Russia-the other to those Powers who meditate, or may attempt, an interference hostile to the freedom of South America or of Mexico." After quoting the clauses relating to Russia and to colonization in America, the Times said: "Now, this grave and somewhat novel doctrine, being connected by Mr. Monroe himself with the subject matter of the dispute with Russia, touching an occupation of the northwestern shore of North America, looks to us as if the Cabinet of Washington, had determined to carry its resistance to the famous ukase for monopolizing as well the ocean as the coast beyond the mere maritime branch of the controversy; and to exhibit some grounds of opposition to the establishment of Russian colonies on the shores of the northwest continent and of its adjacent islands. There is little doubt that if such be the design at Washington, full power exists to carry it into execution, let Russia act how she may.'

The Times then considered "the point of more immediate urgency in this message, the undisguised exposition presented by it of the policy to be maintained by the United States in respect of South America." It noticed that Monroe disclaimed "every right or thought of meddling in the disputes of the European powers in matters 'relating to themselves.'" After quoting the clauses relating to the Holy Alliance and intervention in Spanish America, the Times interpreted them to mean that the United States would consider such a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition "as a just cause of war. This is plain speaking, and it is just thinking. If the free Government of Spain was so dangerous a neighbor to the Bourbons, that they could do no otherwise than put it down in self-defence, how can the jurists of legitimacy blame a kindred alternative on the part of a free power when threatened by the neighborhood of a despot? The President regards the distinct annunciation of this resolute policy so important, that he repeats it towards the close of his message. The President does not fail

to remark on the extreme ground of uneasiness afforded to independent States, by the avowed principle on which the invasion of Spain was excused. As for Spain, she is

dismissed with a brief allusion to her weakness, which makes it impossible for her to subdue the infant States. The above declarations, therefore, may be regarded as a friendly counsel to France and her continental Allies."2

Other English newspapers praised the message.

The Courier of December 27 described that state paper as "a bold and manly notice to the Continental Powers," that the United States would treat interposition as "affording a just ground for war." It declared that, after "so clear and explicit a warning," there was not one of the continental powers that would “risk a war with the United States." On January 19, 1824, the Courier declared that on great measures of mutual interest England and the United States understood "each other perfectly" and were "upon the best possible footing." It also noticed the noncolonization clause and suggested that this might give "considerable umbrage" to the Russian Government which coolly contemplated turning "the Pacific Ocean into a Russian lake."

In Parliament Mr. Brougham welcomed the tidings in these words: "The question with regard to South America, he believed, was now disposed of, or nearly so; for an event had recently happened, than which no event had ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and gratitude, over all the freemen in Europe-an event in which he, as an Englishman, connected by ties of blood and language with America, took peculiar pride

2 Rush heard that the British packet from New York had been instructed to wait for the messsage "and bring it over with all speed," Ford, W. C., John Quincy Adams, his Connection with the Monroe Doctrine, 68. No reports of the message were found in the London newspapers before December 26 27, and 1823. The quotation is from the Times of December 27.

• A longer quotation is found in McMaster, J. B., A History of the People of the United States, V, 48, note, where the date is erroneously given as December 24. Other interesting quotations from English newspapers are found, ibid., 48–50, note. A most favorable estimate of the influence of the message was given in a dispatch written by Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, in which it was described as "the most decisive blow to all despotick interference with the new States. . . . On its publicity in London the credit of all the Spanish American securities immediately rose, and the question of the final and complete safety of the new States from all European coercion, is now considered at rest." Ford, W. C., John Quincy Adams, his Connection with the Monroe Doctrine, 68.

and satisfaction-an event, he repeated, had happened, which was decisive on the subject; and that event was the speech and the message of the president of the United States to Congress. The line of policy which that speech disclosed became a great, a free, and an independent nation; and he hoped that his majesty's ministers would be prevented by no mean pride, no paltry jealousy, from following so noble and illustrious an example." It became evident at once that all Englishmen did not understand the message alike. Apparently an interpretation to the effect that Spain had not the right "to recover her own colonial dominions" aroused the foreign minister, George Canning. He declared in the House of Commons that he was "clearly of opinion, with the President of the United States, that no foreign state had a right to interfere, pending the dispute between the colonies and the mother-country; but he was as strongly of opinion, that the mother-country had a right to attempt to recover her colonies if she thought proper."5

6

Canning objected to that part of the message which he thought interdicted "all further colonization on the Continents of America." He asked Rush to explain its meaning. The latter evidently stated that this paragraph was aimed at Russia." The English minister then said that England could not "acknowledge the right of any power to proclaim such a principle, much less to bind other countries to the observance of it. If we were to be repelled from the shores of America, it would not matter to us whether that repulsion were effected by the Ukase of Russia excluding us from the sea; or by the new Doctrine of the President prohibiting us from the land. But we cannot yield obedience to either."'s Canning objected particularly to

4

In an address on the king's speech, February 3, 1824, Hansard, T. C., Parliamentary Debates, new series, X, 68.

