ernment." The increasing influence of the governor over legislation is the comparatively new rôle which he is now beginning to play, and which, in its relation to popular control of government, bids fair to become one of the most important developments in the history of the state governments.

Legally speaking, the governor has exercised from the beginning a certain amount of control over legislation by means of his veto. Conferred but grudgingly at first, and not at all except in two states, it has been gradually extended until now only one state still withholds it.10 At the same time the size of the majority required to overcome the veto has steadily increased until now in most states it approximates two thirds. Furthermore the efficiency of the veto has been increased through the power now granted the governor in more than thirty states to veto separate items of appropriation bills, and in three states this privilege has even been made to apply to any bill." In all these cases, of course, the governor's veto is a qualified one only, but it may become absolute with regard to legislation passed shortly before the adjournment of the session. Mention may also be made in this connection of the lengthening of the governor's term of office, and of the partial abandonment of the provision which renders him ineligible to succeed himself. It thus appears that the tendency of constitutional development has been towards increasing the legal power of the governor over the course of legislation. But this tendency has not yet advanced far enough to give the governor any very real and effective control over the shaping of legislative policy. The veto power is evidence in the law of the general recognition of the desirability of granting to the governor some share in the formulation of the will of the state as embodied in legislation. But in spite of the legal sanction of this principle, the veto power is illogical and insufficient in that it carries only one side of that principle into practical effect. The plain fact is that the

• The New Stateism, by the present writer, in the North American Review for June, 1911.

10 Dealey, Our State Constitutions, p. 31.

11 Ibid, p. 32.

governor is held responsible for controlling the course of legislation, but is not given the legal power commensurate with that responsibility. He can sometimes block vicious legislation, "jokers," "riders," and "jobs," but he has legally no correlative power of initiating and pushing through legislation which is demanded by intelligent public opinion. Unless the governor is given both these powers he ought not rightfully to be held responsible for the course that legislation takes. But whether rightfully or not the people are holding him responsible because he alone stands out conspicuously among state officers. In the hydra-headed legislative body no strikingly prominent figure can be found, upon whom responsibility can be saddled. The course of legislative procedure is so confused, and desirable legislation may be emasculated, smothered, and killed in so many different ways in the scuffle and scramble of legislation that the people find it impossible to fix the blame within the legislature. As has been so often observed, the actual process of legislation has deserted the legislative chambers, and now takes place behind the closed doors of committee rooms. And even if the progress of the public business within the committee rooms were entirely open to the public view, the people would doubtless still be confused by the multiplicity of committees, each responsible for only a comparatively small part of the whole field of legislation. Since no one looms up in the legislature that can be held responsible, the governor, who stands off exasperatingly powerless, is made the scapegoat. The deplorable morass into which the state business thus falls has led some publicists to advocate the entire abolition of the legislature.12 Others, such as Mr. U'Ren, 13 Mr. Croly, 14 and Mr. White, 15 disgusted by the results of the present great diffusion or responsibility both in administration and in legis12 Cf. Dealey, op. cit., p. 9.

13 Bill for a Law and Suggested Amendments to the Constitution of Oregon, pamphlet, Portland, Oregon, August 14, 1909.

14 The Promise of American Life, chap. XI.

15 Political Science Quarterly, vol. XVIII, p. 655.

lation, advocate a thoroughgoing reorganization of the state governments upon entirely new lines.16

Meanwhile, however, a development is taking place and being gradually wrought out before our eyes which may render any radical reconstruction of the state governments along legal lines not only unnecessary but undesirable. "The whole country," says Governor Wilson of New Jersey, "since it cannot decipher the methods of its legislation, is clamoring for leadership, and a new rôle, which to many persons seems little less than unconstitutional, is thrust upon our executives. The people are impatient of a President who will not formulate policy and insist upon its adoption. They are impatient of a governor who will not exercise energetic leadership, who will not make his appeals directly to public opinion and insist that the dictates of public opinion be carried out in definite legal reforms of his own suggestion." Some of the subtle, extralegal, and largely unforeseen influences which have raised the President to the predominant position which he occupies in the National Government are now, in spite of the greater legal difficulties in the way, beginning similarly to affect the position of the governor. By the gradual accretion of precedent, and by the growth of custom, the governor is forging the instrument of control over both the initiation and the passage of legislation. This extra-legal instrument is the personal influence of the governor, supported by the full force of "pitiless publicity" and public discussion. This is a much broader power than that which is usually associated with the right of sending messages to the legislature. It is true, as has been recently pointed out,18 the message power has not been used by governors to the extent which the language of the state constitutions would warrant. They "give him the right to recommend measures and do not limit him in respect to the form in which he shall 16 These plans are summarized in Beard, American Government and Politics, pp. 504-6.

