Irish House of Commons. This Parliament is to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland. The Senate is to consist of 40 members who are to hold office for eight years and retire by rotation. In first instance they are to be appointed by the Imperial Executive, but after the system is in operation this important function is to be vested in the Irish Executive. The lower house is to be made up of 164 members elected by the existing Irish constituencies, which means that some will return as many as four or five members. Under this arrangement Ulster will have 59 members, Leinster 41, Munster 37, Connaught 25, and the Universities two. Provision is made for the settlement of disagreements between the two houses by a joint session where they will deliberate and vote as one body. Besides the services which were reserved to imperial control by the second Home Rule bill, the fields covered by the Irish Land Purchase Acts, the Old Age Pension Act, and the Insurance Act (1911) are to remain under the control of the Imperial Parliament, as are also the Royal Irish Constabulary, the Postal Savings Banks, public loans so far as such loans were made in Ireland before the passage of the act, and the collecting of taxes. In regard to some of these services, however, there is provision made for a transfer, either automatically or at the option of the Irish Parliament, to Irish control. Except in some purely subsidiary matters the Irish Parliament is denied the power to either amend or repeal the Irish Government Act itself; and the right of appeal to the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council in all cases where the validity of the laws passed by the Irish Parliament is brought in question is definitely preserved. Special provisions are made for the protection and preservation of religious equality. Finally, additional safeguards against the Irish Parliament exceeding its constitutional authority are supplied by the veto which is vested in the Lord Lieutenant, and the over-riding force of imperial legislation.

It is provided in the first clause of the bill that the supreme power and authority of the Imperial Parliament shall remain unaffected. Whether this will in fact mean anything more than the theoretical supremacy which the British Parliament retains over the Legislatures of all the self-governing colonies remains to be seen. The Government affirms, and Mr. Redmond, speaking for the Irish Nationalists concedes, that the effective supremacy of Westminster is to be preserved; that over the Irish Parliament there will always loom large and threatening the power of the Imperial Parliament to nullify

Irish legislation which may be out of accord with the general interests of the Empire. The Unionists are sceptical. They believe that, with the principle of ministerial responsibility to the Irish Parliament firmly established, it will be virtually impossible for the British Parliament to exercise any really effective control. Should the attempt be made, the Irish ministry would at once resign. No other ministry could presumably be secured which would possess the confidence of the Irish Legislature, and the imperial government would confront the alternative necessity of either receding from its position or carrying through its policy by force, with the whole system of Irish self-government in abeyance. There are some very interesting precedents in the colonies which go far to support this view. Except as a legal fiction, the Opposition asserts, this clause is a nullity. The relation of Ireland under the act will inevitably be the same as that of Canada and Australia.

The clauses upon the Executive provide that the Lord Lieutenant shall hold office for a fixed term of years, and that the religious qualification shall no longer be enforced. He shall be advised in all Irish concerns by an Irish Executive, or Cabinet, whose competence shall be co-extensive with that of the Legislature.

The financial clauses of the bill have proved the most troublesome. The Government did not adopt the scheme outlined in the report of the Committee on Irish Finance. An independent Irish exchequer and an Irish consolidated fund under the control of an Auditor General are to be established. There is also to be a body to adjust the accounts between the two exchequers, known as the Joint Exchequer Board, to consist of five persons, two to be appointed by the imperial government, two by the Irish Cabinet, and the chairman to be nominated by the Crown. The collection of all taxes and revenues, whether imperial or Irish, except those of the Post Office, is to remain in the hands of the imperial government, and the proceeds are to be covered into the imperial exchequer. The Irish government is to pay the cost of all branches of the Irish administration except the reserved services. For this purpose there will be transferred every year from the Imperial exchequer to the Irish exchequer a certain sum to be determined by the Joint Exchequer Board as sufficient to cover the cost of the Irish services under Irish administration, except the Post Office, whose revenues are collected by the Irish government and go directly into the Irish exchequer. Furthermore, a sum of £500,000 a year, to be eventually reduced to £200,000, will be given by the imperial

exchequer to establish the new administration. The taxes in Ireland may be reduced or abolished by the Irish Legislature, with the result that the "transferred sum" will be correspondingly cut down. New taxes (with certain exceptions including the customs but not the excise) may be laid by the Irish Legislature. These must, however, be collected by the imperial government, a corresponding increase accruing to the "transferred sum." When at any future time the Irish revenue exceeds the cost of Irish administration an adjustment of the financial relations between the two countries may take place through action by the imperial Parliament which will be re-enforced, for this purpose, by 30 or 40 additional Irish members.

Ireland will not cease to be represented at Westminster, but the number of her representatives will be reduced to 42. These will, however, have the full rights of other members of Parliament and not be confined to participation in imperial and Irish legislation alone. The constituencies for these representatives will be formed by merging some of the Irish boroughs and counties, and disfranchising the Universities.

