J. Eq. 398 (36 Atl. Rep. 483). In an action against a grantee assuming and agreeing to pay a mortgage debt, an endorser of the note is not a necessary party. Morgan v. South Milwaukee Lake View Co., 97 Wis. 275 (72 N. W. Rep. 872). One who has disposed of all his interest in the mortgaged property is not a necessary party. Ingham v. Weed, Cal. (48 Pac. Rep. 318); Johnes v. Outwater, 55 N. J. Eq. 398 (36 Atl. Rep. 483). In California it is held that heirs of a deceased mortgagor are not necessary parties defendant, Finger v. Mc Caughey, 119 Cal. 59 (51 Pac. Rep. 13); and in Illinois an administrator of a deceased mortgagor is not a necessary party where no personal judgment is sought. Roberts v. Tunnell, 165 Ill. 631 (46 N. E. Rep. 713). Where the foreclosure of a mortgage affects an estate limited over to persons not in being, they are represented by the living owner of the first estate of inheritance and are bound by a decree to which he is a party. Doremus v. Dunham, 55 N. J. Eq. 511 (37 Atl. Rep. 62). Applying Ky. Civ. Code, § 21, it is held that a trustee to whom is given a mortgage on lands to secure bonds sold to third persons, may, on default, maintain an action to foreclose the mortgage without joining with him the holders of the bonds. Union Trust Co. v. Broshears, Ky. (39 S. W. Rep. 44). Where a mortgage given to secure the payment of several bonds held by divers persons, provides a method for the procuring of the appointment of a new trustee in case of a vacancy, a holder of a portion of the bonds cannot maintain a bill to foreclose the mortgage, where the position of trustee is vacant without procuring the appointment of another trustee and making him a party, and he will not be relieved from this duty by the bare allegation in his complaint that its performance would necessitate expense and delay. Johnes v. Ouwtater, 55 N. J. Eq. 398 (36 Atl. Rep. 483). A decree of foreclosure had on an ex parte petition of the mortgagee made under Md. Pub. Local Laws, art. 4, §§ 692-704, is not rendered invalid on account of the holder of a subsequent lien not being a party thereto. Hughes v. Riggs, 84 Md. 502 (36 Atl. Rep. 269). Sec. 618. Defenses to foreclosure proceedings. A defendant cannot show by parol evidence that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed was in fact a deed. Goon Gan v. Richardson, 16 Wash. 373 (47 Pac. Rep. 762). Where a prior mortgage is valid it is no defense to its foreclosure for a subsequent mortgagee to show that the plaintiff acquired his title by gift. Dyer v. Dean, 69 Vt. 370 (37 Atl. Rep. 1113). A grantee who assumes the payment of a mortgage cannot defend against an action of foreclosure by an assignee thereof, by showing that there was no consideration for the assignment. Terry v. Durand Land Co., 112 Mich. 665 (71 N. W. Rep. 525). It is no defense to an action for foreclosure brought by an assignee of the mortgage to show that the assignment has not been recorded for the purpose of avoiding the payment of taxes. Terry v. Durand Land Co., 112 Mich. 6C5 (71 N. W. Rep. 525). A defense, by persons who took conveyances after the execution and recording of the mortgage, based upon a contract made by them with the mortgagor, is not available without a showing of their compliance with it and that such agreement was made in a manner to be binding upon the mortgagee. Horner v. Warfield, 180 Pa. St. 103 (36 Atl. Rep. 418). Where a mortgage stipulates for the release of a certain amount of the land upon the pay. ment of a specified sum by the mortgagor, this privilege may be exercised by a purchaser from the mortgagor after the bill has been filed to foreclose the mortgage, and where his first answer setting up the privilege is insufficient on account of the insufficiency of his tender, he may be permitted to file a supplementary answer setting up a later tender and demand. Hall v. Home Bldg. Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 304 (38 Atl. Rep. 447). Particular denials of nonpayment held insufficient to require proof of nonpayment by plaintiff. Westbay v. Gray, 116 Cal. 660 (48 Pac. Rep. 800). Particular evidence held insufficient to sustain the claim of the grantee of a portion of mortgaged premises to the effect that his purchase was made under an agreement between him and the parties to the mortgage, that such portion of the property was to be released from the mortgage. Parker v. Harvey, N. J. Eq. (36 Atl. Rep. 681). Sec. 619. Defenses to foreclosure of purchase money mortgage. In order for the maker of a purchase money mortgage to defend against its foreclosure on the ground that the sale of the premises to him was effected by fraudulent representations, he must show that he relied upon such representations. Ackman v. Faster, 179 Pa. St. 463 (36 Atl. Rep. 324). A breach of covenants in a deed against incumbrances or for good title is no defense against proceedings to foreclose a mortgage given on the land for part of the consideration money, except in cases where there has been an eviction by title paramount or an action is pending to try the title to the mortgaged premises. A further exception exists where actual fraud in the transaction is alleged and proven. Frenche v. Mc Connell, N. J. L. (38 Atl. Rep. 687). In an action brought to foreclose a purchase money mortgage given to the vendor, the mortgagor and his subsequent grantee will be allowed to show as a partial defense that a valuable portion of the land which the mortgagee undertook to convey has been taken and held by another under a paramount title. Chaffey v. Boggs, 179 Pa. St. 301 (36 Atl. Rep. 241). A vendee cannot defend against a purchase money mortgage