NOTICE HUSBAND AND judgment. (Andred v. Mockford et al. [No. 1, BONA FIDE PURCHASER WIFE.- Where land is occupied by two persons, as, for instance, by husband and wife, and there is a recorded title in one of them, such joint occupation is not notice of an unrecorded title in the other. (Kirby v. Tallmadge [U. S. S. C.], 16 S. C. Rep. 349). - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI CARRIERS -PASSENGER GENCE. Where a passenger goes on the side of a platform car opposite the platform, and not at the place arranged to receive passengers, and attempts to climb on the train from between the cars, and in so doing places his foot on the bumper, where it was injured by the engine moving up to couple the train, he is guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover. (Wardlaw v. California Ry. Co. [Cal.], 42 Pac. Rep. 1075.) COMPANY. Payment out of the capital of a limited company of interest on sums paid upon shares in advance of calls is not equivalent to a return of capital to the shareholders; and therefore a provision in the articles of association of the company authorizing such a payment is not ultra vires, but the payment can be legally made. (Lock v. Queensland Inv. & Land Mortgage Co. [Ct. of App.], 73 L. T., 720.) COMPANY. The promoters of a company issued prospectuses to the public, and sent a copy to the plaintiff amongst others. The company was a sham and the prospectus fraudulent. The plaintiff read the prospectus, but did not apply for shares. Afterwards the defendant caused to be published in a financial newspaper a telegram concerning the company which to their knowledge was false. CONDEMNATION OF LAND-BUILDING OF LEVEES.Land in Louisiana bordering on a navigable stream is subject to the State law allowing the public to impose servitudes on such land without compensation for the making and repairing of levees, even though the title to the land is derived from the United States. (Eldridge v. Trelevant [U. S. S. C.], 16 S. C. Rep. 345.) CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS.-- Confessions are not inadmissible because the party making them was in custody provided they were not extorted by inducements or threats. (Pierce v. United States [U. S. S. C.], 16 S. C. Rep. 321.) FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-EVIDENCE-On the issue as to whether a sale by a debtor of his stock of goods to a creditor in payment of a pre-existing debt was fraudulent as to other creditors, evidence of dealings between the vendor and the vendee in another and distinct transaction is inadmissible in evidence. (Cocke v. Carrington Shoe Co. [Miss.], 18 South. Rep. 683.) PRACTICE. In a collision action in rem, the de fendant pleaded (inter alia) compulsory pilotage. The plaintiffs thereupon applied for an order giving leave to have the pilot joined as a defendant to the action. Held, on appeal, that the joinder of a pilot as a defendant to an action in rem. would cause inconvenience in procedure and that, therefore, the court, assuming it had jurisdiction to make the order, had wrongly exercised its discretion in granting it, and that the order must be set aside. (The Germanic The plaintiff, on reading the telegram, purchased [Ct. of App.], 73 L. T. 730.) shares in the company in the market, and thereby suffered damage, which he sought to recover from the defendants. At the trial the jury found (inter alia) that one of the objects which the defendants had in view, both when issuing the prospectus and publishing the telegram, was to induce the plaintiff, as one of the public, to purchase shares in the company in the market. Upon an application by the defendants for judgment: TRADE PROTECTION SOCIETY.- Under the rules of a voluntary trade protection society members, on election, were required to pay an annual subscription, in return for which they were entitled to certain benefits, but they incurred no further obligations beyond such payment. The rules contained no provisions as to the retirement or expulsion of members. A member wrote to the committee resigning his membership, but before receiving any reply to his letter he wrote again withdrawing his previous resignation. The committee, however, insisted that he had ceased to be a member. Held, that there was evidence on which the jury might reasonably come to the conclusion that the function of the prospectus was not exhausted upon the allotment of the shares, and that there had been one continuous fraud, commencing with the prospectus and culminating in the publication of the telegram, practiced by the defendants upon the plaintiff with the object of inducing him to purchase shares in the company in the market, and that the plaintiff having suffered damage in consequence of having thereby been induced to purchase shares in the company in the market was entitled to | App.], 73 L. T. 716.) Held, that the plaintiff, not being subject to any obligation to the society, was at liberty to resign his membership at any time, and that no acceptance of his resignation by the committee was necessary; but that he ceased to be a member from the date when his letter of resignation was received by the secretary; and that he could not become a member again without re-election. (Finch v. Oake, [Ct. of The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, MARCH 14, 1896. