-notice to auditor general. Greenley v. Hovey, 115 Mich. 504 (73 N. W. Rep. 808).

Sec. 914. Redemption from tax sale. Redemption statutes are to be liberally construed. Buell v. Boylan, 10 S. Dak. 180 (72 N. W. Rep. 406); Henry v. Florida Land & Mortg. Co., 38 Fla. 269 (21 So. Rep. 19). The last case holds that a redemption can be made at a place other than that provided for by the statute if the holder of the tax sale certificate consents. Fla. Laws 1883, ch. 3413, construed and applied. A statute (Fla. Acts 1891, ch. 4011), extending the period allowed by a former statute for redemption, is unconstitutional as to sales made before its passage, State v. Bradshaw, 39 Fla. 137 (22 So. Rep. 296); and the same is true of a statute (Cal. Stat. 1895, p. 209, amending Political Code, § 3817), making the conditions of redemption more onerous. Teralta Land & Water Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518 (48 Pac. Rep. 613; 58 Am. St. Rep. 194). Where,on account of his mistake in the description of the property and by his suggestions or directions, a landowner redeems the wrong piece of property from a tax sale, he must suffer the consequences. Browne v. Finlay, 51 Neb. 465 (71 N. W. Rep. 34). A landowner cannot maintain an equitable action to redeem his land from a tax sale on the ground that his tender of payment of the taxes was refused, because the officer erroneously believed that they had been previously paid, where such owner knew of the tax sale for the nonpayment of such taxes before the expiration of the time given for redemption and failed to redeem. Easton v. Doolittle, 100 Ia. 374 (69 N. W. Rep. 672). Construing Wash. Laws 1893, p. 370, §§ 105-135, providing for the forfeiture to the county of lands offered for sale for delinquent taxes which are not sold for want of bidders and for their subsequent sale, it is held that forfeiture to the county is not a sale, and where the county sells lands so forfeitured and issues a certificate of purchase the time for redemption runs from the date of such certificate and not from the date of the forfeiture. State v. Maple, 16 Wash. 430 (47 Pac. Rep. 966). Doudna v. Harlan, 45 Kan. 484 (25 Pac. Rep. 883), distinguished. Supp. Mass. Pub. Stat. 1883, ch. 223, § 1, construed-jurisdiction of

superior court of equity-bill to redeem from tax sale. Barker v. MacKay, 168 Mass. 76 (46 N. E. Rep. 412).

Sec. 915. Notice of expiration of time for redemption. A notice which is so indefinite that it is impossible to tell when the time to redeem expires, is defective. Clason v. Baldwin, 152 N. Y. 204 (46 N. E. Rep. 322). Cal. Pol. Code, § 3785, construed and applied-service by purchaser at tax sale of notice on the owner of the property of the purchaser's intention to apply for a deed-sufficiency of affidavit of service. Simmons v. Mc Carthy, 118 Cal. 622 (50 Pac. Rep. 761). Construing Ia. Code 1873, § 894, providing that "After the expiration of two years and nine months after the date of sale of the land for taxes, the lawful holder of the certificate of purchase may cause to be served upon the person in possession of such land, * and also upon the person in whose name the same is taxed in the manner provided by law for the service of original notices, a notice; * and until ninety days after the service of said notice, the right of redemption from such sale shall not expire," it is held that the notice should be served on the person in whose name the property is taxed, at the time the notice is in fact given, and not on the person to whom it is taxed at the end of two years and nine months from the sale. Smith v. Callanan, 103 Ia. 218 (72 N. W. Rep. 513). For further construction of this statute, see Crawford v. Liddle, 101 Ia. 148 (70 N. W. Rep. 97); McQuity v. Doudna, 101 Ia. 144 (70 N. W. Rep. 99). Applying Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 1654, it is held that where certain land was assessed at the time of issuing the notice of the expiration of redemption in the name of "Anna S. Howard and C. Ingalls," a notice directed to "Anna S. Howard and Cordelia Ingalls," and personally served on them is sufficient, where C. and Cordelia Ingalls are one and the same person. The notice may include more than one tract where several tracts were assessed to the same person, sold to the same purchaser at the same tax sale, and were separately and distinctly described in the notice with date of sale, amount sold for, interest, and the amount required to redeem set opposite each tract, the notice being so worded that the owner might redeem one or more or all of the tracts. Snyder v. Ingalls,

70 Minn. 16 (72 N. W. Rep. 807). Particular notice of the expiration of time given for redemption, held sufficient. McNamara v. Fink, 71 Minn. 66 (73 N. W. Rep. 619). Wash. Code, 1881, § 2934, as amended by Act Feb. 3, 1886, construed and applied-notice of expiration of time given for redemption. Herrick v. Niesz, 16 Wash. 74 (47 Pac. Rep. 414).

Sec. 916.