given to a corporation for land purchased of it on the ground of the corporation's failure to perform an agreement executed by its president, without authority, in reference to a supposed outstanding claim of title held by a third party, nor can a reduction be claimed on account of such supposed claim, where the vendee has not been disturbed or suffered any damages. National Bank v. Levanseler, 115 Mich. 372 (73 N. W. Rep. 399). Sec. 620. Fraud and duress as a defense to foreclosure proceedings. Where a mortgage is given upon a new and valuable consideration, it is ro defense to its foreclosure to allege that it was made in relation to property respecting which there had been prior fraudulent and unlawful transactions between the parties. Stewart v. Chicago Gen. St. Ry. Co., 166 Ill. 61 (46 N. E. Rep. 765). Where a mortgagee can show a prima facie right to recover on the face of the instrument without revealing any fraud in the transaction, the defendant will not be permitted to plead as a defense that the mortgage was executed for the purpose of defrauding his creditors of which purpose the mortgagee was aware. Barwick v. Moyse, 74 Miss. 415 (21 So. Rep. 238; 60 Am. St. Rep. 512). Citing, Harvey v. Varney, 98 Mass. 118; Boncsteel v. Sullivan, 104 Pa. St. 9; Williams v. Williams, 34 Pa. St. 312; Walker v. Brungard, 13 Smedes & M. 723. The defense of duress is available to the wife in an action to foreclose a mortgage upon the homestead which she was compelled to sign through fear of bodily harm and abandonment by her busband, although it was given to secure the payment of a negotiable promissory note that had been transferred to an innocent holder before maturity. Berry v. Berry, 57 Kan. 691 (47 Pac. Rep. 837; 57 Am. St. Rep. 351). Sec. 621. Usury as a defense to foreclosure proceedings. A statutory penalty for taking usurious interest cannot be enforced against a state seeking to foreclose a school fund mortgage, where the effect would be to reduce the school fund in violation of Idaho Const., art. 9, § 3. patrick, Idaho (51 Pac. Rep. 112). given to a corporation is affected by the usurious act of an officer of the corporation who consummated the transaction. Camden Fire Ins. Co. v. Reed, N. J. Eq. State v. Fitz- (38 Atl. Rep. 667). Cal. Civ. Code, § 1919, which provides that the parties may agree that the interest due shall become a part of the principal and thereafter bear the same rate of interest as the principal debt, prohibits a contract for compound interest at a higher rate than the principal bears, and where a contract for compound interest is illegal for this reason no compound interest can be recovered. Yndart v. Den, 116 Cal. 533 (48 Pac. Rep. 618; 58 Am. St. Rep. 200). The plea of usury should set forth the facts constituting the usury. Stanley v. Chicago Trust & Sav. Bank, 165 Ill. 295 (46 N. E. Rep. 273). Where a deed of trust to secure a loan executed between parties residing in different states specifies that the law of the state where the land is situated shall govern, such law governs the question of interest although the contract would be void by the law of the state where the lender resides. Bourland, Sp. J., and Wood, J., dissenting. Lanier v. Union Mort. Banking & Trust Co., 64 Ark. 39 (40 S. W. Rep. 466). Citing, Dugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246 (14 S. W. Rep. 1024; 23 Am. St. Rep. 332; 12 L. R. A. 93). But where a mort gage note given to a foreign corporation is made payable in its state where it is legal, for the evident purpose of evading the usury laws of the state in which it must be enforced, the usury laws of the latter state will be held to govern in its enforcement. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 90 Tex. 480 (39 S. W. Rep. 656). To the same effect is the case of Pryse v. People's Bldg., Loan & Sav. Ass'n, Ky. (41 S. W. Rep. 574). Construing and applying Ga. Code, § 2057f, which declares, “all titles to property made as part of a usurious contract or to evade the laws against usury are void," it is held that the plea of usury is a personal one and the right to have a title declared void rests with the borrower and his personal representatives and privies, and where one conveyed land absolutely as a security for a usurious debt, stipulating for a reconveyance to a third party upon its payment, it is held that he parted with his equity of redemption and could not assail the title on account of usury. Scott v. Williams, 100 Ga. 540 (28 S. E. Rep. 243; 62 Am. St. Rep. 340). Under Ga. Code, § 2057f, a conveyance given to secure the payment of an obligation infected with usury is void, and may be disregarded by the grantor or his personal representatives. Equitable Mort. Co. v. Braswell, 98 Ga. 139 (26 S. E. Rep. 487), Substantially the same is held in Pottle v. Lowe, 99 Ga. 576 (27 S. E. Rep. 145; 59 Am. St. Rep. 246). grantee in a deed given to secure a debt which is tainted with usury cannot, as against the maker thereof, convey a good title, even to a person who takes bona fide before maturity, for value, and without notice of the fact of usury. Beach v. Lattner, 101 Ga. 357 (28 S. E. Rep. 110). Under Mill. & V. Tenn. Code, § 3930, one foreclosing a mortgage given to secure a usurious note must pay the costs of the action. Kelton v. Brown, Tenn. (39 S. W. Rep. 541). A Sec. 622. Usury as a defense to foreclosure proceedings-What constitutes usury-Bonus or commission to broker. Requiring the payment in advance of the highest rate of interest allowed, is not usury. Willett v. Maxwell, 169 Ill. 540 (48 N. E. Rep. 473); Swanson v. Realization & Debenture Corp., 70 Minn. 380 (73 N. W. Rep. 165). Nor |