Government of another country as being due to its nationals, but that this agreement is not applicable when the debtor State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer of arbitration, prevents any compromise from being agreed upon, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award." 1

The conference recommended the extension of the work of the Bureau of American Republics so as to furnish commercial information and promote the extension of commerce and the knowledge of the natural resources of the various American Republics. It recommended the general adoption of a sanitary convention. It again recommended the construction of the links necessary to complete the Pan American Railway, and continued the permanent committee on this subject which had been appointed by the Mexican conference. It recommended such action on the part of the several American Republics as would recognize in each the validity of diplomas conferring degrees in the liberal professions which had been granted by universities and colleges in any of the States represented at the conference.

It discussed and recommended measures to unify the administration of association is designated as the Union of American Republics.

2

After the third conference the Bureau of American Republics was reorganized and its title changed to the Pan American Union. The governing association is designated as the Union of American Republics."

Its usefulness was greatly extended. There is no place in which such extensive information respecting all the American Republics can be obtained as in the building of the Pan American Union.

In conformity with the desire expressed at the third conference, Secretary Root and the American Governments represented at the first conference of The Hague requested that when the second conference should be called all the American Republics should be invited. This request was complied with, and when the second conference met at The Hague in 1907 it consisted of delegates from 44 independent nations instead of 26.

The American Republics, during the interval between the third and fourth conferences, discussed the conventions which had been recommended by the second and third conferences. The convention agreed upon at the third conference in reference to the status of naturalized citizens was ratified by 13 States-Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Salvador, and the United States.

The convention relating to pecuniary claims had been ratified by 12 StatesChile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Salvador, and the United States.

The convention relating to patents, trade-marks, and copyrights has been ratified by eight States, but inasmuch as the fourth conference recommended changes in this convention, it is unnecessary to go into this subject more in detail.

The convention recommending the codification of international law has been ratified by all the States represented in the third conference except Argentina, Cuba, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela; that respecting the appointment of Pan American committees in the various Republics to cooperate with the central union was approved by all parties to the third conference except Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

1 Choate, 2 Hague Conf., pp. 59-60; Scott, Texas Peace Conferences, pp. 193-198.

2 Report, 4th Conf. Amer. States, p. 9, S. Doc. 744, 61st Cong., 3d sess.

3 Report 4th Conf., p. 101.

The fourth conference was held at Buenos Aires from July 12 to August 30, 1910. By an auspicious coincidence it was held in the year in which four of the South American Republics-Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru— celebrated the centennial of their independence.

The program of this conference was somewhat more limited than that of previous conferences. For example, in the instructions from Secretary Knox the United States Government, while approving "the general principle of pacific settlement of international disputes," objected to the subject of arbitration being discussed at this conference. For this there were various reasons not of a permanent character. One of them arose from the fact that the second Hague convention on this subject had just been concluded and it did not seem wise to discuss the subject further after all the nations had come to a certain agreement concerning it.1

In the opening address Dr. de la Plaza, the Argentine minister of foreign affairs, referred briefly to the previous conferences and used the following language, which is especailly interesting in connection with the subject assigned to Judge Fowler and myself. Referring to the meeting of the first congress, he says:

Nor were there lacking those who suspected that it was proposed to introduce a department in international law creating special principles for the peoples of America. Events and the upright procedure pursued in the successive conferences have nevertheless completely demonstrated the falsity of such imputations.2

He pointed out with great satisfaction the growth of the American Republics during the 20 years that had elapsed since the first conference at Washington. Their population had increased from 120,000,000 to 160,000,000. The grand total of their commerce, including imports and exports, had increased to $6,000,000,000, of which a little more than half belonged to the United States. He then added, referring to the condition of the Central and South American Republics in the early part of the nineteenth century:

This condition of precarious autonomy and liberty of action, and the constant danger of being subjugated or suffering the mutilation of their territory, would have continued among these weak States but for the wise and famous declarations of President Monroe, to which we ought to render due homage.'

Although the American delegation had been instructed not to propose the consideration of any further treaties of arbitration, yet their chairman, Hon. Henry White, in his address at the opening of the conference, which we may well commend with our heart-felt good wishes and prayers to the consideration of the warring nations of Europe, said: "We hope and feel that national aggrandizement and prosperity are to be attained far more readily by friendship than by war."^

* *

In this connection it should be noted that in the interim between the two conferences, Argentina, Brazil, and the United States had joined in offering mediation between Peru and Ecuador after their armies had been mobilized. Chile supported the offer and war was averted. This was the first action taken by any Governments under the mediation provision of the first Hague convention."

