done to the inheritance, notwithstanding any intervening estate for life, the right of a remainder man to recover compensation for the taking of the land for a railroad right of way, under Wis. Rev. Stat., § 1852, is barred in six years. from the taking, though the life tenant died within that time. Hooe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 98 Wis. 302 (73 N. W. Rep. 787). Particular facts held sufficient to charge an infant on becoming of age with notice of the fraud of her guardian in conveying her land, so as to start the statute of limitations to running. Wickham v. Sprague, 18 Wash. 466 (51 Pac. Rep. 1055). Sec. 860. As to when the statute begins to runActions for relief from fraud. Construing Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 5136, subd. 6, which provides that actions "for relief on the ground of fraud," must be brought within six years after "the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud," it is held that the statute being borrowed from equity, it must be construed in accordance with the equitable principle which required the defrauded party to be diligent, and which deemed means of discovery as equivalent to actual discovery. The facts constituting the fraud are deemed to have been discovered when, with reasonable diligence, they could and ought to have been discovered. Hence the burden is on the plaintiff to prove not merely that he did not discover the facts constituting the fraud until within six years before the commencement of the action, but also that his failure to discover them sooner was consistent with reasonable diligence on his part, and not the result of his own negligence. Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 113 (72 N. W. Rep. 838). Citing, Board v. Smith, 22 Minn. 97; Fritschler v. Koehler, 83 Ky. 78; Norris v. Haggin, 28 Fed. Rep. 275; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 139; Parker v. Kuhn, 21 Neb. 413 (32 N. W. Rep. 74). Sec. 861. Disabilities of parties. A disability which will arrest the running of the statute of limitations must exist at the time the cause of action accrues. If the statute once begins to run against a party, it so continues until the bar is complete. No subsequent disability, not even insanity, will impede it. Kelly v. Gallup, 67 Minn. 169 (69 N. W. Rep. 812). Citing, Ang. Lim., § 196; 2 Wood, Lim. 578; Moore v. Armstrong, 10 Ohio 11 (36 Am. Dec. 63); Lincoln v. Norton, 36 Vt. 679; Clark's Ex'r v. Trail's Adm'rs, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 35; Allis v. Moore, 2 Allen 306. It is not sufficient for one claiming the benefit of the disability of a married woman, to show the existence of the marital relation, prior to the accrual of the cause of action, but such relation must be shown to have continued until after that time. Bodkins v. Phillips, Tenn. (42 S. W. Rep. 158). Sec. 862. Interruption or suspension of statute. The fact that one who has himself joined as a plaintiff in an action, has been a defendant therein for a long time but during which he sought no affirmative relief, does not prevent the statute from running against him up to the time he is made a plaintiff. Buck v. Davis, 64 Ark. 345 (42 S. W. Rep. 534). In the absence of a fiduciary relation existing between them, the fact that a purchaser of land conceals its value from his vendor who has an opportunity to ascertain it, is not such fraudulent concealment as will prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Wood folk v. Marley, 98 Tenn. 467 (39 S. W. Rep. 747; 40 S. W. Rep. 479). Where, in an action to foreclose a prior mortgage a junior mortgagee files a cross bill seeking to establish the priority of his mortgage and upon default of the mortgagor the cross bill is dismissed and the prior mortgage foreclosed, it is held that such default does not operate as a new promise in writing so as to interfere with the running of the statute of limitations against the foreclosure of the junior mortgage. Boone v. Colchour, 165 Ill. 305 (46 N. E. Rep. 253). Where a statute (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 83, § 18) excepts from the period of limitation the time during which the debtor is absent from the state, it applies to an action to foreclose a mortgage and such action is stayed by such absence of the mortgagor though he has conveyed the land to another. Richey v. Sinclair, 167 Ill. 184 (47 N. E. Rep. 364). A party Sec. 863. Laches General principles. cannot be barred by laches from asserting a right of which he was ignorant. Jameson v. Rixey, 94 Va. 342 (26 S. E. Rep. 861; 64 Am. St. Rep. 726); Hull v. Watts, 95 Va. 10 (27 S. E. Rep. 829). Mere lapse of time when the parties remain in the same relative position and the delay has worked no serious wrong to the adverse party so that justice can still be done, although an important ingredient in the law of laches, will not operate as a bar in equity. Hamilton v. Dooly, 15 Utah 280 (49 Pac. Rep. 769). Laches may consist not only in negligently instituting a suit, but also in negligently prosecuting it after it is begun. Hagerman v. Bates, 24 Col. 71 (49 Pac. Rep. 139). To constitute a bar when the statute has not run, there must be delay together with facts and circumstances during such delay to the prejudice of innocent parties. Kropp v. Kropp, 97 Wis. 137 (72 N. W. Rep. 381). In order for delay to constitute laches, the party against whom it is asserted must have been under obligation to act during the time of the delay. Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315 (37 Atl. Rep. 266; 60 Am. St. Rep. 322). An action for the violation of an express trust may be barred by laches. Preston v. Horwitz, 85 Md. 164 (36 Atl. Rep. 710). Sec. 864. Laches-Particular cases. The defense of laches is available against the United States in an action by it to cancel a patent where there has been a delay of twelve years during which innocent purchasers have acquired rights in the land. United States v. Blackburn, Ariz. (48 Pac. Rep. 904). Heirs of an insane person, who seek to set aside a guardian's sale of his land on account of constructive fraud, are not chargeable with laches for failure to act during the life time of their ancestor. Heyl v. Goelz, 97 Wis. 327 (72 N. W. Rep. 626). A delay by a vendee to bring his action for specific performance for three years after the vendor has notified him that he will not perform the contract, will bar the action. Ketcham v. Owen, 55 N. J. Eq. 344 (36 Atl. Rep. 1095). A purchaser at an execution sale is not barred from asserting the priority of the judgment under which he claims over a mortgage given for advances, where the mortgagee had notice of the judgment, by a delay for the period given him by the statute of limitations for the assertion of his rights under the judgment. Schmidt v. Hedden, Three years' delay after the Eq. (38 Atl. Rep. 843). N. J. discovery of the fraud was held to bar an action to rescind a sale of land for fraud. Woodfolk v. Marley, 98 Tenn. 467 (39 S. W. Rep. 747; 40 S. W. Rep. 479). As to what is sufficient laches to bar an action to rescind a contract for fraud, see Cornell v. Crane, 113 Mich. 460 (71 N. W. Rep. 878). A creditor's delay for ten years to bring an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by his debtor, will bar such action, where, in the meantime, the grantee has exchanged the land for other lands and conveyed the latter to a subsequent purchaser for value. Kinmouth v. Walling, N. J. Eq. (36 Atl. Rep. 891). An action by a substituted trustee in insolvency to cancel conveyances made by his debtor to the original trustee before his appointment, will be held barred by laches, where such conveyances were executed more than twenty years, thirteen years after the insolvency proceedings and five years after the original trustee's death. Preston v. Horwitz, 85 Md. 164 (36 Atl. Rep. 710). A subsequent creditor's action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance will not be held barred by laches where he commences the action immediately upon the recovery of a judgment on his debt,it not appearing how long the judgment debt had existed. Brundage v. Cheneworth, 101 Ia. 256 (70 N. W. Rep. 211; 63 Am. St. Rep. 382). Heirs of the devisee of a grantor, mentally incompetent to convey, who died thirteen years before his wife, who delayed during that period to bring an action to set aside his previous conveyance in consideration of the support of himself and wife, during all of which time they had full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction and knew of the continuous performance of the contract by the grantee, were held to be barred by laches from maintaining such an action after the death of the grantor's wife, they having had such a vested interest as permitted their bringing an action ever since the death of the grantor, although they offered to pay the grantee for services rendered by him under the contract. Chase v. Chase, 20 R. I. 202 (37 Atl. Rep. 804). Particular laches held insufficient to bar an action to reform a description in a deed, Harris v. Ivey, 114 Ala. 363 (21 So. Rep. 422); to rescind a deed, Clapp v. Greenlee, 100 Ia. 586 (69 N. W. Rep. 1049); to enforce a contract, Hagerman v. Bates, 24 Colo. 71 (49 Pac. Rep. 139); to reform a contract on account of mistake, Kropp v. (72 N. W. Rep. 381). Kropp, 97 Wis. 137 Express trusts, alone free from limitation All other trusts, whether legal que Sec. 865. Statute of limitations and laches as applied to trusts or fiduciary relations. cognizable only in equity, are created by laches or statute. or equitable, are either subject to the statute of limitations or liable to be barred by laches. Woods v. Stephenson, 43 W. Va. 149 (27 S. E. Rep. 309). In New Jersey it is held that the rule in equity is, that the statute of limitations has no application to an action between the cestui que trust, and a trustee for the enforcement of an express trust. Carter v. Uhlein, N. J. Eq. (36 Atl. Rep. 956). If the trustees who hold the legal title allow the statute of limitations to bar them or a presumption of a grant to arise, a right of action for the land is barred and their cestui trustent are barred also. Benbow v. Levi, 50 S. C. 120 (27 S. E. Rep. 655). The statute of limitations begins to run against the beneficiary of a trust who has knowledge of his trustee's conveyance in violation of the trust, from the date of such conveyance. Nougues v. Newlands, 118 Cal. 102 (50 Pac.Rep.386). An action by a cestui que trust, to enforce a continuing trust with no specification of time when it shall be performed, under which the trustee is in possession, is not barred by laches so long as the acts of the trustee were such as led the cestur que trust reasonably to expect the trustee to perform his duty. Carter v. Uhlein, (36 Atl. Rep. 956). A wife's action to recover property of which she has been fraudulently deprived, will not be debarred on account of laches by a delay of two years after her discovery of the fraud, where the action involved a charge of fraud against her husband with whom she is living. Connar v. Leach, 84 Md. 571 (36 Atl. Rep. 591). Particular case in which the right to enforce an alleged resulting trust was held barred on account of laches. v. Stephenson, 43 W. Va. 149 (27 S. E. Rep. 309). ular delay held insufficient to bar an action to enforce a trust on account of laches. Wolcott v. Wilsey, 141 Mo. 200 (42 S. W. Rep. 825). Particular facts held'not to constitute such laches, as will bar a co-tenant from assailing a title N. J. Eq. Woods Partic |