In his memoirs Talleyrand relates that at a preliminary conference on the 8th of October, 1814, he threw out the idea that the arrangements about to be entered into by the Powers represented at the Congress of Vienna should be "according to public law;" and adds that these last words raised a veritable tempest. M. de Hardenberg, representing Prussia, rising, trembling, standing upright with his fists on the table, cried out: "No, sir, the public law, it is not necessary. Why say we are acting according to public law? That goes without saying." To which I replied, "If it goes without saying, it will go much better by saying." M. de Humboldt exclaimed: "What has public law to do here?" To whom I replied, "It accounts for your being here." The wily Frenchman's vision had a wider range and a more philosophic reach than his colleagues; for he recognized the fact that there exists a rule of action for States as for individuals, and believed that there is a supreme arbiter over both, who, sooner or later, makes his power efficient. As has been aptly observed: On whatever side you look the idea of international arbitration advances and penetrates. It spreads by means of associations among the masses of the people, and imposes itself on parliaments under the patronage of statesmen. Diplomacy no longer rails against it and politics respect it. It has admission to the chanceries and finds a place in the councils of stateBefore an International Court of Arbitration, such as is contemplated in the Memorial of the New York Bar Association, can be organized on a stable basis, it may be necessary to convene a general congress composed of delegates from the several dominant States authorized to perfect such an organization. In this view it is suggested that the American Bar Association, at its approaching meeting, should appoint a committee to co-operate with the Institute of International Law, and the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, for the purpose of initiating and completing the preliminary procedure for the organi zation of the proposed court. The committee might also be authorized to take such other action as in its opinion would advance the cause of international arbitration. ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE. tion of this work. It will be remembered that the former law of this State relating to charities was greatly modified by chapter 701 of the Laws of 1893, while the act we have referred to codifies the entire law on this subject. The work begins with the history of the early English law of charities, while chapter 2 deals with charitable uses and gifts in English jurisprudence. Chapter 3 gives the law of charities in New York State, while chapter 4 deals with charitable donations not in trust. Chapter 6 deals with forms, while following comes the statutes beginning with 43 Elizabeth, chap. 4, and the Laws of the State of New York as they were enacted. The work is really a valuable addition to the law library, and is especially welcome as it deals with a subject that has not been treated of so far as the State of New York is concerned. Published by the Diossy Law Book Co., New York City. PATTEE SERIES OF ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. Messrs. Johnson & Co., of Philadelphia are rapidly completing their set of "Illustrative Cases" on the various subjects of the law, the author of which is Dr. W. S. Pattee, Dean of the College of Law of the University of Minnesota, a recognized authority on legal subjects and a lecturer of wide repute in the west. This series of cases is undoubtedly of great value to the practitioner as well as to the student and lecturer. The cases are carefully chosen from the best adjudged and most modern of the decisions of the American and English courts, and are arranged so as to illustrate the respective subjects as they are developed in their natural order. Each case is preceded by a heavily leaded headnote, which enunciates clearly and concisely, the principles which the case illustrates. The cases on insurance, the latest of the series, is quite the equal of its predecessors. Published by T. & J. W. Johnson& Co., Phila., Pa. BISHOP'S NEW CRIMINAL Procedure. The second volume of this exhaustive treatise on criminal law has just been issued, and treats in detail of the various specific offences and their inci dents. The offences are taken up in their alphabetical order, so as to be more readily accessible, and each is accompanied by unusually copious citations. The subiect-matter is well presented to the reader, both in expression and in form, so that the work is eminently practical. It ought to prove one of the most useful books ever published on criminal law. Published by T. H. Flood & Co., Chicago, Ill. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JULY 18, 1896. