and it became known that British emissaries and the Federal leaders had agreed upon, or were maturing, a plan for defeating the law altogether in New England, and for throwing off the authority of the national Government, at least to that extent, if they did not sever and disavow all connection with the Union. The Federalists were so infatuated by party feeling as to appoint a committee to confer with British emissaries.

Mr. Jefferson's friend Nicholas, in the House (January 25, 1809), moved a resolution to the effect, that we ought not to delay the repeal of the Embargo Law beyond

day of

and then to resume navigation on the high seas, and to defend ourselves against all nations. This was subsequently changed, so that if by a day certain the obnoxious orders and decrees were not repealed, then letters of marque and reprisal should be issued against the powers complained of after the 1st of June, 1812.

This resolution occasioned a very exciting debate. Some of Mr. Jefferson's friends became alarmed, and especially those from New England, at the indications of insurrection in their own States. Against the wishes of the mover, the date when the embargo should cease was changed from the 1st of June to the 4th of March.

Although not then publicly known, there was more cause for alarm than was generally apprehended. Mr. John Quincy Adams, who had previously acted with the Federal party, and knew much of the acts and of the intentions of its leaders, yielding to the convictions of duty, disclosed to Mr. Jefferson, and subsequently to the public, facts which came to his knowledge on this subject. Among other things, he stated:

"He (Mr. Adams) urged that the continuance of the embargo much longer would certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported by the Legislature and, probably, by the judiciary of the State (Massachusetts). That to quell that resistance, if force should be resorted to by the Government, it would produce a civil war; and that, in that event, he had no doubt that the leaders of the party would secure the coöperation with them of Great Britain. That their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution

of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederation, he knew from unequivocal evidence, although not provable in a court of law; and that, in case of a civil war, the aid of Great Britain to effect that purpose would be as surely resorted to as it would be indispensably necessary to the design."

In an article in the Boston Patriot, in 1809, Mr. Adams fur ther stated:

"They (Mr. Ames's principles) are the principles of a faction which has succeeded in obtaining the management of this Commonwealth, and which aspired to the government of the Union. Defeated in this last object of their ambition, and sensible that the engines by which they have attained the mastery of the State are not sufficiently comprehensive, nor enough within their control to wield the machinery of the nation, their next resort was to dismember what they could not sway, and to form a new confederacy, to be under the glorious shelter of British protection."

At a subsequent period, it became known that the Governor of Canada dispatched one John Henry to New England, to open communications with the disaffected Federal leaders, and to secure arrangements between them and England, which should defeat the laws and intentions of the nation, and prostrate Mr. Jefferson and his party, and destroy the Union, and thus secure to England and the Federalists a triumph.

Concerning the mission of Henry, Mr. Jefferson, in a letter to John Adams, dated 20th April, 1812, said:

"Of this mission of Henry, your son had got wind in the time of the embargo, and communicated it to me. But he had learned nothing of the particular agent, although of his workings, the information he had obtained appears now to have been correct. He stated a particular which Henry has not distinctly brought forward, which was, that the Eastern States were not to be required to make a formal act of separation from the Union, and to take part in the war against it; a measure deemed much too strong for their people: but to declare themselves in a state of neutrality, in consideration of which, they were to have peace and free commerce, the lure most likely to insure acquiescence.' The effect of these malign influences in New England, upon

Congress and the embargo, is thus described by Mr. Jefferson in a letter to General Dearborn, dated 16th July, 1810:

"I join in congratulations with you on the resurrection of republican principles in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, and the hope that the professors of these principles will not again easily be driven off their ground. The Federalists during their short-lived ascendency [the repeal of the embargo] have, nevertheless, by forcing us from the embargo, inflicted a wound on our interests which can never be cured, and on our affections which it will require time to cicatrize. I ascribe all this to one pseudo-Republican, Story. He came on (in the place of Crowninshield, I believe), and stayed only a few days; long enough, however, to get complete hold of Bacon, who, giving in to his representations, became panic-struck and communicated his panic to his colleagues, and they to a majority of the sound members of Congress. They believed in the alternative of repeal or civil war, and produced the fatal measure of repeal. This is the immediate parent of all our present evils, and has reduced us to a low standing in the eyes of the world."

