A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, havedevoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economicapplications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfectequilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game canbe remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for anycooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior- for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and withincomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoreticalunification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature ofgame-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, suchas unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and severalbuyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The lastchapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solutionconcepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood ResearchProfessor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University ofBonn, Federal Republic of Germany.