evidence of that fact and that the other recitals in the conveyance are true. Laws 1897-98, p. 322. Wisconsin has a new statute prescribing special proceedings for the sale or other disposition of future contingent interests in lands. Laws 1899. pp. 525, 630.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 456. Right of landlord to injunction against occupancy of the premises by disreputable members of tenant's family. A tenant occupying premises near his landlord's residence, who marries a disreputable woman, cannot be enjoined by his landlord from bringing her to his house to live with him as his wife, where there is no evidence that she will continue her disreputable life. Miles v. Lauraine, 99 Ga. 402 (27 S. E. Rep. 739). The opinion of the court is as follows: "The ancient feudal system which prevailed in England in

earlier days has never existed in Georgia, and the right of the landlord to interfere with and control the domestic relations of his tenants has received no recognition by the laws of this state. The relation of landlord and tenant rests upon contract, and, in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, we can find no warrant in the law for the proposition that a landlord may lawfully exclude from the domicile of the tenant the wife of the latter, who may be, for any reason, distasteful to him. If the tenant should introduce into his premises disreputable or disorderly characters, such as would tend to convert an ordinarily respectable tenement into a bawdy house, or one frequented by disorderly persons and others of ill fame, such use of the premises by the tenant might well be enjoined as not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract under which he entered was executed; but we find nothing in the record in the present case to justify the application of such a doctrine. The person whose introduction into the house in question was objected to by the landlord was the lawful wife of the tenant. It is true, from the record, that she had not theretofore led a blameless private life. Upon the contrary, she had been guilty of indiscretions. She had, however, expressed a determination to change her method of living. She had become the lawful wife of a respectable man. He gave her the opportunity to demonstrate her willingness to lead a virtuous life, and, in the absence of a stipulation that this particular person should not be admitted into the tenement, she was entitled to have the opportunity of vindicating her claims to future respectability. We find in this record no evidence of a breach of any legal or moral duty due from the tenant to the landlord, and in the absence thereof there was no authority for his exclusion from the enjoyment, in such manner as he saw proper, of the premises in dispute. Sensitive persons, who would shield themselves from contact with disagreeable neighbors, should either move out or protect themselves by covenant."

Sec. 457. Estoppel to deny title. As against a landlord's claim for rent, his tenant is estopped to show that the property belonged to another, Hamer v. Mc Call, 121 N. C. 196 (28 S. E. Rep. 297); or that the lease was oid, Cher

okee Strip Live-Stock Ass'n v. Cass Land & C. Co., 138 Mo. 394 (40 S. W. Rep. 107). A purchaser of a tenant's leasehold interest at a judicial sale thereof, is estoped to deny the lessor's title. Hentig v. Pipher, 58 Kan. 788 (51 Pac. Rep. 229). A tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title, in so far as the right to the use and possession of the premises is concerned, although the title under which the latter first acquired possession and control thereof has reverted to the United States, and both the landlord and tenant are claimants for said property, and applicants and contestants for title thereto under and by virtue of the laws regulating the disposal thereof. Young v. Severy, 5 Okla. 630 (49 Pac. Rep. 1024). The lessee cannot deny his landlord's title on account of the fact that the lease is in violation of the Laws of Choctaw Nation, 1887, act October 28, requiring all noncitizens of the nation owning houses for the purpose of renting them to dispose of the same within sixty days. G. W. Walker Trading Co. v. Grady Trading Co., Ind. Ter.

Rep. 354).

(39 S. W.

The rule does not apply where the lease is void on account of being prohibited by the statute. Mayes v. Cherokee Strip Live-Stock Ass'n, 58 Kan. 712 (51 Pac. Rep. 215). The estoppel does not continue after the eviction of a tenant by his landlord. Evans' Adm'r v. Lytle, Ky. (42 S. W. Rep. 1110). A married woman is not estopped to deny the title of her husband's lessor. Shew v. Call, 119 N. C. 440 (26 S. E. Rep. 33; 56 Am. St. Rep. 678). Minnesota has prescribed the law of estoppel between landlord and tenant in that state by a new statute which provides : "Whenever any person enters into the possession of any lands or tenements in this state, under or pursuant to a lawful lease thereof, he shall not be permitted, while so in possession, to dispute or deny the title of his landlord in any action brought by such landlord, or any one claiming under or through him to recover possession of any such lands or tenements. But such estoppel shall not apply to any lessee who at and prior to the time of accepting such lease, is already in possession of the leased lands or tenements under any claim or title adverse or hostile to that of such lessor." Laws 1899, p. 9.

A forfeiture cannot be enforced

Sec. 458. Forfeiture. on account of the breach of an implied covenant in the lease. Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 O. St. 118 (48 N. E. Rep. 502). A forfeiture of a lease will not be decreed on account of a trivial breach of a covenant therein; nor will the forfeiture of a lease for eighteen years be enforced on account of the lessee's delay for two and one-half months to make improvements which he covenanted to make, where it appears that he has been making the preliminary negotiations and contract for doing the work required of him and his delay has not been willful or in bad faith. Lundin v. Schoeffel, 167 Mass. 465 (45 N. E. Rep. 933). The right of a lessor to enforce a forfeiture on account of the non-payment of rent, is not waived by the fact that he has previously brought summary proceedings for possession of the premises in which he has been awarded a judgment and the lessee has appealed, giving bond to secure the payment of rent during the pendency of the appeal. Wis. Rev. St., § 3368, applied. Palmer v. City Livery Co., 98 Wis. 33 (73 N. W. Rep. 559).

Sec. 459. Tenancy at will-Tenancy at sufferance -Termination. Where an oral lease by a life tenant for the full period of his estate which is void on account of the statute of frauds, fixes no definite term of occupancy, nor makes any reservation of annual rent, or rent payable at stated intervals, it is held to create a tenancy at will. Barrett v. Cox, 112 Mich. 220 (70 N. W. Rep. 446). The common law rule that a tenancy at will is terminated by an alienation in fee or for years of the premises by the landlord, is not affected by Me. Rev. Stat. ch., 94, § 2, providing that "all tenancies at will may be terminated by either party by thirty days' notice in writing for that purpose given to either party, and not otherwise save by mutual consent," it being held that the word "party" is to be understood as party to the contract," and

66

the words" and not otherwise" refer rather to the acts of the parties to the tenancy than to the effects of their acts by operation of law. Seavy v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536 (38 Atl. Rep. 540). Upon the death of the owner of the life estate his lessee becomes a tenant at sufferance. Guthmann v. Vallery, 51 Neb. 824 (71 N. W. Rep. 734; 66 Am. St. Rep. 475). In