Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
Cambridge University Press, 29. 11. 1985 - Počet stran: 390
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.
Co říkají ostatní - Napsat recenzi
Na obvyklých místech jsme nenalezli žádné recenze.
Chapter 1 Editors introduction and overview
Models with incomplete information
Chapter 3 Reputations in games and markets
Chapter 4 An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining ...
Chapter 5 Infinitehorizon models of bargaining with onesided incomplete information
Chapter 6 Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information
Chapter 7 Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information
Chapter 8 Sequential bargaining mechanisms
Chapter 10 Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions
A survey of recent results
Chapter 12 Toward a focalpoint theory of bargaining
Chapter 13 Bargaining and coalitions
Chapter 14 Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining
Chapter 15 A comment on the Coase theorem
Who should bear the burden of proof?
Chapter 17 The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives
Chapter 9 The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
accept actions agents agreement allow alternative analysis approach arbitration assignment assume assumption axioms bargaining bargaining solution behavior buyer Chapter choice claim common condition consider continuous contract cooperative costs decision deﬁned demand depend described disagreement discussion distribution Economics effect efficient equal equilibrium evidence example exists expected fact feasible Figure ﬁrst function gains given important incentive incomplete information increasing individual initial interest knows less mechanism Myerson Nash negotiations Note object observed obtained occurs offer opponent optimal outcome particular parties payoff perfect period play player population positive possible preferences present private information prize probability problem procedure proof proposition rational reputation requires risk averse role rules satisﬁes satisfy seller sequential situation solution speciﬁc strategy studied suppose symmetric theorem Theory tion trade unique University utility valuation