Por último un notable estadista colombiano, el Sr. Dr. Carlos E. Restrepo, desde su catédra de la Universidad de Antioquia, expone y acoge como suya la teoría desenvuelta por Faguet, la cual consiste en una magistratura nombrada por sí misma. ¿Cómo? Fácilmente, por ejemplo: todos los magistrados elegirán la Corte, la Corte nombrará todos los magistrados. Los magistrados elegirán los miembros de la Corte a medida que ocurran las extinciones. Estos serán, pues (1) nombrados por personas competentes; (2) independientes del lado del poder; (3) independientes del lado de los partidos; (4) nombrados por la magistratura de todo el país y por consiguiente, representantes de su espíritu general.

Por encima de todos los argumentos, está la lógica de un sistema, está la fuerza incontrastable de los principios aceptados como base y fundamento de una doctrina, porque no es posible salir de este dilema, o aceptamos la teoría de la separación de los poderes tal como la aceptó ayer la ciencia política, esto es, sin distinciones ni limitaciones, o nos adherimos a quienes la rechazaron por entrañar una concepción mecánica del Estado.

Los lógicos serán quienes al aceptar el principio aceptan todas sus consecuencias.

Un constitucionalista de tanto relieve como lo es sin duda alguna Eugenio M. de Hostos parece, en ocasiones que acepta, como medio de conciliación, lo que viene a constituir la antítesis de la democracia representativa, y ello porque ve la reforma previa del sistema electoral, fundada en el reconocimiento de la función electoral del poder, es sin embargo, demasiado lejana, pero como no puede ser ilógico quien tan sabiamente ha desenvuelto la teoría científica de las diversas funciones de poder, quien con admirable método ha desarrollado la concepción sistemática de la ciencia constitucional, lo que hace es anticiparse a cualquiera objeción en lo que respecta a la reforma de la función electiva del poder, para fiar tal contingencia a la siempre urgente organización judicial.

Mas como no se trata de resolver con datos experimentales el problema, dice el eminente sociólogo, sino de saber doctrinalmente cual es el medio, concorde con el sistema representativo, de formar las magistraturas judiciales, tenemos que ir a la fuente de las doctrinas.

¿La función judicial es una verdadera función del poder social? ¿Lo es? Pues debe constituirse como las demás funciones de poder. Las demás funciones de poder, ¿por que se constituyen y deben constituirse electoralmente? ¿No es por que la elección es el medio único de la delegación y porque la delegación es el símbolo de la representación? Pues la función judicial debe ser electiva para que, siendo efectivamente delegada, concierte con el sistema de representación que integra.

En principio, pues, los cargos judiciales son electivos, y el juez debería tener que agradecer la magistratura más que a sus propios méritos por el cuerpo electoral.

Hasta aquí el pensador antillano. No se contradice cuando afirma que los constituyentes americanos salvaron el escollo de la designación de los jueces federales al consagrar que esta facultad se acordara al Presidente con el asentimiento del Senado, al mismo tiempo que sostiene que todas las funciones del poder sean electivas puesto que son delegadas las funciones que todos des empeñan, ya que reconoce que aquellos hallaron una solución a cambio de una inconsecuencia.

"La doctrina pide lógica," y el nombramiento de los jueces tal como lo idearon los constituyentes americanos, es una mezcla de independencia con un sistema de balanzas y contrapesos, como lo enseña el Profesor Azcárate, en el cual se contrapone un poder a otro poder.

Toda función que no es ejercida por la colectividad social misma, no es más que una delegación, de donde se sigue que esta función debe ser electiva, revocable, temporal.

Se advierte, pues, que este revolucionario va más lejos que el sabio catedrático de Santo Domingo, pero nos parece que este último está más en lo cierto cuando resuelve en sentido afirmativo lo que para el primero constituye una antinomia, conviene a saber si la inamovilidad es compatible con la delegación.

Hostos dice: "desde luego que no, en ningún cargo exclusivamente político." Pero la judicatura no lo es. Eminentemente político, en cuanto expresión de una función de poder, es preminentemente social, no ya sólo por su alcance (que en ese sentido son sociales todas las funciones de poder) sino por la incesante continuidad de su influencia, en la vida individual y colectiva de la sociedad nacional y de cada una de las sociedades particulares, familia, municipio que la componen.

Lo que no sería compatible con el sistema representativo, en cuanto a la función de poder, lo es en cuanto la magistratura judicial tiene una trascendencia inmediata, continua, parcial y total, en la vida de la sociedad.

Los jueces deben ser inamovibles. Esta es una condición de seguridad e independencia en el ejercicio del poder judicial.

Los que discuten estos principios y sostienen que los jueces deben ser nombrados temporalmente parten generalmente de este error: creen que la inamovilidad es una negación de la soberanía del pueblo. Cuando estos piensan así es porque evidentemente confunden la soberanía del pueblo con la libertad. La bondad del principio de la inamovilidad la encontramos confirmada en España, cuando pidieron al rey en 1442 que sus jueces fueran inamovibles porque los reyes destituían frecuentemente a los jueces cuando no les convenían. Con lo cual los aragoneses buscaban una protección contra la autoridad real.