The conference recommended the completion of the Pan American Railway from Washington to Buenos Aires. The report of the American delegates is accompanied by a map, which had been prepared by a permanent committee on the subject. It is shown that the total length of the line from Washington to Buenos Aires is 10,211.5 miles. Of this there had been built in 1910 6,612.9 miles, leaving for future construction 4,198.6 miles.1

It recommended the improvement of the steamship service connecting the different Republics, but no definite plan was attempted. In all the discussions in the conferences in regard to the improvements of steamship service, the facts of the comparative distances between European ports and the ports of South America, on one side, and New York and South American ports, on the other. do not appear to have been considered. Very probably they were by the delegates, but I have failed to find any trace of this in the reports. In point of fact the conformation of South America is such that Pernambuco, which is the most easterly port of Brazil, is only 32° of longitude to the west of Liverpool, whereas it is 49° to the east of New York.'

The conference recommended uniformity in customs and consular regulations, in census and commercial statistics, and proposed a general census of all the American Republics to be taken in 1920.

The conference recommended conventions on patents, on trade-marks, and on copyrights.*

The conference carefully considered the subject of the arbitration of pecuniary claims. The treaty which had been signed at Mexico was to expire December 31, 1912. A new treaty was recommended which should continue in force indefinitely, subject to be terminated by any party by giving two years' notice in writing. The arbitration was to be before The Hague tribunal, unless the parties should prefer to create a special jurisdiction. This conventon was ratified by the United States Senate February 1, 1911.5 Finally the conference recommended the interchange of professors among the universities of the countries recommended in the conference.

I have thus endeavored briefly to summarize the action of the fourth international conference of the American States and to mention some of their results. This can not be better expressed than in the words of our great American ambassador and advocate, Mr. Choate:

But the success of conferences is to be weighed and measured, not simply by their direct action, which commands the approval of all the nations, but also, and perhaps even more, by the progress they make in questions still left undecided and subject to further action by diplomacy or by future conferences."

1 Report, pp. 12, 254.

Report, pp. 13, 186, 261. The Merchant Shippers & Ocean Travelers' Atlas, London, 1899, gives the following distances between the several ports: Havre to Montevideo, 6,020; Liverpool to Montevideo, 6,110; Glasgow to Rio Janeiro, 5,420; Buenos Aires from Montevideo, about 130 miles; New York to Rio Janeiro, 4,730; New York to Montevideo, 5,890; New York to Buenos Aires, 5,910.

3 Report, pp. 13, 17, 192, 264.

Report, pp. 19, 20, 102, 112, 128.

Report, pp. 21 to 25; 138 to 145.

The report of the committee on this important sub

Ject is at page 280, Treaties between United States and other powers, Vol. III, p. 345. Choate: The Two Hague Conferences, p. 74.

LA SOLUCIÓN PACÍFICA DE LAS CUESTIONES INTERNACIONALES POR EL ARBITRAJE.

Por ADOLFO BERRO GARCÍA,

Profesor de la Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay.

La solución de las cuestiones internacionales por medio de la guerra, es uno de los más absurdos prejuicios que mantiene hoy, a despecho de los inmensos progresos realizados, la civilización contemporánea. La guerra, ha dicho Guillermo Ferrero, es la vida de bohemio de las naciones bárbaras, y sin embargo las naciones modernas sostienen aun como solución de sus conflictos internacionales, este medio violento e inhumano, cuya existencia se explica en las sociedades primitivas, pero resulta en cambio absurdo dentro de la organización de las sociedades actuales.

Sean cuales fueren las ideas que se profesen respecto de los fines del Estado, es indiscutible que la razón fundamental de su complejo organismo está esencialmente basada en la necesidad de garantir a los hombres su seguridad personal, el libre desarrollo de su energía, en todos los órdenes de la actividad humana, y la posibilidad de alcanzar el mayor bienestar.

En este sentido, pues, el Estado fija sus normas jurídicamente obligatorias, y dentro de ellas el individuo desenvuelve sus esfuerzos, sin lesionar el derecho igual que compete a cada uno de los otros componentes de la sociedad a que pertenece. En caso de conflicto entre los derechos de uno de los asociados y los de otro, el Estado, por medio de sus autoridades judiciales, soluciona de acuerdo con la razón la cuestión pendiente y hace obligatorio el cumplimiento del fallo pronunciado.

Y no podría ser de otra manera, si la sociedad, debidamente organizada, desea garantir el orden interno y el derecho de cada uno. Hacer la justicia por su propia mano, es una fórmula que sólo pudo tener cabida en los tiempos remotos ya de las primeras sociedades en que la persona humana era desconocida en lo que ésta tiene de más inalienable: el derecho a la vida, conditio sine qua non, sin la que toda asociación es irrisoria y toda comunidad es una farsa.

