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(28 S. E. Rep. 337). To authorize an injunction to restrain a trespass the bill must charge that irreparable damage will result if the injunction is denied, setting forth facts constituting such injury or that defendant is insolvent. Collins v. Sutton, 94 Va. 127 (26 S. E. Rep. 415). A landlord may have an injunction against a trespasser interfering with the possession of his tenants, although he has no right to possession. Where an act of trespass may be indefinitely repeated, injunction is the proper remedy. Barbee v. Shannon, Ind. Ter. (40 S. W. Rep. 584). In support of the last proposition the court cite: Galway v. Railway Co., 128 N. Y. 132 (28 N. E. Rep. 479; 13 L. R. A. 788); Tantlinger v. Sullivan, 80 Ia. 218 (45 N. W. Rep. 765); Ladd v. Osborne, 79 Ia. 93 (44 N. W. Rep. 235); Shaffer v. Stull, 32 Neb. 94 (48 N. W. Rep. 882); Smithers v. Fitch, 82 Cal. 153 (22 Pac. Rep. 935); Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179 (15 N. E. Rep. 67; 2 Am. St. Rep. 405). It is held proper to refuse a temporary injunction against alleged threatened acts of trespass, when the defendant both by answer and affidavit disclaims any right to commit the acts and positively denies that he ever intended to commit them. Hagemeyer v. Village of St. Michael, 70 Minn. 482 (73 N. W. Rep. 412). A landowner cannot enjoin the construction of a railroad across his land before condemnation proceedings, where it appears that his damages are only nominal, that the railroad company has made every reasonable effort to secure a right of way by agreement, and that the landowner purchased the land for the purpose of obstructing the construction of the railroad. Bray v. Ocean City R. Co.,

N. J. Eq. (37 Atl. Rep. 604). Where, in an action to enjoin a trespass, the main question is the location of a boundary line between two states upon which there is conflicting evidence, the court should abide by the facts as found by the jury. Miller v. Wills, 95 Va. 337 (28 S. E. Rep. 337). Particular case in which injunction is held to be the proper remedy to prevent a trespass. Kern v. Field, 68 Minn. 317 (71 N. W. Rep. 393; 64 Am. St. Rep. 479).

Sec. 737. Injunction against trespass-Insolvency or nonresidence of defendant as a ground for. Injunction is the proper remedy to prevent a threatened repetition of a

trespass where the defendant is insolvent. Kaufman v. Wiener, 169 Ill. 596 (48 N. E. Rep. 479). In the case of Miller v. Wills, 95 Va. 337 (28 S. E. Rep. 337), the supreme court of appeals of Virginia say: "It has accordingly been. held, upon the ground of the inadequacy of the remedy at law, that an injunction will lie in the case of a trespass, where the trespasser is pecuniarily irresponsible. 1 High, Inj., § 356; Musselman v. Marquis, 1 Bush. 463 (89 Am. Dec. 637); Spear v. Cutter, 5 Barb. 486; Mulry v. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424 (3 N. E. Rep. 581; 53 Am. Rep. 206); Webb v. Harp, 38 Ga. 641; Hicks v. Compton, 18 Cal. 206; and Morgan v. Palmer, 48 N. H. 338. While mere insolvency would not generally be decisive of the right to grant an injunction, it constitutes in particular cases an important element in determining whether the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, should award it; for, the trespasser being insolvent, the legal remedy, though theoretically perfect, would be practically fruitless. And for a similar reason the nonresidence of the trespasser, which is the case with the appellees here, is justly entitled to much weight in determining the propriety of awarding the injunction; for it would be unjust that a court of equity should turn from its doors a citizen of the state, who has been subjected to aggravated and repeated trespasses, and leave him to seek redress through the precarious remedy of a suit at law in a foreign jurisdiction."

Sec. 738. Mandatory injunctions to recover possession or remove structures. A party is not entitled to a mandatory injunction to aid in the recovery of the possession of real property, where his petition shows that he has a plain and adequate remedy at law. Laughlin v. Fariss, 7 Okla. 1 (50 Pac. Rep. 254). Citing, Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U. S. 119 (12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659); Bodwell v. Crawford, 26 Kan. 292 (40 Am. Rep. 306); Weeks v. White, 41 Kan. 569 (21 Pac. Rep. 600). Where a small and insignificant portion of one's land which was uninclosed and unproductive had been encroached upon with a building erected by an adjoining owner, which was erected in good faith and did not interfere with the use of the remainder of the land, equity will not compel a removal of the building where the cost of such

removal would largely exceed the value of the land occupied by it and it appears that the injured party has been awarded adequate damages. Methodist Episcopal Soc. v. Akers, 167 Mass. 560 (46 N. E. Rep. 381). Where one, ignorant of his boundary line, projects the cornice and window sill of his building over the land of an adjoining owner, who warns him of the encroachment during the erection of the building, the latter is entitled to a mandatory injunction against the maintenance of the building over and upon the land; but such injunction will not be extended to slight unintentional and harmless encroachments of a wall underneath the surface of the earth. Harrington v. Mc Carthy, 169 Mass. 492 (48 N. E. Rep. 278; 61 Am. St. Rep. 298).

