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General assent the great argu

ment.

§ 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles, both speculative and practical (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind; which therefore, they argue, must needs be constant impressions, which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

Universal consent

proves no

3. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it; that if it were true in matter of fact, that thing innate. there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.

"What is,
is," and "it
is impossible
for the same
thing to be,
and not to

be," not uni-
versally as-
sented to.

§ 4. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such; because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration; "whatsoever is, is ;" and, "it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be;" which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.

Not on the mind natu

§ 5. For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least ap

rally imprinted, be

cause not known to children,

idiots, &c.

prehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths it seeming to me near a contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which, since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions for if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of: for if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only, because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate: and this great point will

Nay,

But as to the way, your lordship thinks, I should have taken to prev the having it thought my invention, when it was common to me with oth it unluckily so fell out, in the subject of my Essay of Human U standing, that I could not look into the thoughts of other men to in myself: for my design being, as well as I could, to copy nature, give an account of the operations of the mind in thinking; I coul into nobody's understanding but my own, to see how it wrough have a prospect into other men's minds, to view their thoughts t observe what steps and motions they took, and by what gradat proceeded in their acquainting themselves with truth, and their in knowledge: what we find of their thoughts in books, is bu of this, and not the progress and working of their minds, in co opinions or conclusions they set down and published.

All therefore, that I can say of my book, is, that it is a cop mind, in its several ways of operation: and all that I can say lishing of it is, that I think the intellectual faculties are man alike in most men; and that some, that I showed it to bef it, liked it so well, that I was confirmed in that opinion. if it should happen, that it should not be so, but that so have ways of thinking, reasoning, or arriving at certaint others, and above those that I find my mind to use and not see of what use my book can be to them. I can humble request, in my own name, and in the name of t size, who find their minds work, reason, and know in that mine does, that those men of a more happy geni way of their nobler flights; and particularly would shorter or surer way to certainty, than by ideas, al agreement or disagreement.

Your lordship adds, "But, now, it seems, not1 what suits with the new way of ideas." My lord. and the old way of speaking intelligibly", was al same; and if I may take the liberty to declare consists: 1. That a man use no words, but such certain determined objects of his mind in thin' known to another. 2. Next, That he use the sign of the same immediate object of his mind join those words together in propositions, ace rules of that language he speaks in. 4. Tha a coherent discourse. Thus, and thus only. may preserve himself from the confines an he pleases to call those immediate objects o or should stand for, ideas, or no.

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rally im

printed, because not

known to

children,

idiots, &c.

prehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which, since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions for if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of: for if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only, because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate: and this great point will

amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles for nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is capable of knowing, in respect of their original: they must all be innate, or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He, therefore, that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of: for if these words (to be in the understanding) have any propriety, they signify to be understood: so that, to be in the understanding, and not to be understood-to be in the mind, and never to be perceived-is all one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions," whatsoever is, is," and "it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.

That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered.

§ 6. To avoid this, it is usually answered, That all men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason, and this is enough to prove them innate. I

answer,

§ 7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those, who being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things: either, that,

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