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW Journal, All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] contracts for the delivery of any specific commodity. In Butler v. Howitz, 7 Wall. 258, the Supreme Court of the United States held, Chief Justice Chase writing the opinion, as follows: "A contract to pay a certain sum in gold and silver coin is, in substance and legal effect, a contract to deliver a certain weight of gold and silver of a certain fineness, to be ascertained by count. Damages for non-performance of such a contract may be recovered at NE of the most extreme planks which has law as for non-performance of a contract to de cal party was that recently adopted at Chicago, which reads as follows: "We favor such legislation as will prevent, for the future, the demonetization of any kind of legal tender money by private contract." The evident intention of this sentence is to render the so-called “gold clause " of any contract nugatory. The question as to whether any such legislation, if it could be passed, would be constitutional, is a grave and serious one, and one which we believe few would care to decide in an off-hand manner. Many laymen and not a few lawyers labor under the illusion that the clause of the Constitution inhibiting legislation impairing the obligation of contracts is binding upon Congress. Upon a careful examination it will be found that it refers and relates only to legislation by the different States. We, however, believe that any such legislation would be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, not upon the ground that there was an express restraint in the Constitution against such statutes, but because there is an inherent lack of power in Congress to pass any such measure as we have suggested. We notice that many of our contemporaries have also discussed this question, and while many disagree with us, yet we think there are some who will agree in the conclusion we have arrived at. It will be remembered that it has not been deemed necessary by Congress to assert, because of Federal sovereignty in the department of finance, that the payment of money- although a specified kind of money-was provided for, any form of money must be accepted. Fortunately, we have been without decisions of this nature. In the cases we have examined, we believe that the law is well defined, that express contracts for the payment of coin have been treated like VOL. 54 No. 3. the contract for the delivery or payment of coin or bullion, or other property, damages for non-performance must be assessed in lawful money; that is to say, in money declared to be legal tender in payment, by a law made in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States. * * When, therefore, it appears to be the clear intent of a contract that payment or satisfaction shall be made in gold and silver, damages should be assessed and judgment rendered accordingly. It follows that in the case before us the judgment was erroneously entered. The damages should have been assessed at the sum agreed to be due, with interest, in gold and silver coin, and judgment should have been entered in coin for that amount, with costs." Chief Justice Chase also wrote the opinion in the case of Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, in which the court holds that where obligations made payable in coin are sued upon, judgment may be entered for coin dollars and parts of dollar. At page 250 the court says: "Payment of money is delivery by the debtor to the creditor of the amount due. "A contract to pay a certain number of dollars in gold or silver coins is, therefore, in legal import, nothing else than an agreement to deliver a certain weight of standard gold, to be ascertained by a count of coins, each of which is certified to contain a definite proportion of that weight. It is not distinguishable, as we think, in principle, from a contract to deliver an equal weight of bullion of equal fineness. It is distinguishable, in circumstance, only by the fact that the sufficiency of the amount to be tendered in payment must be ascertained; in case of bullion, by assay and the scales, while in the case of coin it may be ascertained by count." Looking at some of the decisions of the various States we come to that of Carpenter v. Atherton (25 Cal. 564), where it was held that a State statute known as the "specific contract law" which provided for the enforcement in terms of contracts made payable in specific kinds of money or currency, was not in derogation of or in conflict with the laws of Congress (Legal Tender act) making United States notes lawful money and legal tender for debts, and any such suit or judgment might be rendered payable in the money specified in the obligation or contract upon which it was rendered. In the opinion of the court which says: "Both a contract to pay a sum of money in gold coin and a contract to sell and deliver coin at a future date create a debt in a general sense, and in that respect stand upon the same footing. But they do more. The party agreeing to pay or deliver gold coin at a future day not only creates a debt which he agrees to pay or discharge, but he also waives the privilege which the law would have guaranteed to him had he not voluntarily renounced it, and takes upon himself an obligation to pay it in a specific kind of lawful money, and nothing else. The waiver and obligation are essential conditions and parts of the consideration of the contract, without which we must presume the contract would not have been made. The agreement to pay in coin is as much a part of the consideration as the agreement to pay at all, and the presumption is that an ample equivalent has been received for the promise The parties, then, are competent to contract-the contract is not against public policy-is not prohibited by law —is payable in a lawful kind of money, and is a lawful contract. Other cases which are pertinent on this subject are: Legal Tender cases, 12 Wall. 457; Maryland v. Ry. Co., 22 Wall. 105; Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 141; Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall. 687; Woodruff v. Miss., 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820; Wallace v. Eldridge, 27 Cal. 498; Harding v. Cowing, 28 Cal. 213. From these authorities it is evident that the