Co. v. Bristol Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 99 Tenn. 871 (42 S. W. Rep. 19). Notes of a third person are "collateral security" within the meaning of S. Dak Comp. Laws, § 5468, which provides that no person is entitled to a mechanic's lien who takes collateral security in the same contract. Edward P.Allis Co. v. Madison Elec. L. H. & P. Co., 9 S. Dak. 459 (70 N, W. Rep. 650). A statute (Ky. Stat. 1894, § 2467), providing that a mechanic's lien shall have no effect "if security shall have been taken for labor performed or materials furnished,' does not apply where the lien claimant is induced by fraud to accept a worthless security. Norton's Assignee v. Hope Milling, Min. & L. Co., (40 S. W. Rep. 688).

Ky.

Sec. 550. Filing and recording building contract— Statute construed. Construing Cal Code Civ. Proc., § 1183, which renders certain building contracts void if the plans and specifiations are not filed and recorded and declares that"in such case the labor done and materials furnished by all persons aforesaid, except the contractor, shall be deemed to have been done and furnished at the personal instance of the owner and they shall have a lien for the value thereof," it is held that the owner is not personally liable for the labor done and materials furnished at the instance of the contractor, even though the contract be void, the only remedy against the owner in such case being a foreclosure of the lien; but the contractor is personally liable for such labor and materials and he may be made a party defendant in actions to foreclose the liens and a personal judgment may be rendered against him. Sureties upon the bond of a contractor are liable on the bond though the contract is void under the statute. McMenomy v. White, 115 Cal. 339 (47 Pac. Rep. 109). As to the liability of the sureties upon the bond of the contractor this case is followed in the case of Summerton v. Hanson, 117 Cal. 252 (49 Pac. Rep. 135). It is also followed as to the personal liability of the owner in the case of Gnekow v. Confer, Cal. (48 Pac. Rep. 331). Construing this statute in connection with § 1186, it is held that where the original contractor abandons the building which is finished by the owner, persons furnishing labor and materials must file their claim within thirty days from its completion. Pierce v. Birkholm, 115 Cal. 657

(47 Pac. Rep. 681). The statute is not complied with by recording a contract which refers to plans and specifications in the hands of an architect. Pierce v. Birkholm, 115 Cal. 657 (47 Pac. Rep. 681).

A lien statement

Sec. 551. Filing of lien statement. need not state matters which the statute does not require it to contain. Jeffersonville Water Supply Co. v. Ritter, 146 Ind. 521 (45 N. E. Rep. 697). All the parts of a lien statement should be construed together, and, when thus construed, if they meet the substantial requirements of the statute, the statement is sufficient. Drexel v. Richards, 50 Neb. 509 (70 N. W. Rep. 23). A lien statement is insufficient where it does not state either directly or by necessary inference, the name of the person to whom the claimants furnished material or for whom they performed the labor for which they seek to enforce the lien, or that claimants, have, in fact, performed labor upon or furnished material for the building mentioned. Getty v. Ames, 30 Or. 573 (48 Pac. Rep. 355; 60 Am. St. Rep. 835.) Where the lien statement complies with a statute (N. Dak. Comp. Laws, § 5470), requiring the lien claimant to file "a just and true account of the demand due him after allowing all the credits and containing a correct description of the property to be charged with said lien and verified by his affidavit," it need not set forth all the facts necessary to entitle the party to a lien. Red River Lumber Co. v. Friel, 7 N. Dak. 46 (73 N. W. Rep. 203). It may be signed for the claimant by his attorneys. Jeffersonville Water Supply Co. v. Ritter, 146 Ind. 521 (45 N. E. Rep. 697). In Pennsylvania, a lien for original construction, and a lien for addition, alteration or repair are given by distinct statutes, and a lien claim must show on its face to which class it belongs and contain sufficient allegations to bring it within the provisions of the statute. Wharton v. Real Estate Inv. Co., 180 Pa. St. 168 (36 Atl. Rep. 725; 57 Am. St. Rep. 629). Mich. Pub. Acts 1891, No. 179, § 4, construed and applied-duty of contractor to furnish owner sworn statement of subcontractors and laborers, showing amount due them as a prerequisite to file a lien claim. Wiltsie v. Harvey, 114 Mich. 131 (72 N. W. Rep. 134).

Sec. 552. Filing of lien statement by subcontractor or material man. A subcontractor's lien statement which makes a lumping charge and shows several items which can be itemized is bad. Wharton v. Real Estate Inv. Co., 180 Pa. St. 168 (36 Atl. Rep. 725; 57 Am. St. Rep. 629). Where bricks for several buildings are furnished under one continuous account, a lien may be filed within the statutory limit from the date of the last items furnished, though several months have elapsed between such items and preceding ones. Maryland Brick Co. v. Dunkerly, 85 Md. 199 (36 Atl. Rep. 761). A statute (Mich Laws 1891, Act 179, § 5), requiring a subcontractor to file a statement showing the amount "justly and truly due him," does not prevent a subcontractor from filing a lien claim for amounts for which he has taken notes that are not due at the time of filing his lien statement. Smalley v. Brown-Stone Co., 114 Mich. 104 (72 N. W. Rep. 29). In California, the filing of a notice of lien by a material man before completion of the building, is premature and confers no right to enforce a lien. Particular evidence examined and held sufficient to sustain a finding that a building was completed at the time the lien claim was filed. Santa Monica Lum. & Mill Co. v. Hege, 119 Cal. 376 (51 Pac. Rep. 555).