Hansard, T. C., Parliamentary Debates, X, 74. See also, ibid., 90, 91, 92; Bagot, J., George Canning and his Friends, II, 208. The views of Sir James Mackintosh are also quoted in Moore, J. B., A Digest of International Law, VI, 411.

6

Bagot, J., George Canning and his Friends, II, 209; Rush, R., Memoranda of

a Residence at the Court of London (Philadelphia, 1845), 471, 472.

• Reddaway, W. F., The Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1905), 92, 93.

the prohibition of colonization by England on the north-west coast of North America; hence Monroe's pronunciamento soon became a factor in the dispute of England and the United States with Russia over conflicting claims to the north-west coast." It hindered concert of action between the United States and England.10 Canning even ventured the prediction that England would "have a squabble with the Yankees yet in and about those regions."'"1

The great English minister was evidently chagrined at Monroe's bold assumption of Pan-American leadership. Canning, as a monarchist, believed that the bustling young republic wished to separate democratic America from monarchical Europe; hence, while disclaiming all thoughts of forcible intervention by England, 12 he soon desired, as a counterpoise, to encourage the establishment of monarchies in Latin America. "I have no objection," said Canning, "to monarchy in Mexico— quite otherwise . . . even in the person of a Spanish infanta. Monarchy in Mexico, and monarchy in Brazil would 13 Thus it is

cure the evils of universal democracy

9

• Rush, R., Memoranda of a Residence, 597, 598. On February 25, 1824 (O. S.), Henry Middleton, minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, wrote to Adams: "I have reason to believe, too, that insinuations were not wanting to put the most unfavorable construction upon the doctrine we had advanced, and to make it appear as peculiarly directed against Russia. I have been at considerable pains in endeavoring to efface all impressions of that kind, and I let it be distinctly understood, that I should protest in the strongest terms against any delimitation of territory without the participation of the United States. It may be very well understood that a course different from that we are pursuing with regard to Spanish affairs would have pleased better State Dept. MSS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches from Russia, 10. On February 5/17, 1824, Middleton wrote to Adams in regard to intervention in Spanish America: "The decided tone of the President's Message at the meeting of Congress (which was received here with unprecedented rapidity, having reached St. Petersburg (in the English Gazettes of the 26th December) on the first of January O. S.) is considered generally as having gone far towards deciding the question against interference." Ibid.

10 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 460, 461, 463; Bagot, J., George Canning and his Friends, II, 218, 219.

" Ibid., 266.

12 Ibid., 237; Paxson, F. L., The Independence of the South-American Republics, 213.

13 Stapleton, A. G., George Canning and his Times, 394, 395.

hardly an exaggeration to say that the original doctrine of Monroe at times provoked antagonism to the spread of democratic governments in America.

The ministers of Louis XVIII evidently read Monroe's message "with the deepest interest."14 To the minister of foreign affairs, Viscount Châteaubriand, the principle of non-colonization and the principle of non-intervention were alike distasteful. Châteaubriand even suggested to Sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Paris, "a joint representation to the United States" against "the prohibition of future colonization on the Continents of America."15 On January 2, 1824, Châteaubriand said to Stuart "that the striking coincidence of the language of the Message to Congress with the communications between His Majesty's Government and the Prince de Polignac, respecting the affairs of the Colonies, almost justified in his mind the supposition that these doctrines were now set forth for the first time by the President, in virtue of an understanding between the British and American Governments." Châteaubriand "thought that a declaration of the principles, upon which the President affects to pronounce that the whole of the New World shall in future be governed, made at a time when the American Government is wholly unable to enforce such pretensions, ought to be resisted by all the Powers possessing either territorial, or commercial, interests in that Hemisphere, and more especially by Great Britain and France, inasmuch as it strikes at the principle of Mediation brought forward by Them both, by peremptorily deciding the question of South American Independence, without listening to the concessions which either of the parties at issue might be disposed to admit. Monsieur de Châteaubriand added that under these circumstances he felt the more confirmed in his opinion, that it will not be expedient to allow a Representative of the United States to participate in any nego

14 Stuart to Canning, January 1, 1824, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Correspondence, France, 305.

15 Stuart to Canning, January 13, 1824, ibid. See also Rush, R., Memoranda of a Residence, 486, 487.