Como si al través de los siglos perdurara el espíritu del sistema judicial de Roma durante la República, muchos ven en la inamovilidad de los magistrados los peligros que los emperadores temían de la influencia de los prefectos pretorianos, y de ahí que en algunos países se cambien las magistrados cada cuatro o cada seis años, como en Roma se cambiaba anualmente.

Era que no había entonces, escribe Lord Mackenzie, una clase parecida a los jueces de Inglaterra nombrados por la corona que tienen sus cargos ad vitam anteculpam, y están educados para ser intérpretes de la ley, haciendo de esta la ocupación de toda su vida y de esa magistratura que debe su elevado carácter y su sabiduría a la inamovilidad de los jueces, que data del año de 1688.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA.

Los trabajos geográficos de la Casa de Contratación, por Manuel de la Puente y Olea. Nota, pág. 19, tomada de la Colección Navarrete, tomo 2, pág. 359.

Histoire de S.-Domingue, par P. F. X. de Charlevoix.

Tome I, Livre IV,

Conferencia dictada en Madrid el 24 de marzo de 1891, por el Marqués de Hoyos.

Conferencia inaugural, pronunciada en el Ateneo de Madrid el día 11 de febrero de 1891, por D. Antonio Cánova del Castillo.

Trabajos geográficos de la Casa de Contratación.

Referencia a la vida y

escritos de Fr. Bartolomé de las Casas, por D. Antonio M. Fabié. Tomo I, pág. 21. Madrid.

Historia de Santo-Domingo, por D. Antonio Delmonte y Tejada. Tomo II, pág. 126. Sto. Domingo, 1890.

El Derecho Internacional Hispanoamericano, por el Dr. Rafael F. Seijás. Tomo IV. Caracas, 1884.

Le Droit International Codifié et sa Sanction Juridique par Pasquale Fiore. Paris, 1890.

Haiti: Son Histoire et ses Détracteurs, par J. N. Léger. New York and Washington, 1907, pág. 106; Ibid, pág. 121.

Imprenta de la Presidencia del Estado Independiente de Haití Español, 1821. Lecciones de Derecho Constitutional, por Eugenio M. Hostos. Sto. Domingo,

1887.

Reconstitución de la Magistratura en la introducción al Manuel de Droit Civil, por Acolley. Tomo I, pág. LXVI.

The CHAIRMAN. The Library of Congress planned a few years ago a series of books regarding foreign law. The plan has been perfected, and at least two volumes have already appeared. The intention is to give to American lawyers, in a language which they can understand, some account of the system of law of the several countries, and also some account of the legal history and literature of those countries, with full reference to the books which should be used by a lawyer who wishes to obtain either an elementary view or a very practical and thorough knowledge of the law. From what I have said you perceive that this is an important undertaking. The plan, I believe, was the creation of Dr. Borchard, librarian of the United States Supreme Court library. The volume on German Law was prepared by him. We are now to have the pleasure of listening to a paper on the general question by Dr. Borchard.

SOME LESSONS FROM THE CIVIL LAW.

By EDWIN M. BORCHARD,

Yale School of Law, New Haven, Conn.

The purpose of this brief article is not so much to set forth any specific institutions disclosed by a study of the civil law, as to point out some of those defects of our own system which are accentuated by comparison with the civil law, defects due to the methods rather than the substance of the common law. There is no desire to urge such a radical and perhaps impossible step as the substitution of civil-law methods for our own; but in the consideration of plans for the improvement of our law, it may be profitable to observe that the other great legal system has avoided some of the most obvious defects under which we labor, and the suggestion of a partial remedy may be ventured.

The civil law, as is well known, has had a history of some 2,000 years, and in its present physical form, so to speak, its general principles have been codified into various codes. The modern codification movement may be said to have begun with the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the Prussian Landrecht of the eighteenth century, and the French codes of the early nineteenth century. From France it has spread to most of the other civil-law countries, coming by way of Spain and Portugal to the countries of Latin America. These codes include in all cases a civil code, a commercial code, a penal code, and codes of civil and criminal procedure; and with the development of eco

nomic life, following the tradition, other codes have been promulgated in various countries, such as an industrial code, a mining code, a maritime code, a rural code, a military code, and other codifications of different branches of the law. The most recent development of the civil law is contained in those remarkable monuments of codification to which some of the greatest legal minds of modern times have contributed, namely, the German and the Swiss civil codes. The most prominent feature of all these codes is that they have laid down certain general rules governing legal relations, leaving to the courts the duty of applying the rules and filling in the details. Incidentally the development of this system has drawn and continually draws to its service the best legal minds of all the civil-law countries, and judges in their decisions call to their aid the best critical thought of the legal world. The German civil code, which for 22 years received in its preparation the concentrated constructive criticism of one of the ablest benches and bars in all the world, supplemented by that of economists and business men, is a practical demonstration of what legal science may contribute to the development of a well-rounded, practical, and efficient system of rules for the conduct of life and the adjustment of interests.

