Sec. 496. Pendente lite purchasers. A purchaser of property pending litigation for its recovery, takes subject to an attorney's lien given by Ga. Code, § 1989. Lovett v. Moore, 98 Ga. 158 (26 S. E. Rep. 498). Persons who acquire liens pending foreclosure proceedings are as much bound by a decree rendered therein as if made parties thereto, Warford v. Sullivan, 147 Ind. 14 (46 N. E. Rep. 27); and one purchasing from a mortgagor after a suit to foreclose a mortgage has been begun, takes subject to the decree of foreclosure and the rights of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale thereunder. Hibernia Sav. & L. Soc. v. Lewis, 117 Cal. 577 (47 Pac. Rep. 602). A conveyance, pendente lite, does not affect the result of the suit where the grantee is not made a party. Mealy v. Lipp, 91 Tex. 182 (42 S. W. Rep. 544). A person who acquires title at a partition sale to effect a settlement between plaintiffs of their rights and interests in property in suit takes their position and standing in the litigation, in point of fact, notwithstanding he fails to have himself made a party thereto; that is to say, his acquisition gives him no advantage, and does not affect the rights of the defendants and appellees. Dufossat v. Fontenot, 49 La. 898 (22 So. Rep. 46). A lis pendens is sufficient notice to one who buys timber on the land of the rights of the complainant in the suit. Alliance Trust Co. v. Nettleton Hardwood Co., 74 Miss. 584 (21 So. Rep. 396; 60 Am. St. Rep. 531; 36 L. R. A. 155). Where judg ments are docketed or deeds of trust recorded, or liens otherwise acquired, and a chancery suit to enforce the same is pending, there need not be any notice of the pendency of such suit, under W. Va. Code 1891, Ch. 139, § 13, to bind one purchasing after the docketing of such judgment or recordation of such deeds of trust or liens. They are pendente lite pur chasers under the common law rule. Shumate's Ex'rs v. Crockett, 43 W. Va. 491 (27 S. E. Rep. 240). Although under Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 5267, an action is, after final judgment, still under the control of the court for the purposes of that section, yet the action is not pending (at least after the time for appealing has expired), so as to render a purchaser, from a party to the action, of property the title of which is affected by the judgment, a purchaser pendente lite. Such purchaser must be made a party to or given notice of any

application under that section to vacate or modify the judgment, at least when the party making the application has notice, actual or constructive, of the transfer of interest; and, if he is not made a party to or given notice of such application, the setting aside or modification of the judgment will be, as to him, void and inoperative to affect his title. Aldrich v. Chase, 70 Minn. 243 (73 N. W. Rep. 161).

Sec. 497.

Miscellaneous notes-Statutes construed. A party may, by agreement, give a lien on property not yet acquired by him, and such lien attaches when the party agreeing to give it acquires the property. Cal. Civ. Code, § 2883. Kreling v. Kreling, 118 Cal. 413 (50 Pac. Rep. 546). A probate court has no power to direct the distribution of an estate to the decedent's heirs charged with a lien in favor of the administrator, on account of money expended by him for the benefit of the estate, Huston v. Becker, 15 Wash. 586 (47 Pac. Rep. 10); or for money due him for his fees. In re Sour's Estate, 17 Wash. 675 (50 Pac. Rep. 587). Where the payee of a note executed a bond to the payor, agreeing to convey certain lands upon his payment of the note, it is held that an assignee of the note acquires a lien on the land. National Bank of Commerce v. Lock, 17 Wash. 528 (50 Pac. Rep. 478; 61 Am. St. Rep. 923). Ala. Code, §§ 265, 279, 284-286, construed and applied-lien of bond of probate judge -additional bond intermediate mortgage subrogation. Randolph v. Billing, 115 Ala. 682 (22 So. Rep. 468). N. Dak. Rev. Codes, § 4845, construed and applied-enforcement of seed grain lien-liability of purchaser of property covered by. Black v. Minneapolis & N. El. Co., 7 N. Dak. 129 (73 N. W. Rep. 90). S. Dak. Comp. Laws, §§ 5490–5493, construed and applied-sufficiency of complaint to enforce seed grain lien-sufficiency of description of property in notice of lien. First Nat. Bank v. Peavy Elevator Co., 10 S. Dak. 167 (72 N. W. Rep. 402).

Sec. 498.

Statutes amended and new statutes. Ala. Code (1896), §§ 1920-1922-lien of judgments-filing oftranscript―amended, Laws, 1898-99, p. 34. La. Laws 1899, p. 215, provides for filing lis pendens in actions affecting immovable

property situated in cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants. Minn. Laws 1899, p. 122, provides that in case of dispute as to what county land is located in, lis pendens may be filed in each county. Ohio Rev. Stat. § 5391-restricting lien of judgment to two-thirds of value of land-amended Laws 1898, p. 284. Utah Rev. Stat. 1898, § 3198,-docketing judgment -lien for eight years-filing transcript in other countiesamended, Laws .1899, p. 34. Va. Code, § 3567-time for which judgment is to be a lien on real estate-amended, Laws 1897-98, p. 507.

