ment of the taxes, but Code Civ. Proc. § 150 (see 10 Gen. Laws, 1880-81, p. 29), makes it necessary in order to establish adverse possession, to prove the payment of taxes. Brose v. Boise City Ry. & Ter. Co., Idaho (51 Pac. Rep.753). Title is not acquired by seven years' possession and payment of taxes, under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 6, unless the claimant shows that he has paid all the taxes lawfully assessed against the land. Donahue v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 165 Ill. 640 (46 N. E. Rep. 714). To establish title under the statute, the evidence must show payment of taxes by or on behalf of the person having color of title and actual possession, and the burden is on the party claiming under such title to prove the payment by clear and satisfactory evidence. The necessary payment of taxes is not shown by tax receipts which do not contain a sufficient description to identify the land. Bell v. Neiderer, 169 Ill. 54 (48 N. E. Rep. 194). Where a title under this statute is relied upon as a defense to an action of ejectment, there must have been seven years' adverse possession and payment of taxes before the suit was brought. Converse v. Dunn, 166 Ill. 25 (46 N. E. Rep. 747). A railroad company may acquire title to land for a right of way under this statute. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Grant, 167 Ill. 489 (47 N. E. Rep. 750). Particular evidence held sufficient to show an acquisition of title under this statute. Peadro v. Carriker 168 Ill. 570 (48 N. E. Rep. 102). Starr & C. Ann. Ill. Stat., Vol. 2, p. 1539, § 6 (Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 6), construed and applied-title by seven years' possession and payment of taxes. French v. Goodman, 167 Ill. 345 (47 N. E. Rep. 737).

Sec. 73. Title by-Time necessary. In Alabama ten years' adverse possession confers title. Beasley v. Howell, 117 Ala. 499 (22 So. Rep. 989). In Kansas fifteen years' adverse possession under claim of title, confers title. Schrimpcher v. Stockton, 58 Kan. 758 (51 Pac. Rep. 276). In Nebraska ten years' adverse possession gives title to real estate. City of Florence v. White, 50 Neb. 516 (70 N. W. Rep. 50); Fink v. Dawson, 52 Neb. 647 (72 N. W. Rep. 1037); Oldig v. Fisk, 58 Neb. 156 (73 N. W. Rep. 661). Under N. C. Code, § 144, twenty years' adverse possession is required to give title in fee to the possessor as against all persons not

under disability. Walden v. Ray, 121 N 4. 287 (28 3. E. Rep. 293). In North Dakota ten years' "actual open adverse and undisputed possession of land" accompanied by payment of "all taxes and assessments legally levied thereon" confers title. Laws 1899, p. 230. In South Carolina, a person who has held land adversely for ten years has a good title by virtue of such possession which may be affirmatively asserted against one not protected by some disability. Cave v. Anderson, 50. C. 293 (27 S. E. Rep. 693); Duren v. Kee, 50 S. C. 444 (27 S. E. Rep. 875). In Tennessee it is held that a party in possession of land under a valid deed purporting to convey a lee and defining boundaries can perfect his title by seven years' open and adverse possession without showing that the land was granted by that state or the state of North Carolina. O'Dell v. Swaggerty, Tenn. (42 S. W. Rep. 175).

Sec. 74. Title by-Tacking possessions. Seven years' adverse possession under color of title, under N. C. Code, 141, cannot be made by tacking possessions unless they are under color of title. Morrison v. Craven, 120 N. C. 327 (26 S. E. Rep. 940). In South Carolina, adverse possession by parties in privity cannot be tacked. Code 1870, §§ 98 et seq. construed and applied. Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28 (26 S. E. Rep. 3); Burnett v. Crawford, 50 S. C. 161 (27 S. E. Rep. 645). But in the second case cited it is held that the possession of an heir can be tacked to that of his ancestor. A privity of possession between occupants for the purpose of acquiring the benefit of tacking possessions, may arise from a parol bargain and sale of the possession of the premises followed by delivery thereof, as well as by formal conveyance from one occupant to another. Rambert v. Edmondson, 99 Tenn. 15 (41 S. W. Rep. 935; 63 Am. St. Rep. 819).

Sec. 75. Interruptions of adverse holding. Adverse possession is lost by a break in its continuity by abandonmentor other cause before the bar of the statute is complete, and seisin is restored to the true owner. A subsequent entry is a new disseisin and cannot be added to the former possession. Parkers

