Vice Chancellor Wigram held that conversion, being an equitable fiction, would only be carried to the extent necessary to accomplish the equitable result aimed at, and 'would not alter the nature of the property for the purpose only of subjecting it to fiscal claims to which at law it was not liable in its existing state.' More recent English cases have somewhat modified this decision so far as it relates to land held by partners for partnership purposes. See Dos P. Col. Inh. Taxes, § 46b, and 32 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 474, note by Mr. Howard W. Page. But the court of appeals of New York adopted the same view as late as 1893. In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77 (32 N. E. Rep. 1096; 18 L. R. A. 709)—and In re Curtis, 142 N. Y. 219 (36 N. E. Rep. 887), where it was said: 'It was never intended by the law to tax a theory having no real substance behind it'; and quoting In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77 (32 N. E. Rep. 1096; 18 L. R. A. 709), The question of taxation is one of fact, and cannot turn on theories or fictions.' In Pennsylvania, however, the other view was taken in Miller v. Com., 111 Pa. St. 321 (2 Atl. Rep. 492), where it was held that, as the testator had peremptorily directed a sale of the land and the distribution of the proceeds, the doctrine of conversion applied, and the actual situs of the land was immaterial, as what passed under the will was not the land, but the proceeds, which were personalty, and liable to the tax. The same rule was followed in Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. St. 508 (26 Atl. Rep. 246). These cases rest upon the basis that the testator intended and directed, not a merely nominal or limited conversion, but an actual conversion by sale, and the blending of the proceeds with his other personalty for purposes of administration under his will. The action of the court in dating such conversion from the instant of death was but the application of the general rule that what is to be done must be treated in equity as done already. Though this argument is severely technical, and therefore questionable in regard to jurisdiction to tax land in fact situated in another state, yet it has the merit of being unanswerably logical if the premise be once accepted. This court has followed the argument unswervingly to its logical conclusion, even when the result seemed contrary to the express legislative policy of the state. Thus, In re Coleman's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 231 (28

Atl. Rep. 137), where land in Pennsylvania was owned by a testator in New York, whose will made an equitable conversion, the logical corollary of Miller v. Com., 111 Pa. St. 321 (2 Atl. Rep. 492), was accepted, and the land was held to have become personalty, and to follow the owner's domicile, and therefore not to be taxible here.

All our cases agree that the status of the property at the instant of death must govern the question of tax, both as to liability and amount. Drayton's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 172; Appeal of Mellon, 114 Pa. S. 564 (8 Atl. Rep. 183); Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. St. 508, 521 (26 Atl. Rep. 246). Where, therefore, the conversion is not imperative, but only permissive, and rests in the discretion of the executors or others, it does not become operative until the exercise of the discretion; and in the meantime the land retains its normal character. Drayton's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 172; Miller v. Com., 111 Pa. St. 321 (2 Atl. Rep. 492). For the same reasons, where the conversion, though imperative, is not in praesenti, but in futuro, it goes into effect only from the happening of the stipulated contingency. This brings us to the exact question now before us, and we find it expressly decided in the last case on the subject, Hale's Estate, 161 Pa. St. 181 (28 Atl. Rep. 1071). The testator left lands in Missouri to his wife for her life, and, upon her death, directed his executor to sell them, and invest the proceeds in mortgages in St. Louis, and pay the income therefrom to collaterals. It was held by the orphans' court of Philadelphia that the proceeds were not taxable, and the decision was affirmed. The auditing judge put his conclusion directly on the postponent of the conversion, and, though the court in banc referred to the additional circumstance that the proceeds were to be invested in mortgages in St. Louis, yet it is clear that was not a material point in the ratio decidenti. Mortgages, no matter what the situs of the land pledged, are personal property; and, if the conversion had been immediate, no direction as to the investment of the proceeds could have exempted them from the tax. The ground of the decision, which is the logical result of the principles adopted in all the preceding cases, is that the tax is assessable at the instant of death; and where the conversion is not referable to that same instant, as where it is to take place only

in the discretion of the executors, or, a fortiori, where it is postponed by the express direction of the testator, the land in the meantime retains its real character, and, being outside the state, is not subject to taxation. In the present case the testator postponed the sale for twenty years, and there was therefore no conversion when the tax upon the estate accrued. The assignments of error to the tax on the lands in Virginia and West Virginia are therefore sustained." A collateral inheritance tax statute has been adopted in California and Missouri. Cal. Laws 1899, p. 101; Mo. Laws 1899, p. 328. N. J. act May 15, 1894, concerning collateral inheritance tax has been supplemented by an additional provision, Laws 1898, p. 106.

Sec. 892. Exemption from taxes. Statutes exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed. Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n v. People, 170 Ill. 377 (48 N. E. Rep. 905). The rule requiring a strict construction of a statute exempting property from taxation will not apply where such statute contains a positive direction as to the rule of construction which shall be applied to it. Brown University v. Granger, 19 R. I. 704 (36 Atl. Rep. 720; 36 L. R. A. 847). A general exemption from taxes does not include special assess ments for local improvements. City of Philadelphia v. Union Burial Ground Soc., 178 Pa. St. 533 (36 Atl. Rep. 172; 36 L. R. A. 263). The determination of an assessor that property is not so used as to entitle it to exemption from taxation is not conclusive. Portland University v. Multnomah Co., 31 Or. 498 (50 Pac. Rep. 532). Particular case in which property is held not exempt from municipal taxation on account of being agricultural lands. City of Lebanon v. Bevill, Ky. (38 S. W. Rep. 872).

