doing a benevolent work in the truest sense of the word we are unable to see. It is really the work of the good Samaritan. It is true that those who are able to pay do pay a very moderate weekly charge, but those who are unable to pay receive the same care for nothing. This does not render the work done any the less benevolent. Doubtless, if the hospital were absolutely free to all, it could not be operated. It is the very fact that pay is collected from those who can pay which enables the sisters to operate the hospital, and care for those who are too poor to pay. If this work be not benevolent work, especially in the great cities and in the newly-settled districts, then there will have to be a new meaning attached to the word ' benevolent.' It is impossible to know how many men without home and friends owe their very lives to the care received in this and similar hospitals, when no other place opened its doors to them. We entertain no doubt that the work of this association is a benevolent work. The care of the sick and wounded of all races and religions indiscriminately, with or without pay, according to the ability of the patient, must ever be one of the most genuine forms of benevolence. It breaths the truest love for unfortunate mankind. City of Philadelphia v. Womans Christian Ass'n, 125 Pa. St. 572 (17 Atl. Rep. 475); County of Hennepin v. Brotherhood of Gethsemane, 27 Minn. 460 (8 N. W. Rep. 595)."

Sec. 895. Exemption from taxes-Property of manufacturers and railroad property. La. Const., art. 207, construed and applied-exemption of property of manufacturers. Moore v. City of New Orleans, 48 La. 1452 (21 So. Rep. 90); Nicholson v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. 1570 (21 So. Rep. 167); St. Landry Cotton Oil Co. v. McGee, 49 La. 750 (22 So. Rep. 236). La. Const., art. 207, as amended by laws 1886, Act No. 92, construed and applied-exemption of manufacturing corporations. Southern Chem. & Fer. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. 1475 (21 So. Rep. 31). An electric light company is not a "manufacturing industry" within the meaning of an ordinance exempting such industries from taxation. Frederick Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Frederick City, 84 Md. 599 (36 Atl. Rep. 362; 36 L. R. A. 130).

Where a federal grant of a right of way through public lands to a railroad company provides that," Said way is granted to said railroad company to the extent of one hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass through the public domain, including all necessary grounds for station buildings, work shops, depots, machine shops, switches, side tracks, turntables and water stations; and the right of way shall be exempt from taxation within the territories of the United States," the exemption from taxation extends to all structures placed upon the right of way which are necessary to the operation of the railroad. Bantz, J., dissenting. United States Trust Co. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 8 N. M. 673 (47 Pac. Rep. 725). Construing and applying N. J. Gen. Stat., p. 3332, exempting from local taxation railroad property, it is held that the actual uses to which lands owned by a railroad company are devoted are the tests by which it can be determined whether the same is exempt from local taxation, as lands used for railroad purposes; and it is the main uses to which it is actually devoted which are to be considered in order to determine this question. Where a railroad company uses a freight yard for the purpose of carrying on a private coal business upon its own account, with coal from its own mines, transported in its own cars to such yard, and then from such yard by the railroad company, through its own agents, sold to others in its own name and upon its own account, such yard so used is not properly retained or used for railroad purposes, and is locally taxable. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Mayor of City of Newark, 60 N. J. L. 60 (37 Atl. Rep. 629). In Pennsylvania, a machine shop of a railroad company used for making repairs necessary to carrying on its business is exempt from local taxation. Western N. Y. & P. R. Co. v. Venango Co., 183 Pa. 618 (38 Atl. Rep. 1088). Mich. Pub. Laws 1891, No. 174, construed and appliedexemption of railroads. Manistee & G. R. R. Co. v. Turner, 115 Mich. 291 (73 N. W. Rep. 240). Mich. Pub. Acts 1893, No. 206, § 11, as amended by Pub. Acts 1895, No. 229; Pub. Acts 1893, No. 129, § 3, construed and applied-exemption of railroad property from general tax. Auditor General v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 114 Mich. 682 (72 N. W. Rep. 992).

Sec. 896. Exemption from taxes-Statutes construed. Ill. Const., art. 9, § 3, and Rev. Stat., ch. 120, § 2, exempting from taxation " all lands used exclusively as grave yards or grounds for burying the dead," do not exempt a lot adjacent to a cemetery inclosed with it, used as an entrance for the cemetery, and partly occupied by a dwelling house for the use of the superintendent of the cemetery grounds and by a well for their benefit. Bloomington Cemetery Ass'n v. People, 170 Ill. 377 (48 N. E. Rep. 905). Under Mich. Pub. Acts 1883, No. 129 (3 How. Ann. Stat., § 3718h) telephone companies are exempt from local taxes. Attorney General v. Common Council, 113 Mich. 388 (71 N. W. Rep. 632). For construction of § 251 of the charter of the city of Detroit, Mich., as to exemption from taxation of property held for water works purposes, see Board of Water Com'rs v. Auditor General, 115 Mich. 546 (73 N. W. Rep. 801). Miss. Laws 1858, p. 40, § 18; Laws 1867, pp. 237-248, construed and applied-exemption of lands from levee tax. Owens v. Yazoo M. V. & R. Co., 74 Miss. 821 (21 So. Rep. 244). Construing Wash. Const., art. 7, §§ 1, 2, providing that "all property in the state not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this constitution shall be taxed in proportion to its value to be ascertained as provided by law; * the property of the United States and of the state, counties, school districts, and other municipal corporations, and such other property as the legislature may, by general laws provide, shall be exempt from taxation," it is held that the phrase "such other property" does not authorize the legislature to exempt from taxation private property. State v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111 (49 Pac. Rep. 243).