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] A N attempt is being made by the legislature of the State of New York to amend sections 364A and 364B of the Penal Code, which defines what is known as the "Sterling Silver Law." The section of the law of 1894 provides for conviction if goods are made and are stamped "sterling" when they do not contain 925-1000 parts of pure silver. One of the amendments now in the legislature provides for conviction only when it is proven that the seller had actual knowledge that the goods had less than that quality when he sold them. The law does not now require goods to be stamped "sterling" or anything else. It simply demands that when "sterling" is placed on them that all such goods shall contain not less than 925-1000 parts pure silver. The law does not prevent the manufacture and sale of any other grade of silver goods so long as the word "sterling" is not placed thereon. It merely established a legal definition of the word "sterling" when applied to silver. Whatever the object of the amendment may be the results are twofold; to allow fraudulent goods to be sold and to quash the present indictments, as the amendments have no saving clause. The law as it stands now does not bear injuriously upon any honest dealer. It makes no distinction in the trade. It is the same for the jew eler, the department store or any merchant. We do not see any reason why it should not stand upon our statute books without any amendment. study of law in Dover. He was admitted to the bar in 1864, and five years later became associate judge of the Supreme Court. He resigned his office in 1847, and two years later was appointed chief justice. Judge Doe was eccentric in manner, dress and mode of living and was a confirmed believer in fresh air. Windows were taken out of his residence on the coldest days in winter. Lawyers declare that to attend court in winter, when the chief justice presided, was equal to a trip to the Arctic regions. In Some of the debates in Congress in regard to the Cuban question have involved the use of the term "public war" by members who do not seem to know the true meaning of that term. As defined in an official publication by the United States government, it is not applicable to the present state of facts in Cuba. general orders No. 100, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field." prepared by Dr. Francis Lieber, approved by President Lincoln, and promulgated by the war department, April 24, 1863, the several kinds of war are carefully defined. Thus, in paragraph 20 of section 1 of the Instructions, it is declared that “public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations or governments." In paragraph 149 of section 10, it is stated that "insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government or a portion of it." In paragraph 151, it is added that "the term rebellion is applied to an insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war between the legitimate government of a who seek to throw off their allegiance to it, and country and portions or provinces of the same set up a government of their own." Finally, by paragraph 150, “civil war" is defined as between two or more portions of a country or State, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the legitimate government." These definitions are precise, and it would be well if our statesmen and our newspapers would bear them in mind. There can be no right reasoning without the right use of words. 66 war We have received many letters recently in regard to a bill pending before the Legislature restricting appeals to the Court of Appeals. In this issue we publish a letter in which one writer explains his views upon this subject. Of course it is too short a time since the appellate division was established to ascertain whether the enlargement of the general term and the constituting of the appellate division will in any way affect appeals to the Court of Appeals. It would seem, however, from the information we have received that no cesation has taken place and that the number of cases being carried to the highest court of this State is not at all affected by the strengthening of the intermediate Court of Appeals. It has been fully demonstrated many times that while there is a chance to appeal, few lawyers will stop until they are prevented by the Constitution or by some statute. While on this subject it might be well to call attention to part of an address which was recently delivered and which deals with the system of common law pleading. We believe it will appeal to those who advocate codes in lieu of the older methods. The part of the address referred to is as follows: like all old things, in the march of progress Witness its decadence within the last fifty The innovations of the present half of years. the nineteenth century have demonstrated its uselessness, and falsified all of the predictions of its eloquent eulogists and most ardent admirers. A few years ago all of the lawyers and judges, with here and there a few exceptions, believed in the efficacy of the subterfuges and refinements of special pleading. Fifty years. ago it was vehemently asserted, and firmly believed by all of the reverend judges and the able lawyers as well, that it was impossible to conduct a lawsuit, or administer justice, without bringing into play all of the appliances of this ancient system. Actions with their refined distinctions; declarations with their general and particular requisites; pleas with their technical Let us now take a hasty glance at the com- qualities; replications with their absque hocs, mon law system of special pleading. Every and free from negative pregnants, together with legal system has its beginning, its maturity, its a thousand other quirks, quibbles, fictions and old age, and then passes away. The common falsehoods of special pleading, were considered law system of special pleading is very old; and absolutely necessary to the administration of if age is proof of wisdom the argument is at an justice