His wit was ready; his ridicule, on proper occasions, pointed and satirical; and his power of holding people in laughter uncommon. Some, indeed, thought he was farcical on subjects that required seriousness; but to people very solemn, yet stupid and conceited, he would allow himself to say, "Brother, explain the matter; when I comprehend the subject, I'll preach about it." Towards every truly good and honest man, however simple, he could shew the greatest indulgence: but coxcombs, particularly when in black, were the abhorrence of his soul.

On one point, he was rather decisive. Priesthood, in his estimation, was the grand adversary, or, to use his own language," the great black devil," whom all good non-cons should oppose. Had he known how, he would have destroyed this enemy: yet with priests he could live in agreeable intimacy, and interchange ideas. Blest with a talent for sprightly conversation, and possessed of much general knowledge, he was courted by wise men, and his condescension rendered him accessible to the weakest. Called, in the discharge of his duty, to intimacy with persons of various occupations, he quired a peculiar art in turning their visits to account, so that different mechanics, when discoursing with him on their particular callings, enquired, "Whence did this man derive his knowledge?" In the constitution of his mind, and the general turn of his manners, he was a mixture of Rousseau and Socrates: his admirers pronounced him a disciple of Jesus; yet some thought he took a few lessons from Chesterfield to an uncommon degree, he could pay adulation and could endure it: before knaves he was reserved; but he could flatter fools.

As a teacher of religion, he was an unique: his voice was uncommonly harmonious; and his eyes were in constant motion; he used to study the countenances, and the circumstances of his audience. His best sermons rose out of the occasion, and his images were drawn from familiar objects. This mode of address has been particularly noticed by Sir Isaac Newton, and others, as agreeable to the practice of the east, and the conduct of Jesus. Hence there appeared great animation in his discourses, and an ease, remote from the pedantry of preaching, and a display of knowledge. The clerical appearance, and even the ministerial character, he by no means approved; on the contrary, he made them the subject of his frequent raillery, as well in private circles as in the pulpit. His wish was, to lead people to think, and to act, for themselves: at the same time, no man possessed greater power over a congregation. In many respects, therefore, he was somewhat accommodating; and without affecting to govern, his sway over his audience was irresistible. He appeared no where to more advantage, than among the poorest of his flock. Each Sunday he devoted the intervals, betwixt morning and evening service, to friendly intercourse; and being fond of a pipe, though he was never a drinker, he used to get his poor people round him at an old widow woman's house, near the meeting here he gratified himself in hearing their distresses, in answering their diffi culties, and, to the best of his power, in relieving their wants.'

For

For many curious extracts from Mr. Robinson's letters and private papers, for a full account of his writings, and for various facts and observations indirectly connected with the Memoirs, we must refer our readers to the work; and we will venture to assure even those, who may not entirely approve the sentiments either of Mr. R. or of his biographer, that they will find much to admire, both in the character itself, and in the manner in which it is exhibited.

E.

ART. III. A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles concerning Man, the World, and the Deity, submitted to the Consideration of the Learned. By F. A. Nitsch, late Lecturer of the Latin Language and Mathematics in the Royal Friderician College at Königsberg, and Pupil of Professor Kant. 8vo. pp. 234. 5s. Boards. Downes. 1796.

THE

HE metaphysical writings of Professor Kant, which have successively appeared in Germany from the year 1770 to this time, have in that country attracted such general attention, that an inquiry into the real value of his system is become an object of something more than mere curiosity. If an unreasonable prejudice has arisen against it, from the obscurity which almost unavoidably attends the communication of new speculations on abstract subjects; and if it has been found, in reality, to contain the genuine elements of theoretical philosophy; it is highly desirable that the English nation should reap the benefit of this philosopher's lucubrations in a correct translation. If, on the contrary,-as we several years ago concluded from the perusal of one of the Professor's principal works, intitled, Kritik der reinen Vernunfft, or Criticism of pure Reason,and as we are still inclined to suspect,-this philosopher, like many of his predecessors, has bewildered himself in a labyrinth of words, and, instead of presenting the world with a new discovery, has given to old metaphysical ideas a new appear ance, in a technical language of his own, it may be of great importance that the fallacy of his principles should be detected. The public is, therefore, in any issue of the question, obliged to Mr. Nitsch, who has been one of M. Kant's pupils, and who professes to have studied his philosophy with great attention, for undertaking to introduce the English reader to a more intimate acquaintance with the Kantian philosophy, than could hitherto be obtained without an accurate knowlege of the German tongue.

The present publication is merely intended as introductory to Professor Kant's system. Mr. N. does not here undertake to establish the principles of this philosophy by a connected series

of

of arguments: he only professes to state such particulars as may inform his readers what they may expect from the study of the Professor's writings; and to put him in possession of such preliminary knowlege, as shall prove useful to him whenever a translation of them shall appear. For this purpose, he commences with an examination of that series of philosophical opinions which has given occasion to the Kantian principles. A concise but distinct comparative view is exhibited of the variety of philosophical opinions which have been embraced, and which exist to this day, concerning the substances of the world; the bounds of the universe in time and space; the first cause of all that exists; the nature of the percipient, or the soul of man; and the freedom of human volitions. The manner in which these several systems operated on the mind of Professor Kant, to prompt his inquiries concerning the nature and extent of the human faculties and the bounds of human knowlege, is well described. The essential difference between him and former philosophers, in their mode of searching for a general criterion of what is knowable, is this: they endeavoured to ascertain the possible extent of human knowlege from the nature and properties of the things to be known; he directed his inquiries immediately to the powers of the human mind, and, abstractedly from all particular knowlege, and individual objects, examined the properties of knowlege in general, or the common nature of all our knowlege. In order to exhibit the method, which the Professor used, to discover the common characteristics of human knowlege, Mr. N. gives, in a connected series, a summary of his leading principles; referring the arguments on which they rest to a subsequent work, to be intitled An Analysis of the perceptive and reasoning Faculties of the Human Mind, according to Kant's Principles."