The highest significance of this bill does not consist in the altered. relationship between Ireland and Great Britain which must follow its adoption, important as that is. The measure is frankly introduced by the Government as the first instalment of what is called "Home Rule all round." Similar provision for the establishment of local autonomous governments for Scotland, Wales and England is promised by the Liberal leaders. These measures are urged as imperatively needed in order to relieve the Imperial Parliament of the crushing burden of legislation under which it is now staggering. It has been estimated by a careful student, Mr. H. deR. Walker, that, in the legislation of the last twenty years, 49.8 per cent of the public general acts of Parliament have referred to the separate countries of the United Kingdom, and that only 50.2 per cent of the statutes have related to the United Kingdom as a whole. Even in bills which are of a general character it is frequently necessary, because of the different circumstances and conditions of the different countries, to introduce what are known as application clauses which define exactly how much or how little of the enactment is to apply to Ireland or Scotland, as the case may be. A certain degree of legislative devolution has been already secured through the establishment of the Scottish Standing Committee to which are referred all bills relating especially to the country beyond the Tweed. Administrative

decentralization has gone much farther. Ireland has of course almost complete administrative separation. It has been found necessary to revive, after one hundred and forty years of disuse, the office of Secretary for Scotland, and the powers of this minister are increasing rapidly. He has control over such subordinate departments as the Scottish Local Government Board, the Education Office, the Crofter's Commission, and the Congested Districts Board, as well as extensive authority in the field of Scotch Private bill legislation. Both the Chief Secretary of Ireland and the Secretary for Scotland have not unjustly been called prime ministers without parliaments. It is manifestly quite impossible for the Imperial Parliament to exercise any very effective control over the local affairs of these separate commonwealths. A Scottish or Irish Standing Committee does not suffice. Mr. Winston Churchill insists that, "The British parliamentary system is not sufficiently representative of the local and provincial life of the nation. Home Rule all round will, by opening other roads to political distinction, notably enrich it. New and vivifying pulses will begin to beat, and the new nerve centers of a higher organism will spring into being."

With relief from the mass of local and special legislation which is now thrust upon it, the Imperial Parliament will have time and opportunity to bring more careful and critical consideration to the great measures of general concern, and will be able to subject the imperial administration to more effective responsibility. Instead of being little more than the registering machinery for the Cabinet, into which position it has sunk under the intolerable burden of work which modern economic and social conditions have imposed upon it, the House of Commons will, it is predicted, experience something like a revival of its old predominance and independence. Imperial federation, hitherto a fatuous dream, will become a recognized and practical possibility. The self-governing colonies will, in the natural course of events, be given representation in the Imperial Parliament, and the bonds of empire will be immeasurably strengthened. To this glowing forecast Mr. Balfour has made reply that it is a strange and unprecedented procedure to initiate a scheme of federation by a process of disintegration. Federalism, he insists, is always a step toward centralization. It has never in the history of the world resulted from breaking up a government of the unitary type. He challenges the Ministry to point to a single instance in the history of federal government where the federation has not represented a movement toward

closer union. This argument, incontrovertible in its way, will not carry much conviction to the minds of Englishmen. The English people have never been seriously influenced by theoretical arguments in making changes in their constitution. Nor have they often paid. particular attention to what other nations have done, or what methods they have employed, when circumstances appear to dictate alterations in the bases of their own government. The English constitution has been the model and pattern for continental peoples largely because it embodies the practical political genius of the Anglo-Saxon mind, and the principles of normal development from its own historic origins. It is quite conceivable that, under the special and peculiar circumstances obtaining in the British Empire, federation can only follow a preliminary disintegration of the United Kingdom.

The present bill enjoys a much better prospect of becoming law than ever attended either of Gladstone's measures. The votes on the first and second readings (carried by majorities of 94 amd 101) indicate that the Government has behind it in the House of Commons the united support of the Liberal coalition. On the second reading only one Liberal member spoke against the bill and another alone voted against it. The Parliament Act of last year makes it possible to overcome within two years the resistance which it is certain that the House of Lords will make to the passage of the bill, and to place the measure upon the statute books in spite of their continued rejection. To do this it is merely necessary for the Government to secure its passage through the House of Commons in three succeeding sessions, and for two years to elapse between its original introduction and its final passage for the third time through the House of Commons. This, it is evident, can all be accomplished within the life of the present Parliament. There is no necessity that the question of Home Rule be submitted to the country at a general election. What the verdict would be, were the electorate given an opportunity to pronounce upon the question, it is most difficult to say. If the feeling in England is not enthusiastically in favor of the measure, there is at least the absence of such general and definite opposition as the earlier bills encountered. Scotland and Wales can be counted on to give it a warm support. Scotland is predominantly Liberal, and the resolution of April 25, of the Scottish Liberal members in Parliament, urging upon the Prime Minister "the necessity of introducing a bill providing for the self-government of Scotland next session," may be taken as evidence that the sentiment of the Scotch people is in accord