MARRIED WOMEN.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 499. Contracts and conveyances-Power of abandoned wife at common law. A contract of guaranty, executed by a married woman in the state of her residence, the law of which does not permit her to make such a contract, does not become valid by its delivery in another state by her husband whose agency is created in the state where the contract was executed. Appeal of Freeman, 68 Conn. 533 (37 Atl. Rep. 420; 57 Am. St. Rep. 112; 37 L. R. A. 452). In Michigan it is held that a wife is not liable upon a covenant in her husband's deed. Webb v. Holt, 113 Mich. 338 (71 N. W. Rep. 637). The contrary is held in Minnesota. Security Bank v. Holmes, 68 Minn. 538 (71 N. W. Rep. 699).

"At the common law, if the husband has abjured the realm, or was an alien residing continuously abroad, these circumstances invested the wife with the protection and powers incident to a feme sole." And the same rule has been extended and applied when the husband resided without the state of the wife's residence, he having deserted her. Buford v. Adair, 43 W. Va. 211 (27 S. E. Rep. 260; 64 Am. St. Rep. 854). Citing. Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89; Gregory v. Pierce, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 478; Rose v. Bates, 12 Mo. 30; Gallaher v. Delargy, 57 Mo. 29; Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. 105; Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31; Cornwall v. Hoyt, 7 Conn. 427; Arthur v. Broadnax, 3 Ala. 557 (37 Am. Dec. 707);

Roland v. Logan, 18 Ala. 307; Starrett v. Wynn, 17 Serg. & R. 130 (17 Am. Dec. 654).

Sec. 500. Estoppels applied to married women. Where a married woman has executed a note and mortgage to secure the payment of a sum which, from the recitals in such note and mortgage, appears to have been loaned to her, and upon the faith of her separate estate, she is not entitled to impeach the transaction by showing that the papers were executed to secure the payment of her husband's debts, and not her own, unless she alleges in her plea, and proves, that at the time of their execution the lender knew that the transaction was merely colorable, and was a scheme or device by which her own property was pledged to the payment of the debt of her husband. Temples v. Equitable Mortg. Co., 100 Ga. 503 (28 S. E. Rep. 232; 62 Am. St. Rep. 326). In South Carolina it is held that a married woman is estopped to deny recitals in her note and mortgage that they are for the benefit of her separate estate, as against an innocent assignee of them for value before maturity and without notice. White v.

Goldsberg, 49 S. C. 530 (27 S. E. Rep. 517). A married woman who gives to one holding her separate estate as trustee, written authority to sell and convey the same and joins with him in the deed, will be estopped to assail the title of a subsequent purchaser of the property on account of misapplication of the purchase price of which she had notice at the time of the transaction but failed to disclose it to the public. Harris v. Smith, 98 Tenn. 286 (39 S. W. Rep. 343). In Texas it is held that the execution of a deed by a married woman, which is invalid because her husband does not join her in its execution and her receipt for purchase money, do not estop her or her privies from assailing the validity of the deed, even as against a subsequent purchaser without notice of her coverture. Daniels v. Mason, 90 Tex. 240 (38 S. W. Rep. 161; 59 Am. St. Rep. 815). In West Virginia it is held that a married woman cannot even by fraudulent conduct, be barred under the principle of estoppel in pais from asserting her title to land, although it be her separate estate. Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 652 (27 S. E. Rep. 411; 64 Am. St. Rep. 891; 38 L. R. A. 694)

Sec. 501. Equities of married women as against husbands' creditors. A wife who permits her husband to take and hold the legal title to real estate purchased with her money, cannot assert her ownership to the injury of his creditors. Roane v. Hamilton, 101 Ia. 250 (70 N. W. Rep. 181); Township of Maple Valley v. Foley, 113 Mich. 622 (71 N. W. Rep. 1086); Holter v. Wassweiler, 19 Mont. 169 (47 Pac. Rep. 806). In Missouri it is held that where a married woman permits her husband to hold the legal title to lands purchased with her money, not knowing the effect thereof, or that the husband was obtaining credit on the faith of his ownership, she is not guilty of any fraud, so as to invalidate, as to his creditors, a subsequent conveyance of the land to her by her husband. Alkire Grocery Co. v. Ballenger, 137 Mo. 369 (38 S. W. Rep. 911). Where the wife, who was the owner of an equitable undivided interest in land conveyed to her husband, caused him to convey such interest to her before his debtor acquired a judgment against him, she can assert her title as against such debtor, although he extended credit to the husband upon the faith of his ownership of the land, where it appears that she did not authorize the husband to take title in his own name alone or do anything to mislead the creditor or warrant him in believing the land belonged to the husband. Bell v. Stewart, 98 Ga. 669 (27 S. E. Rep. 153). To the same effect is the case of Hill v. Meinhard, 39 Fla. 111 (21 So. Rep. 805). Where a wife asserts title to crops raised by her husband on her land and in his possession, as against his creditors she has the burden of showing that the land is her separate real estate and that the crops belong to her, which is not discharged by her merely showing a deed of the land to her. Eavenson v. Pownall, 182 Pa. St. 587 (38 Atl. Rep. 470).

SEPARATE REAL ESTATE.

[In Vol. II, §§ 381-428; Vol. III, §§ 470-493; Vol. IV., §§ 466-492; Vol. V, SS 479-508, will be found a compilation of the statutes and decisions of the several states and territories on the subject of Separate Real Estate of Married Women. Below we give such amendments, changes and additional constructions as have been made.]

Sec. 502. Alabama. (See Vol. II, § 381; Vol. III, § 470; Vol IV, § 466; Vol. V, § 479.) A husband's mortgage upon his wife's land to