Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Přední strana obálky
Cambridge University Press, 29. 11. 1985 - Počet stran: 390
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.
 

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Obsah

Chapter 1 Editors introduction and overview
1
Models with incomplete information
9
Chapter 3 Reputations in games and markets
27
Chapter 4 An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining ...
63
Chapter 5 Infinitehorizon models of bargaining with onesided incomplete information
73
Chapter 6 Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information
99
Chapter 7 Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information
115
Chapter 8 Sequential bargaining mechanisms
149
Chapter 10 Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions
215
A survey of recent results
233
Chapter 12 Toward a focalpoint theory of bargaining
259
Chapter 13 Bargaining and coalitions
269
Chapter 14 Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining
305
Chapter 15 A comment on the Coase theorem
321
Who should bear the burden of proof?
341
Chapter 17 The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives
363

Chapter 9 The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model
181

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