trend of decisions is to the effect that contracts to pay gold or any other coin are in the nature of contracts for the delivery of a specific commodity. It would, therefore, seem that there is a lack of authority in congress to prevent citizens from enforcing contracts for the delivery of gold, and there is no more reason why such contract should be permitted than there would be if contracts were for the delivery of iron, grain or other commodities. It will be observed that some of the cases we have cited were made before the passage of the Legal Tender Act, but even so, it would not seem possible that contracts between individuals for the delivery of gold should be construed otherwise than in the nature of contracts to deliver the specific material mentioned therein. We fail to see how congress could insist upon the right of enforcing any contract between individuals or prevent persons from exercising their right to trade unless there was an express provision of the fundamental law, and there is none, which would give congress the right under certain circumstances and in certain cases to prohibit such dealings and transactions. At last it seems probable that the British parliament will pass the so-called "deceased wife's sister's act." Perhaps no law has more regularly made its appearance before parliament for the last twenty years than the act which we believe will become a law. It has passed the House of Lords and will now go before the House of Commons, where it has been passed many times before, and where it doubtless will receive the sanction of the commons. The operative part of the Earl of Dunraven's bill to amend the law as to marriage with a deceased wife's sister, which has now passed its second reading in the House of Lords, runs as follows: No marriage heretofore or hereafter contracted within the realm or without, other than a marriage hereafter contracted in England by solemnization thereof by a clergyman of the Established Church of England, shall be deemed to have been or shall be void or voidable by reason only of having been or being contracted between a man and his deceased wife's sister, notwithstanding any statute, canonical, or other objection. But if either party to such a marriage has, after the marriage and during the life of the other, already lawfully married another such (latter) marriage is good. No clergyman of the Established Church of England is to be liable to any pains or penalties for withholding the rights and privileges of church membership from persons living together in marriage made valid by this bill, or The assumption of medical titles by American doctors resident in England has occasionally given considerable trouble to the English courts, and has recently led Mr. Justice Collins of the Queen's Bench Division to remark that the English law on the subject was in a fog. It is an offence in England, under the statute known as the Medical act, for any person who is not duly registered as a practitioner of medicine to hold himself out to the world as being so registered. A doctor named Bridgewater maintained an office at Cardiff, at which it was shown that he had prescribed for a patient, and upon the window of which appeared his name, followed by the letters M. D., U. S. A. Inside the office was displayed a diploma from an American university. Bridgewater was prosecuted for unlawfully and falsely pretending to be a legally qualified doctor of medicine, but the stipendiary magistrate dismissed the case "on the ground that the defendant only held himself out to be a doctor of medicine of the United States of America, thus implying that he could not be registered under the Medical act." titioner using the letters M. D. after his name was evidence that he professed to be a duly registered doctor of medicine; and finally his associate, Mr. Justice Collins, said the law was in a fog by reason of the difficulty in distinguishing between what were legal inferences and what were inferences of fact, under the statute. There is a case in the English law reports which arose in 1872 that goes a good way in the direction of holding that a false representation as to the right to practice may be implied from the simple use of the letters M D. There, however, they represented a fraudulent degree. The defendant was plainly a scamp, as he had purchased his diploma from an institution in Pennsylvania, although he had never been in this country and never studied medicine for a degree anywhere. He added nothing after M. D., to indicate that the title was of foreign origin, while in Bridgewater's case the evidence tended to show that the man was acting honestly and had a genuine degree, though it gave him no right to treat patients in England. Perhaps no event has engaged more universal attention of late years than the raid of Dr. Jameson. The demand of President Krueger, that Dr. Jameson be punished by the English courts at first seemed startling, though afterwards entirely proper and appropriate. The Law Journal, speaking of the formalities connected with the trial of Dr. Jameson, say: "It is proposed in Dr. Jameson's case to demand a trial at bar, to fix the date of trial for July 22, and we believe also to have a special jury. As soon as issue is joined and the record for trial is made up, the application for trial at bar can be made; and when the notice of trial is given, the special jury will be summoned in the ordinary course, or struck in the crown office if so ordered, under the old practice by which forty-eight jurors are selected by ballot in the crown office and reduced