Here we see why the embargo was repealed, and all the advantages of instituting it lost to us. It was the negotiations with British agents to place New England under the control of that power, and, if need be, to engage in insurrections and civil war, thus severing the Union, to accomplish that purpose. These things indicate the anti-Democratic principles of the day, and their fatal consequences. It is evident that Jefferson knew of their existence and the intentions and purposes of their leaders, but doubted their courage to carry them out in practice, knowing as he did that criminals are proverbial for their want of it. They served the purpose of frightening Congress into conforming to their wishes in repealing the embargo, which a large majority deemed a wise, salutary, and necessary measure.

19. "FREE TRADE AND SAILORS' RIGHTS."

These words were one of the war-cries of the Democratic party before and during the War of 1812. They had a special significance, calculated to arouse the American feeling. France

forbade all nations, by her Berlin and Milan Decrees, to trade with Great Britain, and threatened seizure and condemnation as a consequence of violating them; but, after a short time, she made our country an exception. Great Britain not only threatened, but actually seized and condemned our ships for trading with France, by her orders in council. It was trade freed from these decrees and orders that was referred to in the above motto. The war opened that trade which we continue to enjoy to this day. We now emphatically enjoy "free trade," so far as interference by other nations is concerned.

The expression" sailors' rights" had a widely-different origin. Great Britain has ever held that her native-born subjects cannot, in any way, throw off their allegiance. Her maxim is, "Once a subject, always a subject." This assumption we have ever controverted. When her subjects come to us and become naturalized, they become American citizens, owing her no allegiance, but entitled to protection from our Government. Governor Marcy's Martin Koszta letter to the Austrian minister will ever stand as a monument of his and our nation's fame. In addition, Great Britain claimed the right, and had acted upon it, time out of mind, that under the king's prerogative she had unquestioned authority to impress British subjects wherever found, on or within prescribed limits of the sea, and to force them into her naval service, provided they were or had been seamen. She further claimed, and practically asserted, her right to do so, to enter American ships and take from thence all such persons as she claimed as her subjects. In practice, her naval officers often insisted that speaking the English language was prima facie evidence of the party being a British subject, and it devolved upon him to prove the contrary. Hence, it was not strange that disputes arose as to whether the person claimed was a British subject or not. The whole claim set up by the British was disputed, and "sailors' rights" to sail free in our vessels were insisted upon by us. This principle of freedom and protection was clearly within the Democratic theory, and necessary to enable men to pursue happiness in their own way. The Democrats were willing, the embargo having been abandoned in a panic, to go to war

with the most powerful nation on earth, to maintain "free trade and sailors' rights." When this question came fairly up between us and Great Britain, the Federal party, without openly and broadly sustaining her, did so indirectly in a variety of ways, thus furnishing evidence of a disposition to excuse if not to defend her, when they admitted that she was actually in the wrong. We give a few examples to illustrate the truth of our remark, first giving a statement by Mr. John Quincy Adams, made as early as 1808, showing the number which had then been impressed. In his letter to Mr. Otis, Mr. Adams said:

“Examine the official returns from the Department of State. They give the names of between four and five thousand men impressed since the commencement of the present war, of which not one-fifth part were British subjects. The number of naturalized Americans could not amount to one-tenth. I hazard little in saying, that more than three-fourths were native Americans. If it be said that some of these men, though appearing on the face of the returns to be American citizens, were really British subjects, and had fraudulently procured their protections, I reply, that this number must be far exceeded by the cases of citizens impressed which never reached the Department of State. American consul in London estimates the number of impressments during the war at nearly three times the amount of the names returned."

The

In 1798 the commander of a British squadron in the WestIndies seized and detained a part of a fleet of American merchantvessels on their way to Havana, under convoy of the war-sloop Baltimore. He even sent on board this sloop-of-war and took five or six of her crew, claiming them as British subjects. He was not content to seize on board the merchant-vessels, but he must aggravate the insult by taking from a vessel-of-war. This act, if it had been generally known, would have set the friends of "freetrade and sailors' rights" in a blaze; although known to the then administration, it was not even made the subject of a communication to Congress.

The ultra-Federalists insisted that the number of impressments had been very small. A committee of the Massachusetts Legis