Sec. 739. Appointment of receivers-Practice. Where the only issue in an action of ejectment is the plaintiff's title and right to possession, a receiver will not be appointed. Sengfelder v. Hill, 16 Wash. 355 (47 Pac. Rep. 757; 58 Am. St. Rep. 36). Where there can be an immediate advertisement and sale of a manufacturing plant under a mortgage, a receiver should not be appointed to sell it and pay the mortgage debt, Beardslee v. Citizens' Com. & Sav. Bank, 112 Mich. 377 (70 N. W. Rep. 1027). A receiver may he appointed in an action brought by a deserted wife for maintenance and to set aside conveyances made by her husband for the purpose of defeating her right to maintenance. Murray v. Murray, 115 Cal. 266 (47 Pac. Rep. 37; 56 Am. St. Rep. 97; 37 L. R. A. 626). Against a defendant in possession under claim of title, equity will not interfere by appointing a receiver in favor of a plaintiff setting up a mere legal title. There must be some special circumstances of imminent danger or of loss or of irreparable injury or fraud, to warrant the court in interfering before the plaintiff's title has been established at law. If it appears that the plaintiff is protected by a lis pendens or that the person in possession is solvent, or offers to secure the plaintiff by bond, a receiver should not be appointed. City of Spokane v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor, 18 Wash. 81 (50 Pac. Rep. 1088). Where a receiver has been appointed, pending a controversey between a lessor and a lessee, it is error for the court to order him to

pay out of the rents received, debts contracted by the lessee prior to his appointment, for repairs made to the property which were not a lien thereon. Estabrook v. Stevenson, 50, Neb. 378 (69 N. W. Rep. 972). Miss. Code 1892, §§ 574, 575, 922, construed and applied-appointment of receiver on ex parte application-bond of party requiring appointment. Pearson v. Kendrick, 74 Miss. 235 (21 So. Rep. 37).

Sec. 740. Receivers appointed by federal courtsSuits against. Applying Act. Cong. March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 552, ch. 373, § 3) it is held that a party may sue a receiver appointed by a federal court without permission first obtained, not only for an injury caused by his own act, but for those which result from acts of the corporation done before his appointment. Meyer v. Harris, 61 N. J. L. 83 (38 Atl. Rep. 690). Applying this statute it is held, that a suit may be brought against a receiver operating a railroad for injuries caused by fire started by it, without first obtaining leave of the court appointing the receiver. Wall v. Platt, 169 Mass. 398 (48 N. E. Rep. 270). Under §§ 2, 3, of the Act of Congress of August 13, 1888 (25 Stat. 436), amendatory of the federal judiciary act, receivers over property appointed by the United States courts, are required to manage or operate the trust property according to the laws of the state in which it is situated, and may be sued in respect to its management or operation, in the courts of such state, without the previous leave of the court appointing them; and in such cases a judgment rendered in the state court is conclusive upon the federal court as to the existence and amount of the plaintiff's claim, but the time and manner of its payment are to be controlled by the court under whose orders the receiver acts. Reinhart v. Sutton, 58 Kan. 726 (51 Pac. Rep. 221).

Sec. 741. Parties to real actions. The wife of a lessor who is not named in a lease of his lands by him, but simply signs the lease with him, is not a proper party plaintiff in an action on the lease. Indianapolis Nat. Gas Co. v. Spaugh, 17 Ind. App. 683 (46 N. E. Rep. 691). All the beneficiaries in an instrument creating a trust are necessary parties to an action to cancel it. Nev. Gen. Stat., § 3039,

construed and applied. Robinson v. Kind, 23 Nev. 330 (47 Pac. Rep. 1). Where the beneficiaries of an implied trust are known to the plaintiffs instituting a general creditor's suit against the trustee to subject his property to the payment of his debts, such beneficiaries must be made formal parties to such suit; and they are not bound by the decrees therein by reason of the publication of the general notice to lienholders, required by W. Va. Code, ch. 139. Marshall's Ex'rs v. Hall, 42 W. Va. 641 (26 S. E. Rep. 300). A party charged with participation in the execution of a forged deed, by taking a false and fraudulent certificate of acknowledgment as a notary public, is a proper party defendant to an action to cancel the deed. Alexander v. Davis, 42 W. Va. 465 (26 S. E. Rep. 291). A provision in a city charter (Wash. Laws 1885-86, p. 243, § 10) that in the foreclosure of an assessment lien for improvements "it shall be a sufficient statement of the cause of action to allege * the names of each person having an interest in the premises," does not make the holder of a mortgage on the premises a necessary party to such suit. Krutz v. Gardner, 18 Wash. 332 (51 Pac. Rep. 397). A principal and his agent operating a mine, who are guilty of encroachment upon an adjoining mine, may be joined as defendants in an action for an injunction and an accounting. United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal Co., 24 Colo. 116 (48 Pac. Rep. 1045). Where a will devises a life estate, making no disposition of the fee, but directs the executor to convert the estate into money upon the death of the life tenant and distribute the proceeds among certain legatees, the testator's heirs are necessary parties defendant to an action to compel the executor to exercise this power. Wooster v. Cooper, 56 N. J. Eq. 759 (36 Atl.

Rep. 281).

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Sec. 742. Sufficiency of complaint. Where several plaintiffs join, the complaint must state a joint cause of action in favor of all of them. Indianapolis Nat. Gas Co. v. Spaugh, 17 Ind. App. 683 (46 N. E. Rep. 691). A complaint for relief on account of mistake need not specifically allege that the relief sought is founded upon mistake, but it is sufficient to allege facts which show clearly that either a

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