66. Acts of 1892, No. 29, relating to process.
67. Acts of 1892, No. 55. relating to support of paupers..
68. Acts of 1886, No. 42, relating to paupers......
69. Acts of 1855, No. 89, incorporating the village of Montpelier..... 480
Acts of 1884, No. 140, rights of married women..
Acts of 1886, No. 93, s. 6, State Board of Health...
Acts of 1882, No. 82, s. 11, State Board of Health..
Acts of 1891, No. 1, s. 4, tax returns by corporations...
Acts of 1882, No. 1, s. 33, abolishing State Equalizing Board.... 662
75.
Acts of 1892, No. 82, State Board of Health...
76. Acts of 1888, No. 156, trotting for wager...
77. Acts of 1884, No. 79, hunting or fishing on prohibited lands..... 579
78. Acts of 1884, No. 7, to whom real estate shall be set in grand list. 676
79. Acts of 1880, No, 90, s. I, collection of taxes by treasurer....... 678
STENOGRAPHER. See PERJURY 2.
STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT.
STIPULATION. See ERROR 3, 4.
SUBROGATION. See CHATTEL MORTAGE 8.
SUPPORT. See DEED 3; EJECTMENT 2, 3; EVIDENCE 10,
II, 12, 13, 14, 15.
SURETY. See EQUITY 5; MORTGAGE 1.
The charter of the village of Montpelier provided that the
bailiffs might at any time before the voting of a tax make a grand
list upon the basis that the town grand list comprised within the
limits of the village should constitute such grand list, and that the
bailiffs should deduct therefrom the real estate lying without the
limits of the village, and further that the bailiffs should make out
and deliver to the collector a rate bill for the collection of any tax
duly voted. The bailiffs assessed the tax in question upon prop-
erty and persons within the limits of the village upon the basis of
the town grand list, and delivered the rate bill to the defendant as
collector, who receipted for and proceeded under the same.
Held, that in a suit upon the collector's bond for not collecting
and paying over the tax, the objection that no separate grand list
for the village was prepared before the voting of the tax could not
be urged. Montpelier v. Clarke et al., 479.
In a suit against a collector for not paying over taxes
actually collected, it is no defence that the grand list was in-
valid.
3.
A tax collector and his sureties are liable in an action upon
his bond, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties,
for uncollected taxes, unless some valid excuse is shown for their
non-collection.
4. In a suit upon a tax collector's bond for not collecting and
paying over the taxes for a particular year, it is not a defence that
he did pay over the money collected on that bill to apply on previ-
ous bills, and therefore no error to reject evidence of that fact. Ib.
5. The true date when the listers were sworn and deposited the
quadrennial appraisal in the town clerk's office may be shown by
parol, although there is attached to the appraisal, as deposited, a
certificate that the oath was administered on a day later than that
within which the list should have been completed and filed.
Wilmot v. Lathrop et al., 671.
6. Quere, whether this would be so if the tax-payer, relying
upon the date attached to the appraisal, had lost the right of ap-
peal. Ib.
7. No record of the preliminary oath of the listers need be
made by the town clerk.
8. Real estate, conveyed by deed by the terms of which the
grantor reserves the use and possession, is properly set in the
grand list to the grantor as the owner thereof.
9. A mere error in computation will not invalidate a grand list
nor a particular tax.
IO. Held, that it sufficiently appeared from the town records
that the tax had been voted under the proper article in the warn-
ing. Ib.
II. A tax bill delivered to the treasurer in accordance with s.
1, No. 90, Acts 1880, need not be certified by the selectmen, and
what it is may be shown by parol.
See SCHOOLS I, 2, 3, 4; COLLECTOR OF TAXES; GRAND LIST;
PLEADING 2, 3.
A part owner of real estate, who redeems it from a tax sale,
has a lien upon the entire property for the amount so advanced,
and his co-tenants cannot maintain a petition for partition until
they have paid him their proportion of the same. Wilmot v.
Lathrop et al., 671.
I. An abutter who has consented to the erection of a line of
telegraph poles along the street in front of his premises, cannot
revoke that license after the poles have been set, but before the
wires have been strung. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bullard,
2. By consenting to the erection of the line, the land owner
waived any claim he might have for damages, and it is therefore
immaterial whether the construction of a telegraph line along a
public highway imposes an additional burden, and, if so, whether
one who does not own the fee of the street can claim compensa-
tion. Ib.