fifty years ago. Fifty years ago this sysend. For no other system has left so much be- tem prevailed quite universally with the Enghind in the oblivion of the past. It has indeed lish-speaking nations of the world. But time been blessed with a wonderful longevity. It and change have indeed wrought wonders. witnessed the dawn of civilization; saw the first Only in the States of Maryland, Maine, New ray of light flash through the gloom of barbar- Jersey, New Hampshire, Virginia, Pennsylvania ism; it flourished in the days of chivalry, when and Illinois does the system exist to-day, and our rude ancestors wore armor and went clad in these States only in a modified form. Noin complete steel; it was lusty in its youth, in where else does it prevail. All other States the days of the warring Plantagenets; it had that once had it, have abolished it, and those grown to manhood when Newton discovered the that never had it do not want it. Every nation laws of gravitation and Galileo first pointed his of Europe, England alone excepted, has for rude telescope to the stars; it survived the wars, ages administered justice without its aid or ascruelties and superstitions of the middle ages sistance, and the same is true of every Latinand emerged unhurt; ages rolled on; systems speaking nation of the world. England is the and creeds grew up, flourished and fell; rulers mother of this system of pleading; there it was and dynasties passed away; ideas and fashions born; there it flourished for quite 600 years; came and went, but it remained in the plenti- there it was deeply rooted in the affections; tude of its power, unimpaired. It lives to-day there it was enshrined in the heart of every to behold the marvelous wonders of the present lawyer, for its praises were mingled with the age; and stands ready to salute the dawn of earliest recollections of his childhood; there it the twentieth century before it passes away. was associated with all of the great trials, and We rise uncovered in reverence to its age. But, I praised by all of the great judges. be liable as sureties if such candidate was to have the management of the public finances. It was shown on the trial by the defendant that such objection by bondsmen had actually been made. The court held that the article in question did not by any necessary inference impugn the plaintiff's honesty, but might have related simply to his general ability and qualifications for the place. It was decided, as we think properly, that the legitimate sphere of criticism by the press upon candidates for office had not been transcended, and that a verdict had been rightly directly for the defendant. As we said in our note on Tuesday last: "It certainly cannot be legitimately argued that the holding of a public office is a private business, in the sense that discussion and hostile criticism of an incumbent's or candidate's qualifications on the score of capability or experience, make out a cause of action for defamation." The case is One of our contemporaries has seen fit to ridicule this journal because it published a syllabus of a case, the general principles of which had been determined by the courts of this State and of other States and of England, on the theory that under abstracts of recent decisions we should only give cases which in volve new principles of law. Does our contemporary appreciate that there are few cases which are decided which really involve new principles of law, and that our difficulty at present is that there are too many opinions written which are simply a re-hash of the same well-worn principles of law? It was no news to us to be told by our egotistical contemporary of the principles that should be enunciated. Certain general principles are given in nearly every case which has been previously determined and which case is particularly known because it adopts old principles to another statement of facts. If we were inclined to examine the re-distinguishable from Mattice v. Wilcox, in the ports simply to find new principles we would spend our time mostly in fruitless endeavors, and even though our contemporary may not appreciate our efforts to select cases which interest the public it is no fault of ours that the cases so cited do not meet with its ultrafine judgment. If our northern contemporary is still in the midst of its torpid winter slumber and is trying to stir up some life within itself by poking at others, we will be pleased to instil into its lifeless columns some energy by allowing it to become engaged in a controversy of any kind at any time. The New York Law Journal on February 14th published a very good article on publications entailing degradation, contempt or ridicule, which cites numerous cases and editorial statements involving this important branch of the law of libel. The article is one which will bear careful study, and is: On Tuesday last a note was given in this place of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in an action for libel (Dennebacke v. Tribune Printing Co., 65 N. W. R. 583), holding that it was not actionable to say in a newspaper editorial of a candidate for county treasurer, that upon a previous occasion, when it had been proposed to appoint him the deputy treasurer, the then treasurer's bondsmen objected because they were unwilling to new Court of Appeals, 147 N. Y. 624, holding that certain language applied to the plaintiff in a circular, which was distributed among citizens, was libelous per se and actionable. Although the occasion and the motive for disseminating such circular were political, it was nevertheless decided that the language in effect charged the plaintiff with general incapacity in his profession