*

Sec. 897. Assessment of taxes-General principles. A valid assessment of land is essential to a valid tax sale. McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276 (21 So. Rep. 103). A tax lien cannot be created against the tax payer's property except by strict compliance with the provisions of the statute by the officers who assess or levy the taxes. Manistee & G. R. R. Co. v. Turner, 115 Mich. 291 (73 N. W. Rep. 240). An assessment is void where the supposed statement of the valua. tion of the property is given in figures without the use of any

dollar or cents mark or any other sign to indicate the value or denomination of money. Anderson v. Post, Tenn.

(38 S. W. Rep. 283). In Nevada it is held that an assessment of several parcels of land belonging to one person as one tract is void. Peers v. Reed, 23 Nev. 404 (48 Pac. Rep.897). But it is held under the statute of Idaho, that two contiguous town lots owned by the same individual, may be jointly assessed and one valuation fixed for the two lots unless the owner demands a separate assessment. Cooperative Sav. & L. Ass'n v. Green, Idaho (51 Pac. Rep. 770). In Illinois it is held that land held and used as right of way by a railroad company, including the superstructures thereon, is railroad track, and not subject to assessment by the local assessor; and that land so held by a railroad company as right of way is required by law to be assessed for taxation by the state board of equalization, and that an assessment of such property by the local assessor is void. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Grant, 167 Ill. 489 (47 N. E. Rep. 750). In Kentucky it is held that an assessment of property for taxation in a town, made by the copying of the assessment made by the county assessor for state and county taxation, so far as it applies to persons and real estate within the limits of the town, is void, although authorized by an ordinance. Turner v.

Town of Pewee. Valley, 100 Ky. 288 (38 S. W. Rep. 143, 688). Pipes, hydrants and conduits of a water company are, for the purpose of taxation real estate, and taxable in the town or city where they are situated. Inhabitants of Dover v. Maine Water Co., 90 Me. 180 (38 Atl. Rep. 101). Water, as an element, is not property any more than air; but when used, its potential power becomes actual by operating upon real estate, thereby giving it value, and that value is the basis of taxation. The assessment of this value must be made at the place where the power is applied and not at the location where the water is accumulated for that purpose. Union Water-Power Co. v. City of Auburn, 90 Me. 60 (37 Atl. Rep. 331; 60 Am. St. Rep. 240; 37 L. R. A. 651).

Sec. 898. Assessment of taxes-Statutes construed. Ala. Code 1886, §§ 453, 477, applied-assessment of leased timber land. Freeman v. State, 115 Ala. 208 (22 So. Rep.

560). Construing and applying Sand. & H. Ark. Dig., § 6401, providing that "The term real property and lands' wherever used in this act, shall be held to mean and include not only the land itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, with all things thereon contained, but also all buildings, structures and improvements, and other fixtures of whatever kind thereon, and all rights and privileges belonging or in anywise appertaining thereto," it is held that buildings, machinery and fixtures owned by a lessee on leased lands are taxable as real property. Union Compress Co. v. State, 64 Ark. 136 (41 S. W. Rep. 52). Citing, People v. Assessors of Town of Dunkirk, 46 N. Y. 46. Cal. Const., art. 13, § 4, construed and applied-assessment of mortgaged real estate. California Loan & T. Co. v. Weis, 118 Cal. 489 (50 Pac. Rep. 697). Where two tracts of land are assessed, one being assessed to a named owner, but the other is not assessed to any owner or occupant or as unknown, as required by Florida Laws 1883, ch. 3413, §§ 6, 7, but the valuation of the two tracts are aggregated and the tax computed upon such aggregate valuation, such assessment is fatally defective and a tax deed based thereon is void. McKoewn v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276 (21 So. Rep. 103). Ga. Pol. Code, §§ 847, 858, 908, construed and applied-duty of tax receiver as to unreturned landpower of tax collector to issue a tax execution. Norris v.

Coley, 100 Ga. 547 (28 S. E. Rep. 222). Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 120, §§ 58, 191, providing that an assessment of railroad property shall not be illegal because made in the wrong name, are held to apply to special assessments. Zeigler v. People, 164 Ill. 531 (45 N. E. Rep. 965). How. Ann. Mich. Stat., § 3358, construed and applied-assessment of railroads by commissioner of railroads. Manistee & G. R. R. Co. v. Turner, 115 Mich. 291 (73 N. W. Rep. 240). Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 1689, providing a commuted system of taxation of mining property and products by the payment of a fixed sum per ton for all ore mined and shipped or disposed of, is held unconstitutional. In re Taxes Delinquent in St. Louis Co., 71 Minn. 283 (73 N. W. Rep. 970). Miss. Laws 1884, p. 14, applied-approval of assessment roll by board of supervisors. Brothers v. Beck, 75 Miss. 482 (22 So. Rep. 944). Under the statutes of Oklahoma, the listing of property by the owner for