husband, who sued for specific performance, and she resisted on the ground that the realty was held in trust. Concerning her estate, the court held that it was not affected by the words "in trust and that, owing to the utter absence of terms of the trust or of its administration, she took a fee.

In Orr v. Yates, 209 Ill. 222, 70 N. E. 731, William H. Yates devised a farm to a trustee for the sole use and benefit of his daughter during her life, and at her death without issue for the benefit of the widow, if living, and at the widow's death the land was to be divided between the testator's brothers and sisters and their heirs. No provision was made for accounting or manner of conducting the farm. The court said: "It may be conceded that the declaration of a trust must be reasonably certain in its material terms, and that this requisite of certainty includes, first, the subject-matter or property embraced within the trust; second, the beneficiaries or persons in whose behalf the trust is created; third, the nature and quantity of interests which they are to have; and, fourth, the manner in which the trust is to be performed. If the language is so vague, general, or equivocal that any one of these necessary elements of the trust is left in real uncertainty, the trust must fail; or if any one of the three things necessary to constitute a trust is wanting, that is, first, sufficient words to raise it; second, a definite subject; and, third, a certain or ascertained object,-the trust will fail. It is not practicable to adopt any specific definition of a trust which can be applied to all cases. Many attempted definitions are to be found in the textbooks and decided cases, but it is unimportant here to accept one rather than another. All must agree that it is not necessary to the validity of a trust that every element necessary to constitute it must be so clearly expressed in detail in the instrument creating it that nothing can be left to inference or implication. No particular form

or words are necessary, but, wherever an intention to create a trust can be fairly collected from the language of the instrument and the terms employed, such intention will be supported by the courts. The fact that the times and manner of accounting for the rents and profits of the trust estate are not fixed cannot render the trust void. The law will compel the trustee to render accounts in proper manner and at proper times. The absence of specific directions as to when and in what manner the trustee shall render his accounts simply leaves that matter to be determined by construction. If the trustee and cestui que trust disagree on that subject, the courts may be resorted to for a settlement of the differences.'

In Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 32 L. ed. 138, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1164, the will reads thus: "I give and bequeath to my said wife, Ellen M. Colton, all of the estate, real and personal, of which I shall die seised or possessed or entitled to. I recommend to her the care and protection of my mother and sister, and request her to make such gift and provision for them as, in her judgment, will be best."

Notwithstanding this indefinite language, which hardly could be more uncertain, the court held that the widow took the property affected by a trust for the benefit of the decedent's mother and sister.

"But giving a trust in discretion as to the method of carrying out a definite purpose does not render the trust void, and if the trustee refuses altogether to exercise the discretion with which he is invested, the trust must not, on that account, be defeated." 26 R. C. L. 1184.

Weatherhead v. Sewell, 9 Humph. 272, was a case where the language of the will was: "My estate to be equally divided among my children, to each of my daughters a small tract of land, my lands and slaves to be equally divided amongst my children."

It was held in construing the will that the clause "to each of my

(- Or.

daughters a small tract of land" was void for uncertainty, but the court did not set aside the whole will for the minor uncertainty. Other authorities are cited in the brief of the petitioner, but in the main they are precedents which deal only with a certain clause of the will, but do not allow it to overturn the entire instrument.

The trust created by this will, however, is reasonably certain for all practical purposes for the management of a business during so long a period as twenty years. It declares that it is made "to avoid as far as possible any loss or depreciation of the estate." Here we have the principal object for which the trust was formed. As a means and manner by which this result is to be attained, with a view of final distribution of the property among his descendants, the testator has given to his trustees full and complete power and authority over his estate, with the right to full and complete possession and control of the same, and they are directed to keep surplus funds invested in good securities. As part of it, they are to pay monthly allowances to his wife and children, and to their descendants by right of representation. The tustees are directed to accumulate enough to pay off the debts and obligations, and when that is accomplished they shall disburse the excess of such reserve to his wife and children, and finally upon the termination of the trust, at the end of twenty years, they shall divide the property among his descendants. It would be impossible for a testator to foresee and provide for all of the details to be observed in the management of a trust estate of such magnitude. It is sufficient if it be done so that anyone

Trust-validity -indefiniteness.

of reasonable discretion and judgment could take the property and manage it in a reasonably faithful manner. The action of the testator in thus reposing so large a trust in two employees who had been faithful to him through many years may

199 Pac. 633.)

or may not have been provident, as the sequel shall prove, but it was not unlawful, and the will in that respect is a valid document, declaratory of his disposition of his estate.