In civil-law countries the decisions of courts are not binding precedents, but when supporting a well-reasoned principle have naturally great persuasive force. While attributing less authority to single decisions than Anglo-American courts, a consistent current of decisions or settled "practice" is regarded as almost conclusive authority. As a matter of fact, there is practically no civillaw country at the present day in which the decisions of its highest courts are not regularly reported, and both briefs and opinions cite previous decisions. Certainly one of the greatest advantages which such countries enjoy is a large degree of certainty in the law, which saves much litigation and contributes to the development of a definite system. Not that differences of opinion on numerous points of law do not exist; but the margin of uncertainty is, comparatively speaking, small.

A visit to some 20 countries in which the civil law prevails and a certain degree of contact with the law and the lawyers of those countries may permit one to express, by way of comparison, a certain general opinion concerning the methods of our own legal system, which, in the writer's opinion, hamper its responsiveness to the social needs of the times. Our law is largely what judges have made it and is the result of rules they have applied in the adjudication of cases. The guiding principle of our legal method, of course, is stare decisis. It is based on the theory that when a court has once laid down a rule of law in one or more cases the rule will no longer be open to examination or to a new ruling by the same tribunal or by those bound to follow its decisions. This maxim involves no reference to the correctness or fallacy of the precedent required to be followed. At a time when precedents were comparatively few, when economic life had not reached its present complexity, when the great landmarks of the common law were still being worked out, when judges all had to think out their opinions, the system was undoubtedly well adapted to the people for whom it was designed to do justice. But at the present day conditions have completely changed, and stare decisis nas, it is believed, outlived its usefulness. Reported decisions have enormously multiplied. The American case law to-day is to be found in some nine thousand volumes of decided cases, with three to four hundred added each year. The attempt to retain the old system in the presence of these new conditions has resulted in chaos in the law and in an inefficiency in the administration of justice and an economic waste to the community which are incalculable in their scope.

The rule of stare decisis is based upon the importance of stability and certainty in the law, which, as Lieber said, was next in importance to its justice. But with the "countless myriad of precedents" supporting contrary sides of so many questions, it is not unfair to say that stability and certainty, the reason for the rule, have practically disappeared. And the manner in which precedents have been used, or abused, has further destroyed the value of the rule. Instead of adhering to the original maxim that only previous decisions in the same jurisdiction are binding precedents, many of our courts and our lawyers, when they deem it desirable, draw upon the decisions of any other jurisdiction in support of a conclusion. Nor is the distinction between ratio decidendi and dictum properly maintained.

But most curious development is the varying degree of consistency with which different courts have adhered to the rule. Many courts have considered themselves bound by former decisions although frankly expressing doubts as to whether they were legally defensible. Other courts have considered it their duty to follow decisions even if thereby they perpetuated error, regarding the legislature as the only source of relief. Still other courts, in the endeavor to uphold the principle and yet depart from a prior decision considered erroneous, have introduced the insidious process of distinguishing and limiting, which, however much its legitimate use may contribute to the growth of the law, has been carried to a point at which it creates confusion and uncertainty. While professing to uphold a rule of law they actually pare away all its substantial support. But few courts have recognized expressly that it was not the purpose of stare decisis to perpetuate judicial error.

One of the results of stare decisis has been a lack of flexibility in the interpretation of the law, notwithstanding its early success in this regard. The common-law rules, as has been demonstrated during the last decade, could not accommodate themselves to the social needs of the present day as now expressed in much of our "social legislation" and statutory repeal of common-law rules was in some cases necessary to secure judicial recognition for such legislation. While it is well that changes in the law should be slow, there must be some measure of harmony between the progress of the law and the development of society. The principles of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule, åll favorable to the employer, with the "due process' clause of our constitutions, were responsible for much maladjustment and long delay in the recognition of the worker's rights.

But the slavish worship of precedent has had other results. The system and the courts demand that to sustain a proposition of law previous supporting decisions must be cited. To enable the lawyer to examine the immense mass of judicial law, enterprising publishing companies have prepared voluminous digests which are designed to make his task easy. Incidentally, it may be said that it is not the principle of law which is emphasized in this digesting of cases, but rather the similarity of fact, and it may be added that by the customary treatment of a case in minute cross-sections, the broad principle of law is often completely lost. The result of the system is that in practice the lawyer to whom a case is presented for litigation immediately feels called upon to search for similar or analogous cases, and it is commonly stated that with 50 or more jurisdictions in this country now handing down decisions, there are few points of law doubtful enough to require litigation in which decisions on both sides can not be found.

No better picture of the place now occupied by judicial decisions in our legal system has perhaps ever been presented than that drawn recently by one of