by the foreign government concerned; 26 of the 30 agreements were subject to legislative ratification while our own Congress was excluded from considering any of the agreements. In the case of 12 of the agreements, they came into effect provisionally, subject to subsequent ratification. The ramining 14 had to be ratified by the foreign legislative body before coming into operation. This completely disposes of the argument that the President needs to have plenary power in these matters in order to deal with the trade agreements on a par with foreign emissaries. (The table referred to is as follows:) LEGISLATIVE ACTION ON TRADE AGREEMENTS BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES I. Agreements not requiring foreign legislative action: 1. Belgium. 2. Cuba. 3. Ecuador. 4. Peru. II. Agreements put into effect provisionally, subject to eventual foreign legisla tive action: 1. Argentina. 2. Canada, first agreement. 3. Canada, second agreement. 4. Canada, fox-fur agreement. 5. Canada, supplementary fox-fur agreement. 6. Czechoslovakia. 7. France. 8. Netherlands. 9. Switzerland. 10. Turkey. 11. United Kingdom. 12. Venezuela. III. Agreements which did not become effective until after foreign legislative action. 1. Brazil (10 months, 29 days between signing and effective date). 2. Columbia (8 months, 6 days). 3. Costa Rica (8 months, 4 days). 4. Cuba, first supplementary agreement (4 days). 5. Cuba, second supplementary agreement (12 days). 6. El Salvador (3 months, 11 days). 7. Finland (5 months, 14 days). 8. Guatemala (1 month, 21 days). 9. Haiti (2 months, 5 days). 10. Honduras (2 months, 12 days). 12. Nicaragua (6 months, 19 days). 14. Uruguay (5 months, 10 days). Source: State Department mimeograph dated March 5, 1943. Mr. COOPER. Mr. Secretary, I am sure I voice the true sentiment and feeling of all members of this committee in stating it is very gratifying indeed to have you with us today. We recall our pleasant association with you as a Member of the House and recall that you served for many years with great credit and distinction as a member of this committee, and it is a very happy privilege to welcome you here and to receive the splendid statement you have given us. I am impressed by the fact you point out with emphasis and clarity the importance of this program with respect to the future peace of the world, and I would appreciate it if you could enlarge upon that phase of the matter for our benefit as we give consideration to this important measure. Secretary HULL. I appreciate what my old Tennessee colleague says and, if I may divert for one sentence, I feel more than a friendly relationship to all of you gentlemen. I have always found that this committee has conducted its functions with outstanding capacity, with great research and, as I say in this statement, with real hard-headed business judgment. Naturally, I could spend a long time on this question of the particular relationship or, rather, the particular place which what we might call more liberal commercial policy, as distinguished from extremely narrow commercial policy such as was practiced during the years following the other war-the place that a more liberal commercial policy occupies in the world situation. As we go forward, we shall gradually think out, and talk out, and work out at least tentative plans for the post-war world structure, especially in its political and economic phases. We have had an elaborate experience during recent years as to the effect of each of the political and economic policies of the kind that were then pursued upon a stable post-war world program. Back in the thirties agitators were springing up among peoples who were in economic distress and dictators were gradually emerging and undertaking to assume power. We had been through a colossal economic collapse, both at home and abroad, which began in 1929. The question presenting itself to us was whether we could erect in the international sphere a structure of peace and stable political conditions everywhere, unless that structure rested on the solid foundation of economic security and the beneficial results that flow from it. That was the real foundation we endeavored to build. We found, following the war and for many years afterward, a most complete network of every kind of restriction and obstruction and impediment to the reasonable, and what ordinarily would be the normal, flow of trade and commerce among nations. This was not confined to any one method; many methods of restriction and obstruction were utilized. By degrees, they all were applied, as a rule excessively-import licenses, exchange manipulation, sudden maneuvering of the currency situation, tariffs, discriminations in trade right and left on the part of all the different nations, or most of them. We had virtual chaos in the international economic situation. This was not given very serious attention at the time or during the early stages, for the reason that, prior to the First World War, our country-a new country with immense resources-could endure almost any kind of excesses in the international field without very serious injury. But after the war conditions changed. We had developed here a great credit balance between us and the rest of the world. We still had almost unlimited natural resources-foodstuffs, all