how serious this plan was, as to how much of Lord Lansdowne's plan would have survived the amending batteries. But what evidence we have as to the strength of the cathartic stimulus which finally produced the Lansdowne Reconstitution Bill in 1911! It is true that the Bill was opposed by Lord Morley for the government, and that Lord Lansdowne refused categorically to trade his plan of composition for the preamble of the Parliament Bill, to which he declared his continued opposition.51 Nevertheless I know there were sound men who, in the spring of 1911 were privately prepared to compromise on the acceptance of the essentials of both Reconstitution Bill and Parliament Bill. Since this compromise did not take place there remains in any case the question of the constitutional meaning of the Rosebery-Lansdowne scheme as an indication of the limit of possible concession on the part of those opposed to the Asquith government and as a suggestion regarding the lines of future legislation should the Unionists return to power intent to proceed with further constitutional legislation. Varying estimates weremade in May, 1911, as to the probable strength of parties in a House of Lords constituted under Lord Lansdowne's plan. The fact of the overwhelming strength of the Conservative party in the existing House has usually been cited as a cause of complaint by Liberals; and under any estimate which can be regarded as probable the Liberals could not command a majority in Lord Lansdowne's reconstituted second chamber. That fact, however, is subordinate to the consideration that whatever powers the new House might enjoy its real authority would be vastly greater. By a reform in composition with no alteration in the powers of the upper house the whole British political system would endure a profound change. By an alteration in powers which would still give to a reconstituted House of Lords time and opportunity to assert its control over the executive on anything like equal terms with the House of Commons the real authority of such an upper house would after all be the major element in determination of public policy. In other words under the guise of a reorganization of the House of Lords 518 H. L. Deb., 5s. c. 371-72. on a more popular basis the way was open to the restoration in more modern yet subtle fashion of influence by that House such as it had not enjoyed since the days of Whig domination in the eighteenth century. Only one thing could prevent such a result. That would be an abandonment in large part of the claims and policy of the House of Lords as they had appeared during the past fifty years and more. Unless that was also part of the Conservative alternative program the inevitable conclusion is that instead of a modification of the claims of the historical governing class so largely represented in the Lords, instead of a more genuine responsibility to the democracy, real power was to lie farther away from the electorate and more effectively in the hands of the managing directors of the reconstituted upper House. For a House numbering 350 would still require party management and control. The notion of an impartial advisory, revising council was as remote as ever. So after all this turns us to the question of the powers of the second chamber. Here we must distinguish between the functions of the House of Lords with regard to "money bills," and with regard to other public bills. The practice and precedents with regard to money bills must be considered also with a view to the increasing complications and implications which surround the control of the purse. In 1860 a defender of the House of Lords commenting on their rejection of the repeal of the paper duties wrote: "A Budget in our day is a very different thing from a granting of subsidies. To exclude the Lords from this field would be to shut them out from three-fourths of the public business. It would be a gigantic expansion of the power of the House of Commons; and by compelling the Lords to stand still within a technical limit would overthrow the proportions of the constitution and extinguish the House of Lords for all useful purposes." 52 In other words the Lords would cease to be the "fly wheel of the Constitution."53. Undoubtedly the tendency and subject matter of financial 62 What is the House of Lords? in National Rev. XI, p. 123. Ibid., p. 118. legislation has gone far beyond the grounds on which were built the historical precedents for the customary powers of the House of Commons with regard to money bills. The lumping of various financial proposals of the government for the year in one bill-the Budget-has also at times tended seriously to limit even criticism of particular proposals in both Houses. But this practice has made for the rapid growth in modern times of the claim of the House of Commons to determine the time and cause of a dissolution of Parliament. In November, 1909, the House of Lords on the issue of finance boldly challenged the control of the Commons over the executive. From this question of finance, therefore, there depends the whole theory of representative and cabinet government as it has developed in modern British constitutional history. In view at least of these facts the proposals with regard to money bills occupy a central place. The Parliament Act asserts the exclusive power of the House of Commons. The ancestry of this assertion would carry us far back to pregnant periods of constitutional growth. Even the immediate and more notable generations of this matter can receive only bare mention. First is the indignant protest of the House of Commons on December 2, 1909, against the action of the Lords in reserving the finance bill for a vote by the people in a general election, as "a breach of the Constitution."54 In this, passing by the important admissions of Lord Balfour of Burleigh in 1909,55 of Mr. Balfour in 1908,56 1907,57 and 1906,58 54 13 H. C. Deb. 5s. c. 546. 