The ideas, or the terms, of these Principles, have so much novelty, that we could not communicate to our readers a distinct idea of them, without copying about a third part of the volume. They are, however, in some measure coincident with the statement which we gave of the Kantian system in our Rev. N.S. vol. x. p. 524. et seq. Referring the farther consideration of the system to a future occasion, when it shall be more fully laid open in an entire translation, or in Mr. Nitsch's intended work, we shall at present only remark that we are not without apprehension that the system may, after all, be found to be rather a new metaphysical vocabulary, than a more perfect discovery of the process of the human intellect in its operations. This apprehension, however, we shall readily abandon; if, on farther inquiry, it shall appear that the Kan

tian system is, in fact, an important advancement in the philosophy of the human mind.

In the last part of this preliminary treatise, Mr. N. remarks on the influence which this new philosophy is likely to have on science in general, and on religion and morals in particular. On the subject of morals, after having enumerated and refuted other systems, he thus explains and vindicates the Kantian

tenets:

Principle. ACT ACCORDING TO THOSE PRINCIPLES ONLY OF

WHICH THOU CANST WILL THAT THEY OUGHT TO BECOME THE GENERAL LAWS ON CONDUCT AMONG ALL REASONABLE BEINGS.

This Principle is first formal, for it recommends no other object than the mere form of reason; it is universal, because it extends to all reasonable beings; and it is necessary, because the contrary of it cannot be even conceived, without destroying all thought of a moral law. An universal law of conduct is necessary; for a number of free actions, not directed by universal laws, must necessarily contradict each other, and throw the whole into confusion.

The reader will now find, that the difference between the first moral principle of KANT, and those of other philosophers, is, the former is built upon reason alone, the latter upon something which is different from reason; the first is formal, universal, and necessary; the latter are material, particular, and not strictly necessary; the first says, Let us, on all occasions, be morally good, whatever may be the consequence. The latter are not content with this; they propose some particular end, and force reason into the servitude of sense; for whatever object or end distinct from reason be recommended, it can only be known by experience, and only be desired as far as it excites pleasing sensations or makes us happy. In such a case we do not strive to realise the general laws of reason; but to acquire pleasing sensations, and reason must work as a servant to propose the best means of obtaining them; and, in being forced to do this, it is a slave, and not free; the consequence of which is, that we become slaves also, and make ourselves dependant upon things which change with the weather, and very often do not stand at our command.

It is perfectly right to strive after pleasing sensations or happiness; for the desire of happiness is essential to human nature, and can only be destroyed with the destruction of human nature. But man discovers another desire as essential to his nature as that of happiness. He wants not only to be happy, but to be also a morally good man, that is to say, to keep up the natural freedom and independence of his will. Every man has, therefore, two great ends, in which all his exertions and desires ultimately centre, and these are happiness and independence, or virtue. Both ends taken together, form the great and complete object of all human desires or the highest good, and every man must necessarily desire both virtue and happiness as long as he retains the nature of his mind and body. The highest good, therefore, consists not in mere virtue, as the Stoics believed, nor in mere happiness, as the Epicureans affirmed, but in the union of both. REV. JAN. 1797

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The highest good must be supposed by every man who will not fall into contradiction with himself, as practically possible, that is, as something which it is possible to realise. For if it be not practically possible, our desires of virtue and happiness are directed towards something which is impossible, or what is the same, they are altogether absurd. And this, I hope, none will suppose. If, therefore, it be granted, that the highest good is practically possible, those conditions, under which alone it can be so, must likewise be granted. Now, it is clear, that when happiness is made the road to virtue, all virtue is destroyed, and disorder and confusion is the immediate consequence, which can neither be called happiness nor the highest good; whereas if virtue be made the road to happiness, happiness will not be destroyed, but only confined to general laws which preserve it against extravagance, and give it consistency. Hence it follows, that the highest good is practically possible, only upon the condition that VIRTUE BE THE CAUSE OF HAPPINESS, and that man, before he strives after any particular set of pleasing sensations, should always reflect, first, whether the moral law would permit him the enjoyment of them or not.'

We can easily conceive that, in the high opinion which Mr. N. has formed of the Kantian system, the attachment of the pupil may have in some measure biassed the judgment of the philosopher: nevertheless, we acknowlege him to be an inge nious and able advocate; and we think his work entitled to an attentive perusal, from all who are competent judges of the subject.

E.

ART. IV. Musa Etonenses: seu carminum delectus nunc primum in lucem editus. 8vo. 2 Vols. 155. Boards. Pote. Eton. 1795. WE E have long considered the great public schools of this country as most useful national institutions: more useful even, in some respects, than our noble universities. In the latter, as they are now regulated, little would be effected in the progress of literature, did not the former lay down the substantial principles. There, if a young man has no serious inclination to study, he may be as idle as he pleases: here, he must study, whether he will or not, and must be a complete dunce if he does not study to some valuable purpose.-Here, he acquires a certain classical taste; which, if afterward cultivated with care and application, will ever distinguish him from the rest of his fellow-citizens, whatever profession he may follow, or in whatever line of life he be destined to move. In fact, we have seldom seen a man of shining talents, and transcendant abilities, in the senate or at the bar, on the bench or in the pulpit, who has not had his primary education in some one of these seminaries.

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