Address before the Commercial Club of Portland, Oregon, May 18, 1911.

19 Address of Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey before the House of Governors, Frankfort, Kentucky, November 29, 1910.

make his recommendations. He can make them in the form of bills if he pleases."19 But, as Mr. Henry L. Stimson has remarked, "the executive ought not to be forced to resort to innovating constructions. The course of co-operation between governor and legislature ought to be made easy and natural, instead of forced and difficult."20 To obviate this difficulty a method of procedure has already been devised through the introduction in state legislatures of so-called "administration bills," which are nominally fathered by some member of the legislature but which really emanate from the governor. But in securing the passage of such bills after their introduction the personal influence of the governor comes into play. Already in some states we find the governor appearing before informal meetings of legislative committees, discussing with them questions of public policy, and advocating the measures that public opinion demands. The personal influence of the governor is not the influence of coercion or the selling of appointments for favorable votes on administration bills. Such tactics sooner or later undermine the influence of the executive. But the real influence of the governor over the legislature, as Governor Wilson has pointed out, consists in his power to represent, to persuade, and to lead the people.21 If by his qualities of leadership and the force of his arguments, he can persuade the people during the campaign, the same qualities will give him such a personal ascendancy over the legislature after his election that he will be able to lead that body also.22 The

11 Ibid.

Address delivered at the McKinley Day Banquet of the Tippecanoe Club of Cleveland, Ohio, January 28, 1911, pamphlet, p. 13.

21 In the Frankfort address.

* A step has been taken in New Jersey towards granting the governor or candidate for governor in each party a greater influence over the formulation of the public policy which, as governor, he may have to carry into effect. By a recent enactment of that state it is provided that a state convention of each party shall be held annually for the purpose of adopting and promulgating a party platform, which convention shall be composed of the party candidates who have been nominated at the party primaries for the office of member of the Assembly or State Senator, together with hold-over Senators, members of the State Committee, and "the candidate of the party for Governor nominated at the said primaries in the year in which a Governor

legislature must be led by some person or persons. It cannot pass upon all measures that come before it without guidance from some source. Legislative policies do not, as a rule, originate in the legislature itself. They usually emanate from outside sources, sometimes legitimate but too often illegitimate. The bosses have too frequently dictated the passage or the sidetracking of measures. "In his new rôle the governor becomes the virtual boss and shapes the course of legislation for the general benefit, instead of for private and special interests. There is little danger in such bossism, for the governor can be held accountable by the people, while the unofficial boss cannot. This does not imply that the governor is in continual conflict with the legislature and wields the big stick of his personal influence over them. On the contrary, he works, as far as possible, in entire harmony and co-operation with them. Co-ordination, not separation, is the proper relation between the executive. and legislative departments which the governor endeavors to foster. But, in the case of a recalcitrant legislature, the governor's power of appealing directly to the people always remains in reserve, though its existence would usually render its exercise unnecessary. For, no matter how jealous a legislature may be of its own prerogatives, no matter how incapable it may be of being bulldozed, wheedled, or cajoled by threats or intimidation on the part of the governor, it cannot withstand the force of pitiless publicity wielded by a vigorous, independent, and courageous governor, supported by the pressure of intelligent and aroused public opinion. And it is the function of the governor to keep it aroused by a continuous and relentless application of repeated doses of publicity throughout the whole course of legislation."23

The open leadership of an able, responsible, and fearless governor is thus becoming an effective instrumentality for the

is elected, and in each year in which no Governor is elected, the Governor of the State shall be a member of the convention of the political party to which he belongs." New Jersey Session Laws of 1911, Chap. 183, p. 276.

This passage is quoted from an article by the present writer on The New Stateism in the North American Review, June, 1911.