by the parties till a panel of twenty-four is obtained, when the sheriff then summons upon an order from the crown office. In the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice the action of the magistrate was upheld, in spite of a strong effort on behalf of the British Medical Defence Uuion to have it reversed. The Appellate Judges agreed that the use of the letters U. S. A. after M. D. justified the magistrate in deciding, as a matter of fact, that there was no intention on the part of the defendant to deceive. Indeed, Mr. Justice Grantham declared that no case had gone so far as to say that the fact of a prac-which it was found for trial coram rege, and a "Except as to the constitution of the bench, a trial at bar does not differ from any other trial of an indictment in the high court. Even before the great charter it was not uncommon to remove an indictment from the county in precedent of this will be found in Maitland's of ordinary criminal jurisdiction. Pleading to 'Select Pleas of the Crown.' In such a case the indictment is carried on in the crown office; the trial was before the full court, as is shown and if the defendants delay in putting in their in the interesting illumination of the Court of pleas, they may be compelled to do so by an King's Bench, published in the late Mr. Ser-order, also of course, obtained in the crown jeant Pulling's work on the degree of the coif. office. A plea of guilty' or 'not guilty' is But after the statute of nisi prius (13 Ed. I. merely entered in the crown office book; but stat. 1, c, 30), which did not bind the crown, demurrers or pleas to the jurisdiction and the trials at bar at the instance of the subject were like must be filed in writing in the office. restricted to cases requiring great examination, Writs of certiorari to the Central Criminal and have gradually become very rare, or to Court specify the venue on which the High state the law with more historical accuracy Court is to try the indictment, which will in (Regina v. Castro), the award of a writ of nisi this case be Middlesex, although the jury could prius became more and more a matter of be summoned from another county. course, the old practice as to the trial of indictments before the court itself became a rarer and rarer exception, and the most modern precedents are those of Regina v. O'Connell (1843), Regina v. Castro (1874), and Regina v. Parnell (1880), two of them Irish cases. But the right, as already stated, remains unaffected by the judicature acts, except that, instead of having the whole Queen's Bench Division sitting as occasionally happens in the Court for Crown cases reserved, a divisional court of two or three judges constitute the court. "The incidents of the trial in no way differ from those in an ordinary trial of an indictment in the Queen's Bench Division, except that each judge is entitled to charge the jury, which in some old State trials, as of the seven bishops, has led to conflicting directions from the bench. The right which exists in Regina v. Jameson (a misdemeanor case), to apply for a new trial is not in any way affected by trial at bar, and such an application could be made to any judges of the division, even including those who sat at the trial. This was actually done in the Attorney-General v. Bradlaugh. In the present case, immediately after committal for trial, the attorney-general obtained, as of course, an order for the removal of any indictment found to the High Court. The order for certiorari to the Central Criminal Court will now operate, and the indictment will be returned into the crown office, and the subsequent procedure will be somewhat different from that used in ordinary courts of oyer and terminer. The defendants must enter or cause to be entered an appearance in the crown office, and are entitled to obtain an office copy of the indictment, which cannot be done before courts The advantages and disadvantages of the jury system in criminal jurisprudence are most forcibly set out at considerable length in the July number of the North American Review, by M. Romero, Mexican Minister to the United States. This distinguished diplomatist was educated as a lawyer, and has always devoted considerable time to the study of jurisprudence, although he was early summoned to the calling of diplomacy. The advantages of the Roman system of jurisprudence, in criminal matters, is strongly advocated by the distinguished writer, who has evidently devoted a great deal of his time to the study of our criminal procedure. Under the system of criminal jurisprudence prevailing in the federal district of Mexico, it seems that all the preliminary proceedings in a criminal case such as the examination of the accused, the taking of testimony, etc., take place before the judge, who presides over such proceedings without a jury; when this has been completed and the case is already to be submitted, a jury is impanneled and the evidence is read to it as set forth in the record already made; the prosecuting attorney then presents the charges and the defence is heard, the witnesses for both parties are examined and cross-examined; thereupon the jury renders its vervict, judging the accused either innocent or guilty, following substantially the common law principle in England and the United States. It also seems that the Mexican law provides, in the broadest sense of the word, the right of appeal. In every case the appellate court reviews both the law and the fact. The Mexican law provides that no decision made by a judge or jury condemning the accused can be exe |