kinds of raw materials, semimanufactures for further manufacture, the greatest industrial plant in all history, operated by the most intelligent and highly skilled and highly productive labor by far that could be found in any country, either then or theretofore, all needing large foreign markets. Yet we drifted along under the old traditional theory of the isolation era-aloofness, or whatever you might call it-which we had practiced with impunity, especially up to the last war. I have never criticized anybody for having different views on this great question which was presented to us after the First World War and which has become more and more accentuated. But it is plain that after this war we shall have before us the question of whether or not we shall undertake to cooperate and, in part, lead in a somewhat broader post-war program for the economic development of the various countries, so far as trade among nations is concerned. And I think it has become manifest that, under the new post-war conditions, no domestic trade structure will be either sound or capable of full and satisfactory development without an ever increasing volume of international trade. That is especially true of countries like ours with its resources and its vast capabilities, and its surplus producing capacity in many of the greatest lines of agriculture and industry. The conclusion which we reached some time ago and which we have been following in an effort gradually to remove the excesses in the obstructions to international trade and finance, exchange and commerce, has found support from the best authorities, from the most capable businessmen here and abroad. I think it is more apparent each month that our trade-agreements policy is beneficial, is practical, and is worthy of support and maintenance on the part of the general American public. I might say that when the policy was enacted a great many people were very much alarmed. They had been accustomed to very narrow partisan considerations of our international trade and tariff and other interests, and so they were prepared for any kind of rash action. But I want to say this, Mr. Chairman: At the time the act was passed by Congress with some reluctance and misgiving, in 1934, I expressed my conviction that a satisfactory development of this far-reaching policy, within the limits of its legitimate application and objectives, offered the only course for the important nations of the world in the future, unless they were going to return to that ever-narrowing economic road which had brought its full contribution to the disasters that came upon us and other nations of the world. I pledged you, gentlemen, and I pledged my friends at the other end of the Capitol, that the program would be carried out gradually and with the greatest caution. For 9 years now we have proceeded in exactly that fashion to develop the system through the most thorough study and painstaking care. So far as we were concerned, we have kept it, of course, as we have all foreign affairs over at the State Department, a million miles away from domestic politics. Every effort has been made to proceed as a whole-and, therefore, gradually-in developing and preparing this program and implementing it, in the hope that other nations would come along, and the excesses of many kinds in trade obstructions and restrictions which I have mentioned would be gradually eliminated. My associates will go into any and all details that you may be interested in taking up. Up to this time, nobody has been seriously hurt in this country by these readjustments. Every precaution is provided in advance to take care of any unexpected development that might be injurious or materially hurtful to any of our industries; while from abroad, and from the close students and observers at home, we have an accumulation of facts and experiences with the operation of this policy, showing that the Trade Agreements Act thus far has proven to be beneficial both to us and to other countries and hence, in return, again more beneficial to us. I know of nothing that has been said or done in this connection that we would not be glad to take up with any of those who have a different view with respect to it. Further answering Mr. Cooper's request, this program offers a broad basic foundation for the gradual erection of a post-war economic structure that will, in all important respects, make the most practical, and at the same time a vast, contribution to the improvement of economic conditions in this country and in all of the countries that participate to any extent in this policy, and will offer a foundation for economic recovery-gradual, of course. There is no such thing any more as overnight recoveries in economic and commercial affairs. This program will pave the way for a sound over-all post-war program, which must, of course, include related policies such as monetary arrangements, exchange and other phases of international finance, and commercial and trade situations. I do not want to go too far, Mr. Cooper, except to indicate the privilege that this opportunity offers. Mr. COOPER. I am sure we appreciate the information you have given us, Mr. Secretary. Now, of course, following the First World War there were very great and serious dislocations throughout the whole world by reason