Advances in Game TheoryPrinceton University Press, 21. 6. 1964 - Počet stran: 679 The description for this book, Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52), Volume 52, will be forthcoming. |
Obsah
Preface | 1 |
Games With a Random Move | 29 |
A Search Game | 39 |
The Rendezvous Value of a Metric Space | 49 |
Generalized Gross Substitutability and Extremization | 55 |
Adaptive Competitive Decision | 69 |
Infinite Games of Perfect Information | 85 |
Continuous Games of Perfect Information | 103 |
The Tensor Composition of Nonnegative Games | 307 |
On the Cardinality of Solutions of FourPerson Constant | 327 |
By Guillermo Owen | 345 |
ThreePerson Cooperative Games Without Side Payments | 377 |
Some Thoughts on the Theory of Cooperative Games | 407 |
The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games | 443 |
Stable Payoff Configurations for Quota Games | 477 |
On the Bargaining Set M of mQuota Games | 501 |
A Theory of Pursuit and Evasion | 113 |
A Variational Approach to Differential Games | 127 |
A Differential Game Without Pure Strategy Solutions | 175 |
The Convergence Problem for Differential Games II | 195 |
Markov Games | 211 |
Homogeneous Games III | 255 |
Solutions of Compound Simple Games | 267 |
A Property of Stability Possessed by Certain Imputations | 513 |
Coalition Bargaining in nPerson Games | 531 |
The nPerson Bargaining Game | 547 |
Valuation of nPerson Games | 577 |
Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games | 627 |
A General Solution for Finite Noncooperative Games Based | 651 |
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