Tax deed. A tax deed executed in conformity with law will be presumed to be valid. Stroebel v. Seeger, 49 La. 36 (21 So. Rep. 126). One entitled to a tax deed may compel its execution by mandamus against the officer whose duty it is to execute it. State v. Bradshaw, 39 Fla. 137 (22 So. Rep. 296). Where, after a tax sale, such payments are made upon property sold as to deprive the officer of authority to issue a tax deed for the whole thereof, and he is unable to determine upon what part or portion of the land sold the taxes have been paid, he may refuse to execute a deed until this question is determined. Kneeland v. Auditor General, 113 Mich. 63 (71 N. W. Rep. 477). A tax deed may embrace several lots or tracts of land. Crisman v. Johnson, 23 Colo. 264 (47 Pac. Rep. 296; 58 Am. St. Rep. 224). A tax deed purporting to convey several tracts of land which are not contiguous, but widely separated and in different townships, sold together, en masse, for a gross sum, is void. Emerson v. Shannon, 23 Colo. 274 (47 Pac. Rep. 302; 58 Am. St. Rep. 232). Citing, Hall's Heirs v. Dodge, 18 Kan. 279; Byan v. Cook, 21 Ia. 392; Farnham v. Jones, 32 Minn. 7 (19 N. W. Rep. 38). A tax deed is insufficient as an operative coveyance where it purports to convey certain lands excepting a given number of acres, the location of which is not given. Zundel v. Baldwin, 114 Ala. 328 (21 So. Rep. 420). Under Ala. Code 1876, § 460, a tax deed not acknowledged prior to its registration is of no validity whatever. Flowers v. Jernigan, 116 Ala. 516 (22 So. Rep. 853). Construing and applying Cal. Pol. Code, § 3786, which requires that a tax deed shall recite the matters recited in the certificate of sale, and § 3776, which requires that the certificate of sale must state "the name of the person assessed, the description of the land sold, the amount paid therefor, that it was sold for taxes, giv

ing the amount and year of the assessment and stating the time when the purchaser will be entitled to a deed," it is held that a tax deed which does not definitely state the year of the assessment and the amount paid for the lands, is void. Simmons v. McCarthy, 118 Cal. 622 (50 Pac. Rep. 761). The validity of a tax deed is not affected by the fact that its recitals show that the date of the expiration of the time for redemption upon which the purchaser was entitled to a deed came on Sunday. Cal. Pol. Code, § 3776, applied. Rollins v. Woodman, 117 Cal. 516 (49 Pac. Rep. 455). When authority exists for a sale made by a tax collector, his deed is not vitiated by a reference in it to a superseded legislative act instead of an existing act under which the sale is made. Sims v. Walshe, 49 La. 781 (21 So. Rep. 861). Where the sufficiency of a tax title claimed under a deed made in pursuance of a sale had upon a tax execution is dependent upon defendant's having title to the premises, one claiming under such title must show a perfect title in the execution defendant. McLeod v. Brooks Lum. Co., 98 Ga. 253 (26 S. E. Rep. 745). Mich. Pub. Acts 1875, No. 154, § 98, construed and applied -withholding of conveyance by auditor general. Hand v. Auditor General, 112 Mich. 597 (71 N. W. Rep. 160).

Sec. 917. Tax deed-Conclusiveness as evidence of title-Statutes construed. Sayles' Tev. Civ. Stat., art. 447, making a tax deed prima facie evidence of certain facts, has no application to a suit on a tax deed for land not described by it. Ozee v. Ozee v. City of Henrietta, 90 Tex. 334 (38 S. W. Rep. 768). Where a statute (S. Dak. Comp. Laws, § 1639) makes a tax deed conclusive "evidence of all facts therein recited," such a deed is conclusive as to its recitals which render the instrument void. Salmer v. Lathrop, 10 S. Dak. 216 (72 N. W. Rep. 570). Statutes which make a tax deed prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale, do not extend to antecedent omissions rendering the sale void. Cucullu v. Brakenridge Lum. Co., 49 La. 1445 (22 So. Rep. 409). Citing, Treville v. Smalls, 98 U. S. 522. Miss. Laws 1860, p. 216, § 7, providing that thereafter no tax title could be impeached in that state in any manner or for any cause saving fraud or mistake in the assessment or sale of the wrong lands, is held

not to preclude one from showing that the sale upon which the title rests was made for taxes levied in aid of the rebellion and was therefore void. Boyle v. Manion, Miss. (22 So. Rep. 947). Where a statute (Mills' Ann. Colo. Stat., § 3902) makes a tax deed prima facie evidence of all the facts essential to a valid tax title, the fact that the numbers of the lots in a deed conveying several lots are not consecutive, does not sufficiently establish that they are non-contiguous so as to render the deed void. Crisman v. Johnson, 23 Colo. 264 (47 Pac. Rep. 296; 58 Am. St. Rep. 224). Citing, Cartwright v. McFadden, 24 Kan. 662. Under Idaho Rev. Stat., § 1555, a tax deed regular on its face, is prima evidence of the existence and regularity of all the facts and acts set forth in the eight subdivisions of said section; and to defeat such deed the adverse party must show the non-existence of such facts or some of them. Cooperative Sav. & L. Ass'n v. Green,

Idaho (51 Pac. Rep. 770). The presumptions given a tax deed by Iowa Code, § 897, are not overcome by the fact that the county records do not show the existence of the presumed facts, where it appears that a large portion of such records had been destroyed by fire. Barrett v. Kevane, 100 Ia. 653 (69 N. W. Rep. 1036). A tax deed will not sustain an action of ejectment, where it appears that the auditor general, empowered to file proceedings for the sale of land for delinquent taxes, by Mich. Acts 1893, No. 206, § 61, has issued a certificate of error under § 98 of said act showing that the tax for which the land was sold had been paid before the sale. Wood v. Bigelow, 115 Mich. 123 (73 N. W. Rep. 129). Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, §§ 1594, 1601, applied-conclusiveness of certificate of assignment of sale made to the state. McNamara v. Fink, 71 Minn. 66 (73 N. W. Rep. 649). A statute (Wash. Code 1881, § 2937), making a tax deed duly executed prima facie evidence of "the regularity of all other proceedings from the assessment by the assessor, inclusive, up to the execution of the deed," does not make such a deed evidence of a compliance by the holder thereof with the provisions of a subsequent statute, requiring the holder of a tax certificate to give notice of application for a deed, at least sixty days prior to the expiration of the time for redemption. The proceedings, the regularity of which the deed is made evidence, are the acts and proceedings required