of that war. I assume it is reasonable and fair to assume, following this war, that those dislocations may be even more serious and more far reaching than they were then. Secretary HULL. I think that is self-evident and I feel about this somewhat as I felt in talking with an important official of another important country. I said, "We have had enough experience of the most disastrous kind until it is now clear that, if we give the same rational consideration to the basic future problems presented and to suitable remedies, we shall be obliged to collaborate and cooperate." I said, "We may not have any particular admiration for each other, even. I do not think that will be the case, but that could be the case. We may have minor differences, but there is a deeper consideration than even friendship that will draw us together and hold us together in the future, if we proceed-as I think we shall-with vision and deliberation." I said, "It required no appeal to friendship or other relations when we flew to the support of Russia at the time she was invaded. We may not have been in agreement with all of our Russian friends in some matters, no more than they would be in agreement with us; but something caused us to snap together almost instantly and automatically, and proceed to fight together. That something was selfpreservation. In the future we shall have the same problem. Unless we can review and examine what has been going on and what is going on and draw sound inferences for the future, no matter how many predisposed ideas may have to be abandoned-unless we can do that, I have the greatest possible apprehension about the future. I believe we shall be able to do it in a broad, cooperative spirit of teamwork, if you will allow me to emphasize it by using two words that mean the same thing." I do not think I need to go further except to say that, in the future, unless the nations continue to collaborate with respect to the post-war world and to the maintenance of its economic and political welfare under conditions of security, and proceed to do so with every possible effort, then the nations will drop out of line in every direction, just as they did following the other war. Every nation will undertake to look out for itself, with the utterly disastrous consequences that were apparent then and that are even clearer now. And that is my appeal in this connection. We and other countries must respond to the law of self-preservation, which should then as now, during this war, draw us together and hold us together and bind us together for all of these international cooperative plans and policies that are necessary for the peace and political stability and the economic welfare of our people and others. Mr. COOPER. Then if it should develop that all nations of the world will be left to pursue their individual courses after the termination of this war, the natural result, as you anticipate it, would be that it would endanger the peace of the world and we might reasonably expect further hostilities to develop from that course. Secretary HULL. I think after the other war 3 or 4 nations turned to anarchy. After this war it will probably be nearer 14 than 4, and that will be just the beginning of chaos, unless we all collaborate and cooperate to anticipate this and other economic chaotic conditions that will otherwise follow. Mr. COOPER. Anticipating the dislocations which are certain to follow this war, it is your opinion then that this program you have outlined to us here is of vast importance in trying to meet and deal with those dislocations that are certain to develop? Secretary HULL. I would like to emphasize what I said, that a sound economic international policy is one of the basic foundations for any future political, economic, and social world structure. There is none other so important. I am watching and waiting to see if there is a substitute or an alternative plan. Mr. COOPER. With your vast experience and public service extending over half a century or more, and because of the very intensive study and consideration that you have given to this particular problem, it is your position that this method here suggested affords the best instrument that can be provided for meeting and dealing with these important war dislocations and difficulties that are certain to develop? Secretary HULL. This program, I think, must be the central point in any effort to solve the international economic and related monetary and exchange problems. Mr. COOPER. Following the last war, nations of the world restorted to various types and kinds of schemes with respect to international trade-currency manipulation, trade restrictions, and various devices of that type. Now, it is reasonable to assume that those same practices may be renewed following this war, unless there is a proper degree of leadership afforded to guide them in a more constructive and safer channel. Secretary HULL. Well, they will inevitably be renewed, and in far more agravated and complicated form, unless we all cooperate. Mr. COOPER. Then it is your thought, I assume, unless we furnish the leadership through the type of program that you are here presenting and that is anticipated under the bill here under consideration, chaos may result with respect to international trade and relations of that type? |