Sec. 553. Lien statement-Time for filing. A lien may be filed to secure the payment of money not yet due by the terms of of the contract. Healy v. Fallon, 69 Conn. 228 (37 Atl. Rep. 495). Where one contracts to make certain machinery and deliver it "free on board of cars" at a designated place, for a stipulated sum, it is held that the machinery is furnished when it is delivered in accordance with the contract, on board the cars at the place named without expense to the purchaser, and the time given to file a lien dates from that time. Congdon v. Kendall, 53 Neb. 282 (73 N. W. Rep. 659). Following, King v. Building Co., 50 O. St. 320 (34 N. E. Rep. 436). Where materials are furnished. under independent contracts, the time for filing the lien statement begins to run from the time the material is furnished under each contract. Wis. Rev. Stat., § 3318, applied. Brown v. Edward P. Allis Co., 98 Wis. 120 (73 N. W. Rep. 656). Where one's contract to furnish brick specified no time within

which they were to be delivered but he was to deliver them as needed and ordered, it is held that a notice given within thirty days after the completion of the walls was sufficient, though not in thirty days after the last of the brick were furnished. Bristol Brick Works v. King College, Tenn.

(41 S. W. Rep. 1069). All the materials for which there are charges in a mechanic's lien claim, must have been furnished as parts of one transaction or under one contract for a building or job of work; and in determining the time within which a lien statement must be filed, whether all the items of charges for materials were so furnished under a single contract or some items arising under separate and independent transactions or contracts have been included in the claim of lien, are questions of fact for the jury, or for the court, if the case is tried to the court without a jury. Nye & Schneider Co. V. Berger, 52 Neb. 758 (73 N. W. Rep. 274). Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1187, every person except the original contractor must file his claim of lien within thirty days after the completion of any building, improvements or structure. Pierce v. Birkholm, 115 Cal. 657 (47 Pac. Rep. 681). Particular evidence held sufficient to show that a lien claim was filed within thirty days after the completion of the building. Ward v. Crane, 118 Cal. 676 (50 Pac. Rep. 839). Under Utah Sess. Laws 1890, ch. 30, §§ 10, 11, a lien statement may be filed within forty days after the materials are furnished or labor performed. Culmer V. Clift, 14 Utah 286 (47 Pac. Rep. 85). A failure to file a mechanic's lien statement within ninety days as provided by McClain's Ia. Code, § 3314, does not defeat its priority except as against purchasers or incumbrancers in good faith without notice whose rights accrued after the ninety days and before any claim for a lien was filed. Lee v. Hoyt, 101 Ia. 101 (70 N. W. Rep. 95). R. I. Gen Laws, ch. 206, §§ 5, 7, 9, construed and applied-time within which lien statement may be filed. Goff v. Hosmer, 20 R. I. 91 (37 Atl. Rep. 533).

Sec. 554. Lien statement-Extending time for filing by repairs or substitution of new materials. After a building has been accepted as completed, according to the terms of the contract for its construction, the renewal or repair of some

of its parts upon a discovery of their defects, will not extend the time for filing a lien otherwise excluded by the lapse of time. Brown & Haywood Co. v. Trane, 98 Wis. 1 (73 N. W. Rep. 561); Congdon v. Kendall, 53 Neb. 282 (73 N. W. Rep. 659); Avery v. Butler, 30 Or. 287 (47 Pac. Rep. 706). In the last case the court say: "While there is seemingly a conflict of authority upon this question, we think the better reason supports the rule that, after a structure has been completed, inspected, and approved by the owner or his lawful agent, any latent defects, existing in the material or workmanship, that may be cured by the builder upon the request of the owner, are to be considered as repairs, and not omissions in the performance of the original contract. When work demanded by the terms of the original contract has been omitted, the final completion of the structure dates from the time such omissions are supplied by the builder at the request of the owner, although in the meantime the latter may have taken possession of the property (Stock Yards v. O'Reilly, 85 Ill. 546; Holden v. Winslow, 18 Pa. St. 160); the rule seeming to be that while there is anything to do which it is the duty of the builder to perform, under the terms of the contract, the work upon which he is engaged is not completed until this obligation is accomplished (Watts-Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 51 Hun, 302 (3 N. Y. Supp. 869); so that, if the window blinds were demanded by the terms of the original contract, the house could not be considered completed until they were supplied. So, too, when the builder, after a sub stantial completion of the structure, at the request of the owner, makes additions to it which are useful or necessary to its enjoyment, the final completion dates from the time such additions are made. Hofer's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 360 (9 Atl. Rep. 441); Nichols v. Culver, 51 Conn. 177. When the work has been apparently completed, but not accepted, the restoration by the builder of a part to which objection has been made is considered as a substitution under the terms of the original agreement, and not a repair, and therefore the statute begins to run only from the final completion of the imperfectly performed obligation. Bruce v. Berg, 8 Mo. App. 204; Scott v. Cook, Id. 193; Worthenv. Cleaveland, 129 Mass. 570; Harrison v. Association, 134 Pa. St. 558 (19 Atl. Rep.