Sec. 893. Exemption from taxes-Public lands and public property. Public land is not subject to state taxation until a patent has issued or the purchaser has acquired a perfect equity. Duncan v. Newcomer, 9 S. Dak. 375 (69 N. W. Rep. 580). Where land has been certified by the secretary of the interior to a state and the state has patented the same to another, it is held that such certificate and patent operate to transfer the legal title, subject to be decreed to another who

subsequently shows himself to be entitled thereto, and the land is taxable after the date of such certification. Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Davis, 102 Ia. 128 (71 N. W. Rep. 229). Applying Mass. Pub. Stat.. ch. 11, § 5, it is held that a specific statutory provision is not necessary to exempt from taxation property of a municipal corporation appropriated to public uses. City of Somerville v. City of Waltham, 170 Mass. 160 (48 N. E. Rep. 1092). Citing, Wayland v. Commissioners, 4 Gray 500; Worcestor Co. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Worcestor, 116 Mass. 193 (17 Am. Rep. 159); Essex Co. v. City of Salem, 153 Mass. 141 (26 N. E. Rep. 431); Town of West Hartford v. Water Com'rs, 44 Conn. 360; City of Rochester v. Town of Rush, 80 N. Y. 302; People v. Board of Assessors, 111 N. Y. 505 (19 N. E. Rep. 90); Trustees of Public Schools v. City of Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667, 681; Comm'rs v. Gaffney, 34 N. J. L. 131; State v. Hotaling, 44 N. J. L. 347. Land purchased by a city for the purpose of obtaining gravel therefrom for the construction and repair of its streets is held for a public use and is exempt from taxation. City of Somerville v. City of Waltham, 170 Mass. 160 (48 N. E. Rep. 1092). N. J. Gen. Stat., p. 3320, pl. 200, exempting from taxes the property of a county, is held to exempt the property of a county held for the public use outside of the county, although acquired without specific authority of law. Board of Chosen Frceholders v. Collins, 60 N. J. L. 367 (37 Atl. Rep. 623). Wis. Rev. Stat. 1878, § 1038, and Laws 1874, ch. 184, exempting from taxation all property owned exclusively by any "county, city, village, town or school district," and property held by a city under a lease, do not exempt from taxation property in possession of a city under a contract giving it an option to purchase the same where it has not entered into any binding obligation to purchase. City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Co., 95 Wis. 424 (69 N. W. Rep. 819).

Sec. 894. Exemption from taxes-School property - Property of churches and charitable institutions. A charter of a college empowering it to acquire real and personal property by way of endowment which exempts "the college estate" from all taxes, is held to exempt from taxation not only the ground and buildings of the college but also all

property held by it by way of endowment. Brown University v. Granger, 19 R. I. 704 (36 Atl. Rep. 720; 36 L. R. A. 847). Construing Mass. Stat. 1889, ch. 465, exempting real estate of a college when occupied by it or by its officers for the purposes for which it was incorporated, it is held that professors and instructors are officers of the college; but the statute does not exempt property owned by the college constituting a dwelling house which the officers occupy and control exclusively for private purposes and for which they pay rent to the college. President of Williams College v. Assessors, 167 Mass. 505 (46 N. E. Rep. 394). Under Neb. Comp. Stat., ch. 77, art. 1, § 2, all property used directly, immediately, and exclusively for school purposes is exempt from taxation. Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Irey, 51 Neb. 755 (71 N. W. Rep. 752). In order for a voluntary association to claim exemption from taxation, under Mich. Pub. Acts 1893, No. 206, § 7, subd. 4, it is not enough that one of its direct or indirect purposes or results is benevolence, charity, education, or the promotion of science, but it must be organized chiefly, if not solely, for one or more of these objects. Attorney General v. Common Council, 113 Mich. 388 (71 N. W. Rep. 632).

Wis. Rev. Stat., § 1038, exempting from taxation, all real property not exceeding ten acres, of any "religious, scientific, literary, or benevolent association, * necessary

for the location and convenience of the buildings of such association," is held to exempt from taxation the amount of property belonging to a Roman Catholic religious order which is used for the location and operation of a hospital, in which all persons are received and treated with or without charge, according to the ability of the patient, the surplus revenues being loaned without interest to other similar associations and no dividends declared. St. Joseph's Hosp. Ass'n v. Ashland Co., 96 Wis. 636 (72 N. W. Rep. 43). The court say: "The word benevolent' means, literally, well-wishing.' It is a word of larger meaning than charitable.' It has been well said that though many charitable institutions are very properly called "benevolent," it is impossible to say that every object of a man's benevolence is also an object of his charity.' James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17; Thomson's Ex'rs v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 489. How it can be doubted that this institution is