of attorney at law. In contrast with the journalistic utterance, passed upon in the Michigan case (supra), is the following extract from a newspaper article which was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Smith v. Utley, 65 N. W. R. 744: "Choke them off. Blood-sucking police officers, who insist on sitting on juries." "Salaries as officers sufficient." "They neglect their duties as policemen, and cheat some honorable citizen out of $1.20 fee." "Speaking about hogs, they can be found on the Racine police force. The great American hog is not in with some of them. Now this has no reference to Georgie, the chief of police. He is beneath our notice until after the coming spring appointments. Should he be retained as the great 'I am' for another year, he might probably receive a little more notoriety." The Court held that such article was libelous and actionable as to the chief of police referred to as Georgie,' and readily identifiable by the public as George E. Smith, the incumbent of such office. The following is from the scurrilous abuse necessarily tending to degrade opinion: "It was obviously proper for plaintiff, by innuendoes, to define the application of the article to the facts set forth in the pleadings, not to extend the meaning of the words, but to show their meaning-how they came to have the defamatory meaning which plaintiff claims for them, and how they applied to plaintiff. Such is the legitimate office of the inuendo (Cramer v. Noonan, 4 Wis. 233; Bradley v. Cramer, supra; Weil v. Schmidt, 28 Wis. 137; Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231; More v. Bennett, 48 N. Y. 475). We are unable to see how the well established rules of pleading in such cases were seriously violated, if at all. The fair meaning of the words of the article, viewed in the plain, popular sense in which the same would be naturally understood, in view of the matters properly pleaded, is that some of the police force, at least, were nothing more than blood-sucking police officers, who insisted on getting all the money they could, regardless of their duties as such officers, by spending their time serving on juries, and that they deserved to be discharged; that they were in the habit of neglecting their official duties for the purposes of earning additional compensation by serving on juries; that they were hogs, not satisfied with the compensation of their official positions, but seeking to gain additional compensation, to the neglect of their official duties; and that, though plaintiff was not included in the particular arraignment, he was more insignificant and less fit for his official position than those that were. Such language, under the circumstances, necessarily tended to prejudice and degrade plaintiff in his office as chief of police of the city of Racine; to cause it to be believed that he was not worthy to hold such position by reason of habitual neglect of duty-hence actionable." There is obviously a marked distinction between stating a fact concerning a candidate or incumbent of an office and drawing inferences therefrom as to his capability, and indulging in mere vituperative cant which must tend to bring its object into contempt. Even if it were considered that the language applied to the Chief of Police was so indefinite as not to carry any specific charges of unfitness or malversation, it was at least a piece of wanton and him both officially and privately. It would have a healthy restraining influence if verdicts. were occasionally rendered against libelers whose publications had no further effect than exposing the victims to ridicule and contempt. The license of the press in this respect, especially in the department of pictorial caricature, is carried to very extreme lengths. Americans as a class are good-natured and equal to enjoying fun at their own expense. It is furthermore realized that a libel suit is sometimes the best kind of an advertisement, perpetuating the memory of what would otherwise have been a purely ephemeral production. Moreover, a public character, who, like the late James Fennimore Cooper, should constantly prosecute suits for defamation, would be regarded by a large portion of the public as supersensitive, and become through his own zeal more of a butt for ridicule than if he had ignored his assailants. Nevertheless, when raillery and caricature become indecently familiar or brutal in their false suggestions, and, especially if one's business or official standing be touched though indirectly, self-respect as well as regard for the public good may call for bringing the offenders into court. The average sense of moral responsibility of the press is undoubtedly below what it ought to be in the older sections of the Union. But the condition of affairs is much better than in the western communities where civilization is more raw. We doubt if in any of the large cities of the east any newspaper that was worth suing would dare display such unmitigated blackguardism as did the journal published in Racine, Wisconsin, whose editor was the defendant in Smith v. Utley (supra). During the trial of the Durrant case in San Francisco last summer and fall, the court was very seriously embarrassed by the contemptuous and unconscionably "enterprising" spirit of the local press. The American Law Review for January-February, 1896, contains a valuable narrative and critical article on that celebrated trial, from which we extract the following: "First, at the outset of the trial and while the jury was being impaneled, the defense asked for an order in contempt restraining the local journals from attacking the character of jurors and witnesses. The order was refused, |