Pleading

illegal contract.

Summing up, we hold that there was no error in striking out of the original petition the conclusions of law stated as grounds for the contention that the will was void. The petitioner has had the benefit of a full argument and examination of the questions so raised. The circuit court before which this proceeding was instituted had ample jurisdiction of the suit, whether it be one merely to set aside the will as void for undue influence, or whether the issue was the construction of the will with a view of having it declared necessity of void. In the ab- allegation of sence of an allegation of an illegal contract void as against public policy, the will cannot be attacked upon that ground. Further, no agreement of stockholders proceeding from any private mercenary consideration of benefit to themselves in which other members of the corporation could not share has been shown. The testator, in disposing of his own property, had a right to direct his trustees to vote and act as he himself could have done while living. Even conceding that there was a contract, there is nothing to show that it was hostile to the interest of any stockholder, or disqualifying in its effect upon the trustees who have succeeded to the interests of the testator. Finally, the trust established by the will is sufficiently certain in all of its features for practical operation.

To close this opinion, we employ the final words of the court's deliverance in Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security L. Ins. Co. 111 Va. 1, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1186, 68 S. E. 412, 21 Ann. Cas. 1287: "As was said in Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55 N. E. 809, the question before us is not whether or not it would be possible to carry out the contract in

a way which would have made the contract bad if specified in it, but whether it was impossible to carry out the contract in a way which might lawfully have been specified in advance. If in the future the trustees are guilty of a breach of trust, or do any unlawful act to the

prejudice of the interests of the corporation or its stockholders [in this instance, the cestuis que trustent], a court of equity is always open to give such relief as the nature of the case may require."

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

This annotation is supplemental to the annotation in 9 A.L.R. 1242, where the earlier cases are collected.

It is held in the reported case (RE PITTOCK, ante, 218) that there is no illegality in provisions of the will of a majority stockholder of a newspaper corporation, bequeathing his stock to trustees for a period of years, during which period it should be held intact and none of it sold, and further providing: "I direct that my trustees shall vote said stock in favor of themselves as directors of said corporation, and it is my desire and I request" that a certain person, who was one of said trustees, "shall be elected manager" of said newspaper "and shall be retained as such," and that another named person "shall be retained as managing editor of the" said newspaper "until he shall become incapacitated or until he may voluntarily resign." The court considers the words "desire" and "request" as merely precatory or advisory, but not mandatory, and seems to consider that, if mandatory, the provision was not thereby illegal.

Since the earlier annotation, the reported case (RE PITTOCK) is, with a single exception, the only case on the subject which has been found.

In Canda v. Canda (1921) N. J.

13 A.L.R. 1029, 112 Atl. 727, while the court, in affirming for a different reason the decree advised by an advisory master, did not pass upon the question under annotation, it may be noted that the advisory master, in his opinion in (1920) - N. J., 113 Atl. 503, observed, where a testator owned one half of the stock of the corporation in question: "After all, the trusteeship of the stock in the hands of the executors and trustees amounts to a voting trust, which would be illegal under Warren v. Pim (1904) 66 N. J. Eq. 353, 59 Atl. 773, for although the purpose of the trust may be proper (General Invest. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1917) 87 N. J. Eq. 234, at p. 242, 100 Atl. 347; Frost v. Carse (1919) 91 N. J. Eq. 124, 108 Atl. 642, opinion of the court of errors and appeals), the duration of the trust is so unlimited as to render it invalid. I say that this trust, so far as it concerns the stock of the Chrome Steel Works, is no more than a voting trust; for while it is true that the executors and trustees have power to dispose of the stock, still it is not contemplated by the parties that they should dispose of it, and the beneficiaries are, in the meantime, receiving the income.

B. B. B.

V.

(— Cal.

194 Pac. 5.)

undue influence deceit as to relation of husband and wife.

2. Undue influence sufficient to set aside a will is not effected by deceiving testatrix into the belief that the relation of husband and wife existed between herself and the legatee through a marriage which the legatee was incompetent to contract because he had another wife living. [See 28 R. C. L. 139.]