3. Persons having a reversionary interest in the premises are
not necessary parties, for consent of the defendant did not give an
easement, but a mere license. Ib.
I. The officers of a town cannot bind it for the expense of
carrying on a suit in the event of which it has no direct interest.
Sheldon & Cushman v. Bennington, 580.
2. A town has no such interest in a suit for divorce between
husband and wife where the wife has lived for the last nine years
with a daughter in Massachusetts and is still so living, although
as a result of the suit the wife may become chargeable to the town
as a pauper. Ib.
A plea to an action for trespass by cattle which alleges that
the animals escaped into the plaintiff's close through a gate in the
division fence between the plaintiff and the defendant, which was
sufficient to stop cattle, and which the plaintiff had for many years
maintained for that purpose, but which upon the occasion in ques-
tion he had torn down, and through which the cattle had thereby
escaped into the plaintiff's close, is good, althought it does not
show that the plaintiff was under any legal obligation to maintain
the gate. Carpenter v. Cook, 102.
A defendant waives his motion for a verdict made at the
close of the plaintiff's case by putting in testimony upon his own
part, and if at the close of his own testimony he renews his motion
for a verdict, but puts the same upon a different ground, only that
ground upon which he places his second motion will be considered
in the supreme court. Swerdferger and wife v. Hopkins, 136.
2. The defendant town, having in contemplation the construc-
tion of a bridge, contracted with the plaintiff to take rubble from
his ledge at a certain price. The town did not construct the
bridge, but subsequently contracted it, and the contractors took
stone from the plaintiff's ledge and settled with him for the same
in part. Held, that a verdict was properly directed for the de-
fendant, for, under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff was
bound to know that the contractors in taking the stone were acting
for themselves, and not as the agents of the town.
Ladd v.
Grand Isle, 172.
If counsel transcends the right of argument it is the duty of
the trial court to stop him; and if it omits to do so, that is tanta-
mount to a ruling that the remarks are warranted, to which an
exception will lie, without in terms asking and obtaining such
ruling. Magoon v. B. & M. R. Co., 177.
4. Held, that the judgment should be reversed upon the ex-
ception taken to the argument of plaintiff's counsel. Ib.
5. The defendant having introduced evidence of an agreement
between the plaintiff and his sister upon the one part, and the
plaintiff's father upon the other, to pay the note of the father to
the defendant, the testimony of the sister that no such agreement
was made is strictly in rebuttal. Benedict v. Lawrence, 219.
6. There must be an exception to the admission of evidence in
order to raise the question in supreme court; a mere objection is
not enough. State v. Sawyer, 239.
7. The plaintiffs contracted to furnish a monument of a certain
design and of given dimensions. It was conceded that the dimen-
sions of the monument built were different from those called for
by the contract. Held, that the court should have ruled as matter
of law that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, and that it
was error to submit to the jury whether the dimensions used were
necessary to give due proportion to the specified design. Cutler
& Burnham v. Dix, 347.
S. A motion for a new trial is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court, and the supreme court cannot revise the exercise of
that discretion unless some question of law is reserved. State v.
9. A party should state the precise grounds on which he bases
his motion for a verdict, and if he does not, the trial court may
well disregard it. Bickford v. Trav. Ins. Co., 418.
IO. The extent of the cross-examination upon a given subject
is largely in the discretion of the trial court. Held, no error to
refuse to permit further cross-examination in this case.
State v.
II. For the purpose of showing that the words "Rock Island
Whip Co." referred to a former company, and not to the one in
which the orator and defendant, St. Pierre, were partners, the
orator testified that the lawyer who drew the articles had said in
the presence of himself and St. Pierre that the words had that
meaning. Thereupon St. Pierre was inquired of whether he ever
heard such a suggestion, and the answer was taken subject to the
orator's exception, that the question was leading and incompetent.
Held, no error, for, so far as the witness was called to contradict
the orator, he might be inquired of leadingly, and as to the fur-
ther scope of the answer, the orator was not harmed. Norton v.
Parsons et al., 526.
12. A witness may be asked whether he heard certain words or
"that in substance," for this refers to the substance of the words
and not their meaning. Ib.
13. When the objection to a question is such that it can be
obviated, correct practice requires that the ground of the objection
should be stated. Ib.
14. Held, that the orator's right of cross-examination was not
abridged in case of a witness who had answered that he could not
tell, before the master ruled that he need not answer. Norton v.
Parsons et al., 526.
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