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a casting vote.70 This was carried in committee as the result of a test vote of 183 to 44.71 The functions of this tribunal as to money bills were first defined by Lord Cromer's second amendment of June 29, which was then carried 192 to 48.72 The joint committee was to deny to a House of Commons bill the character of a money bill and thus deprive it of its special privilege of speedy enactment unmolested by the Lords if in the opinion of the joint committee “the governing purpose of a Bill, is such as to bring the Bill, within the category of general legislation.”73 As general legislation it would then be subject to other arrangements provided by the Parliament Bill. But on this point as we shall see the opposition was to amend the methods then provided by that Bill for the passage of certain classes of legislation. This Cromer amendment embodied a phrase from a speech by Mr. Asquith on April 11, that “the test whether a bill is a financial bill or not is whether that is its main governing purpose."74 The debate on this amendment is most enlightening but we can better review it after we have noted the third and final alteration proposed by Lord Cromer on July 13, when he offered a substitute for his own second amendment on June 29.75 The accepted version of the functions of the joint committee as to money bills was to be as before if the main governing purpose of a Bill imposing taxation, or of any portion of a Bill imposing taxation, is not purely financial in character.''76 This last amendment aimed to preserve as money bills projects such as naval loans, etc., whose governing purpose was obviously not financial though finance was the actual content of the bill. Lord Cromer returned therefore to Lord Lansdowne's language of November—"purely financial in character.”

708 H. L. Deb. 1049.
71 Ibid., c. 1090.
72 Ibid., c. 1164.
73 Ibid., c. 1135.
74 24 H. C. Deb. 58. c. 259.
76 9 H. L. Deb. 58. c. 458.

76 The italics are my own, indicating the important changes from the amendment of June 29.

The ensuing debate when connected with that of June 28 and 29 barely touched the elaborate definition of a money bill which after amendment in the House of Commons was now in its final form before the Lords. The question was as between the Cromer amendment as it was to be interpreted by the joint committee and the word "only as the controlling word in the long House of Commons definition to be interpreted by the Speaker.77 The Lords feared that the Speaker might become a dangerous partisan; they were desirous to limit the danger of “tacking,” and in that connection to extend the standing order of 1702 so as to exclude "moral" as well as "extraneous tacking.” Here is the gist of the matter. They had less to fear from open "tacking,” since the Bill and their own orders already limited it. What was "moral tacking?” Lord Cromer called it “the endeavor to accomplish by a side wind in a Money Bill some important political or social change which ought to come in the category of general legislation.”78 Lord Lansdowne unconsciously followed the thought in the anonymous article in the National Review of 1860 by saying that without the Cromer amendment the House of Lords "would find itself at once warned off the whole vast field of legislation into which the financial elements enter” and if so they would be “excluded from by far the greater part of the whole field of legislation."79

It at once occurs to the student that, under the Cromer amendment as explained by Lord Lansdowne, a tariff budget providing for colonial preference and protection for home industries and agriculture in order to end or check unemployment might be denied the "exceptional machinery” proposed by the Parliament Bill for “money bills." Whether that be so or not if the Cromer amend

71 Cf. footnote 2 of this article. At this stage of the bill the Speaker alone was the supreme authority on this point. Later in the House of Commons on August 8 the government supported an amendment which directed the Speaker “to consult, if practicable, two members to be appointed from the Chairman's Panel at the beginning of each Session by the Committee of Selection" of the House of Commons. This was finally part of the bill. (29 H. C. Deb. 58. cc. 1055, 1090, 1091.)

789 H. L. Deb. 58. c. 459. 70 Ibid., c. 468.

ment became part of the Bill the functions of the House of Lords might, unless otherwise checked, extend to a considerable part of the "whole field of legislation,” with power of both amendment and rejection, even though finance were involved. The distinction goes deeper. For back even of party programs came the question of property. The Lords were fighting to protect the interests which they peculiarly represent as well as for their own power to control policy. The Parliament Bill proposed to consider the support of the electorate as authority for the imposition of taxation by the Commons in ways and terms which would probably have as part of their justification the alleged benefit and welfare of the electorate and the nation. Which could the taxpayer more safely trust and which could he more readily check or direct?

Lord Lansdowne called the Cromer Amendment "vital”,80 and he was right. For it represented the endeavor of the Lords to define by statute the exclusive powers of the Commons on lines which had existed when finance included little more that the "granting of subsidies” or other well known grants and aids. In 1911 the Lords and the Unionist party proposed to ignore the history of the evolution of the Budget; and to fall back on practice and precedent with regard to financial and constitutional questions which dated from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while facing social and economic problems and conditions of the twentieth century.81 The last Cromer amendment was carried without division, only to be rejected by the Commons. Under the Act as it now stands there is novel recourse to the judgment of the Speaker. Draftsmen must be more careful; and the undoubted danger of tacking will continue to be the subject of discussion. In conclusion, we have the decision of the Speaker in December, 1911, that the

809 H. L. Deb. 58. C. 468.

81 Cf. 8 Ibid., c. 1139 (Lord Haldane) and c. 1152 (Lord Loreburn); 9. Ibid. c. 462 (Lord Morley).

first Budget since the passage of the Parliament Act is not a "money bill” within the terms of that Act.82

82 The decision of the Speaker is noticed in the Times, Dec. 15, 1911; and Lord Morley in the House of Lords, though he naturally had not inquired as to the speaker's reasons, indicated certain clauses dealing with the Post Office as the probable source of difficulty (Times, Dec. 16). In this connection cf. the interesting rulings of the Speaker as to the privileges of the Commons in connection with amendments by the Lords to the Old Age Pensions Bill, July 31, 1908 (193 Hansard, 4s. cc. 1970, 1974, 1980, 1995).

(To be continued.)


University of Illinois

About twenty years ago, Mr. Bryce, with microscopic vision, observed that the state governor was "not yet a nonentity.”ı On the other hand the state legislature was "so much the strongest force in the several states that we may almost call it the Government and ignore all other authorities.”? The strangeness of sound with which these statements strike our ears at the present day is indicative of the length of the road which we have since traveled and of the change which has taken place within recent years in the relative positions of the governor and the legislature in our state governments. The unmistakable tendency which now prevails in many quarters towards an enlargement of the power of the governor directs attention anew to the administrative and political position which that officer occupies and to the manner in which his influence and prestige have been, and may be still further, increased.

The administrative position of the governor has been unsatisfactory since the original organization of the state governments. The first state constitutions were largely adaptations of the colonial charters to new conditions and were framed in the light of colonial experience. The conflicts that had taken place between the colonial governors, appointed by the crown, and the colonial legislatures, composed of representatives of the people, had embittered the colonists against the exercise of executive authority. Hence, in the new state constitutions, the predominant legal position was assigned to the legislature, which was made the controlling and regulating force in the state governments, while the executive was rendered weak and inefficient both in organization and function. As Madison 1 American Commonwealth, 3rd ed., vol. I, p. 532. : Ibid., p. 534.

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