Si las sociedades políticas deben mantener una convivencia internacional, si todas ellas, por más distintas que aparezcan a la vista y más desemejantes, forman en realidad otras tantas partes integrantes de la gran sociedad humana, en cada una de las cuales el hombre desenvuelve su actividad y obtiene el fruto de sus esfuerzos, ¿por qué hemos de negar y rechazar respecto de las naciones lo que es considerado por todos como un postulado dentro de una sociedad política determinada? ¿Por qué adoptar respecto de ellas las fórmulas violentas e inhumanas para solucionar sus conflictos? ¿Da la guerra el triunfo siempre al que tiene la razón? ¿Puede la guerra misma, terminada por la victoria, compensar remotamente los perjuicios irrogados por ella, ni siquiera de una manera relativa? ¿Son acaso la rectificación de fronteras, la incorporación de un nuevo territorio más o menos extenso, el oropel que resulta del triunfo alcanzado, resultados suficientemente importantes para volver justo el sacrificio de millares de existencias que tenían derecho como las otras a la vida y a la acción?

Basta arrojar una mirada sobre la historia para convencerse de que la guerra no ha garantido jamás el triunfo definitivo de las naciones fuertes. Ha sido, por el contrario, el éxito alcanzado en las contiendas bélicas, la causa del derrumbe y la decadencia de los más grandes imperios militares que se han desarrollado sobre la faz de la tierra. Podrán por un momento brillar con deslumbrantes reflejos las glorias de la conquista y el alarde de la fuerza, pero ese

período que no es más que un segundo en la vida de la humanidad, ¿puede justificar la hecatombe de seres organizados y dotados de todas las condiciones intrínsecas para desenvolver sus actividades y recoger el fruto de sus laboriosos esfuerzos?

Asi cayó en las sombras del olvido, de la disolución y de la ruina el imperio romano, que otrora sostuviera con altivez el empuje soberbio de las águilas romanas. Así se hundió para siempre en un derrumbe social y económico la monarquía de Luis XIV, y se esfumó la dominación napoleónica con el humo de las descargas de sus batallas legendarias, en la noche triste de Rambouillet. Obsérvese en cambio como las más grandes naciones modernas, las más libres, las más activas, las más industriosas, son precisamente aquellas que no confían en la guerra para obtener su mejoramiento político, sino en el esfuerzo y la actividad personal de cada uno de sus componentes.

Es necesario, pues, buscar en otra parte la solución de los conflictos internacionales, que el prejuicio secular de las violencias guerreras ha obscurecido y retardado con su empuje primitivo y salvaje. Es necesario ir a las soluciones amistosas, sometiendo las cuestiones al examen sereno y reflexivo de la razón, para terminar con ese flagelo formidable, mancha bochornosa de una civilización que se vanagloria de los enormes progresos alcanzados.

En este sentido, se ha adelantado ya mucho desde unos lustros atrás y especialmente en los últimos años, en el escenario americano. ¿Cuál es el medio, cuál es la fórmula que debemos adoptar para solucionar pacíficamente las cuestiones internacionales?

Desde luego, si dos naciones tienen un litigio sobre una cuestión cualquiera, podrían solucionar directamente entre ambas la dificultad, de acuerdo con los principios de la razón y de la justicia. Pero como esta forma es difícil llevarla a la práctica por el apasionamiento y la excitación que producen los conflictos internacionales, se ha propuesto la fórmula del arbitraje como medio de solucionr la cuestión pendiente, o sea el sometimiento del litigio al fallo sereno e imparcial de uno o más árbitros.

De qué manera y con qué amplitud debe someterse la cuestión litigiosa al fallo del árbitro, es precisamente el punto crítico sobre el que la doctrina y las naciones buscan la solución más justa y más exacta.

Las naciones han sometido y someten más cada día las cuestiones al fallo desapasionado del árbitro. Pero todas ellas han establecido restricciones a la adopción del arbitraje. Se ha aceptado solucionar todas las cuestiones que se presenten entre los Estados por medio del arbitraje, pero se ha exceptuado su aplicación para resolver todas aquellas cuestiones que afecten la existencia, el honor, la soberanía, la independencia, los preceptos constitucionales o los intereses vitales de los Estados contratantes.

La razón de las limitaciones puestas a la fórmula del arbitraje, se halla en el temor de que, al someter las cuestiones al fallo de un tercero, pueda comprometerse, poner en peligro o lesionar los derechos más sagrados de una nacionalidad.

Tal es la manera como se ha aplicado generalmente el arbitraje. Pero si nosotros entendemos el arbitraje como debe serlo, como la fórmula realmente jurídica de resolver las cuestiones internacionales, no podremos menos que declarar que las limitaciones y excepciones puestas a la fórmula del arbitraje, no se hallan en manera alguna justificadas. Por el contrario, esas limitaciones y excepciones son precisamente la negación del principio mismo. Y lo son porque:

1. La solución por medio del arbitraje de las cuestiones que puedan surgir entre dos nacionalidades, importa el sometimiento del litigio a un juez