55 4 H. L. Deb. 5s. c. 1039 (Nov. 25). By "a reference to the people in matters of finance" the House of Lords "would spoil and destroy the control of the other House of Parliament over the Government." se Speech at Dumfries: Times, Oct. 7. "It is the House of Commons, not the House of Lords which settles uncontrolled our financial policy." 57 The House of Lords "cannot touch those money Bills which if it could deal with, no doubt, it could bring the whole executive machinery of the country to a standstill." 176 Hansard, 4s. cc. 929-930 (June 24). 5s Speech at Manchester: Manchester Guardian, Oct. 23. "The House of Lords, as you all know, does not interfere with the general financial policy of the country." and of Lord Salisbury in 1895,59 the House of Commons followed the precedent of their own resolutions of July 6, 1860. Then they had voted that their control over taxation and supply was exclusive as to "matter, manner, measure, and time."60 Earlier in 167861 and 167162 the Commons had passed the wellknown resolutions against the power of the House of Lords to alter aids and supplies which "are the sole gift of the Commons." The preamble of a supply bill had been fixed in 1628 stating the intention of the "Commons" to "give and grant" the "duties" provided by the bill.63 It is true that the House of Lords had never given up the merely legal power to amend or reject a finance bill. It is true that by their standing order of 1702 they had protested against "tacking" that is "annexing" to a finance bill matter "which is foreign to and different from the matter of the said Bills of Aid or Supply" as "unparliamentary," and tending "to the destruction of the constitution."64 And it is true that with regard to many separate bills involving directly or indirectly a financial charge there is prior to 1860 a long record of amendment, delay or rejection on the part of the House of Lords, in spite of the general principle already laid down by the House of Commons.65 But analysis of the character of these actions by "The House of Lords, "by custom, takes no share whatever in the votes by which governments are displaced or inaugurated and it takes no share whatever in that which is the most important part of the annual, constant business of every legislative body"-finance. 35 Hansard, 4s. c. 263 (July 6) 60 159 Hansard 3s. cc. 1384, 1602, 1604, 1606. These resolutions had been presented after a valuable report as to precedents had been made by the Select Committee on Tax Bills. (H. C. Rep. 1860, No. 414.) For an interesting account by an auditor of the famous debate of July 5, 1860, cf. A field night in the House of Commons in Atlantic Monthly, VIII. pp. 663-78. On some of the personal and political aspects of the question cf. Morley: Gladstone, II. pp. 25, 31-40, 238-39, 636; Martin: Lyndhurst, p. 494; Dasent: Delane, II. p. 21; Martin: Prince Consort, V. pp. 99100, 132-33; Letters of Queen Victoria, III. pp. 512-514; Laughton: Reeve, II. p. 45. 61 Commons Journals, IX, p. 509 (July 3, 1678). 62 Commons Journals, IX, p. 235 (April 13, 1671). * Ibid., I. pp. 910, 914, 919. Cf. Lords Journals, III. pp. 858, 860, 879. 64 Order No. XXV; Lords Journals, XVII, p. 185 (Dec. 9, 1702). 65 Cf. Appendix to H. C. Rep. 1860, No. 414. the Lords, appreciation of the political as well as of the constitutional circumstances involved, and lastly the realization that for the bulk of those precedents men must turn to a period when the executive was not exclusively or even primarily depended on or responsible to the House of Commons-all of these considerations do not materially or constitutionally weaken the strength of the convention which has decreed to the Commons the control over finance.66 The Parliament Act in this respect provides in statutory form for restoration of the Constitution to a position beyond the reach of a hostile majority in the House of Lords. What was the alternative to this? It is to be found in somewhat scattered form in the resolutions proposed by Lord Lansdowne on the eve of the election of December, 1910, and in the Cromer amendment to the Parliament Bill in June, 1911. Both involve primarily the definition of a money bill in order to prevent tacking. As such they have their basis in the House of Lords standing order of 1702. That order, however, had not been consistently adhered to during the past two centuries;67 and the Lansdowne-Cromer program looked to a statutory definition and extension of that order. With this in view, according to Lord Lansdowne the Lords were to "forego their constitutional right to reject or amend Money Bills which are purely financial in character," if "effectual provision is made against tacking." In case of dispute on these points reference was to be to a joint committee of both houses, "with the Speaker of the House of Commons as chairman who shall have a casting vote only."68 That was in November, 1910. On June 28, 1911, Lord Cromer moved an amendment to the Parliament Bill substituting a joint committee for the Speaker as the authority to distinguish a "money bill" from other public bills. 69 He then explained that he was thinking of a committee of seven from each House with the Speaker as chairman to give "For a clear analysis and classification of these precedents cf. speech by Mr. Collier on July 5, 1860, 159 Hansard, 3s. cc. 1386-1418 67 H. C. Rep. 1860, No. 414, p. xi. 68 6 H. L. Deb. 5s. c. 838 (Nov. 23). 8 Ibid., c. 1047. |