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The Government of the United States, National, State, and Local
William Bennett Munro
Úplné zobrazení - 1919
adminis administration adopted Alexander Hamilton amendment American cities appointed Articles of Confederation authority ballot become bicameral bill of attainder bills body Cabinet candidates chamber charter chief chosen citizens civil service colonies commerce commission commissioners committee common Congress constitution convention corporations delegates departments district duties election electors England England town established executive federal courts Federalist functions governor hand House impeachment important influence initiative and referendum interest issue judges judicial jurisdiction jury lative lature leaders legis legislature Lord Bryce majority Massachusetts matters mayor measure ment methods moreover municipal national government nomination political parties popular population practice President procedure question reason referendum regulation representatives responsibility revenue rules Senate session spoils system stitution Supreme Court taxes term thirteen colonies tion to-day town meeting townships treaty United usually various veto vote voters whole
Strana 313 - There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty.
Strana 25 - States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union...
Strana 214 - But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.
Strana 312 - Among the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides...
Strana 219 - That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that ; the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very means, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied.
Strana 18 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Strana 390 - The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments it...
Strana 147 - A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained.
Strana 48 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.