burg Industrial Co. Schultz, 43 W. Va. 470 (27 S. E. Rep. 255). A mere vacancy in the occupancy of agricultural land. for a reasonable time, caused by the abandonment of the land by one tenant and the putting of another in possession, does not necessarily break the continuity of the landlord's possession, when there is no intention on his part to abandon the possession. Beasley v. Howell, 117 Ala. 499 (22 So. Rep. 989). Where a railroad having a grant of a right of way over land, after surveying and staking its line abandons the same and the owner and subsequent purchasers occupy it as a part of the farm, the company by subsequently making a survey across the land and sending a man to take possession of the right of way which he did by walking over it, were held insufficient to establish re-entry as against the continued and actual adverse possession of the occupants. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. v. Holton, 100 Ky. 665 (39 S. W. Rep. 27). An acknowledgment by the disseisor of the record or paper title, as by accepting a lease from the owner of it, is in the nature of an admission that he had no title, and is competent evidence tending to prove that his possession was not adverse. Sage v. Rudnick, 67 Minn. 362 (69 N. W. Rep. 1096). The purchase, or attempted purchase of an outstanding title, by one in possession and before the expiration of the statutory period, is not alone sufficient to break the continuity of possession or divest it of its adverse character, although the occupant may believe that he is thereby acquiring the true title. Ragan, C., dissenting. Oldig v. Fisk, 53 Neb. 156 (73 N. W. Rep. 661). Interruption of an adverse possession based on a claim that the property had been protected by a substantial inclosure for a time longer than the statutory period, is not shown by proof of occasional temporary destruction of portions of the inclosure which were repaired within a reasonable time in each instance. Baldwin v. Durfee, 116 Cal. 625 (48 Pac. Rep. 724). Title by adverse possession is not acquired by an adverse claimant, who, before the expiration of the prescriptive period, transferred his possession to another for whom he afterwards acted as agent. Blomberg v. Montgomery, 69 Minn. 149 (72 N. W. Rep. 56). The running of the statute of limitations in favor of a person in the adverse possession of land is not suspended by the death of the opposing claimant. Davis v. Threlkeld, 58

Kan. 763 (51 Pac. Rep. 226). Pa. Pub. Laws, 1859, p. 6039, construed and applied-interruption of the running of the statute. Hasson v. Klee, 181 Pa. St. 117 (37 Atl. Rep. 184).

Sec. 76. Public property. Until a patent for public lands has been issued no adverse possession can begin to run. in favor of or against any one. Stevens v. Moore, 116 Ala. 397 (22 So. Rep. 542); Stringfellow v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 117 Ala. 250 (22 So. Rep. 997). This rule is made a statutory provision in Florida, by Fla. Laws 1872, ch. 1869. Hagan v. Ellis, 39 Fla. 463 (22 So. Rep. 727; 63 Am. St. Rep. 167). Title to land dedicated to a public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession. Home for Care of the Inebriate v. City & Co. of San Francisco, 119 Cal. 534 (51 Pác. Rep. 950). Where lands have been granted by the public to be held as "commons" for the people of a specified community, a quasi municipal corporation created by the state having power to divide them into lots and lease them for fifty years, the state alone having power to segregate or convey the lands, it is held that title to such lands cannot be acquired by adverse possession. President of Kaskaskia v. McClure, 167 Ill. 23 (47 N. E. Rep. 72). One who seeks to defeat proceedings by a city to condemn and open a street by alleging adverse possession of the land by herself and others under whom she claims for twenty years, must show a privity of title with such other owners and clearly allege that the ground has not been previously dedicated to the public for a street. City of Baltimore v. Coates, 85 Md. 531 (37 Atl. Rep. 18). Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 71, art. 5, applied-adverse possession of street. James v. City of Louisville, (40 S. W. Rep. 912). In Michigan it is held that the title to land laid out for a public alley, may be acquired by adverse possession. Vier v. City of Detroit, 111 Mich. 646 (70 N. W. Rep. 189). Under N. C. Code, § 139, the state may be barred by 30 years' adverse possession, which need not be continuous nor need there be any connection between the tenants. Walden v. Ray, 121 N. C. 237 (28 S. E. Rep. 293). In Oregon it is held that title may be acquired to a public highway by adverse possession for the prescriptive period. Grady v. Dundon, 20 Or. 333 (47 Pac. Rep. 915). Construing Tex. Rev. Stat. 1895,

Ky.

art. 3351, it is held that adverse possession may exist against a county as to lands which are not used for road, street, side. walk or some public use. Johnson v. Llano Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 421 (39 S. W. Rep. 995). In Minnesota, a recent statute which does not affect pending actions, provides that title to any public street, highway, alley, public square or levee" cannot be acquired by adverse possession. Laws 1899, p. 65. In Utah, title "to any lands held by any town or city or the corporate authorities thereof," cannot be acquired "by adverse possession thereof for any length of time whatsoever." Laws 1899, p. 55.

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Sec. 77. Landlord and tenant-Tenants in common. One who takes possession of real estate as the tenant of another cannot hold said real estate adversely to his lessor without first having actually or constructively surrendered the premises to him. Perkins v. Potts, 52 Neb. 110 (71 N. W. Rep. 1017); Perkins v. Potts, 53 Neb. 444 (73 N. W. Rep. 936). A tenant in common in possession, who has once acknowledged his cotenant's title, cannot claim to hold adversely until he has brought home to his cotenant knowledge of the adverse nature of his holding, unless his exclusive use and enjoyment has been so long continued as to justify a finding of acquiescence on the part of the other tenants. Saladin v. Kraay

vanger, 96 Wis. 180 (70 N. W. Rep. 1113). The possession of a tenant in common becomes adverse as against his cotenant when the latter has notice of the former's claim that he is holding as absolute owner; but the mere possession of a cotenant, although continued for the prescriptive period, is not sufficient notice to a cotenant that the possessor claims the whole. Weshgyl v. Schick, 113 Mich. 22 (71 N. W. Rep. 323). The possession of the common estate by one holding under a deed executed by all of several cotenants except one, which purports to convey the whole estate, is not adverse to the interests of the other cotenant so long as his title is recognized by such grantee. Van Ormer v. Harley, 102 Ia. 150 (71 N. W. Rep. 241). It is held that as a general principle, the minority of a tenant in common will protect the interest of the other tenants in common from the operation of the statute of limitations; but when adults and infants are ten